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at Kerr's instigation Lloyd George attempted to force Cecil— Rhodes's vision—telling a British diplomat in December 1918 the Britain's representative at the League negotiations—to make sub- British should not describe Americans as their cousins or brothers, stantial changes to the League Covenant. as they were "neither". Due to its ethnic diversity the US could not Kerr had been attempting for quite some time to seek Lloyd be part of any Anglo-Saxon world, Wilson argued. Only a "com- George's support for a less ambitious League arrangement. In munity of ideals and interests" could form the basis of an Anglo- December 1917, for example, Kerr had suggested that Lloyd American alliance.'*! George support the creation of a "League of Allied Nations" based As chairman of the commission at Versailles charged with draw- on the Supreme War Council at Versailles as the centrepiece of any —_ ing up the League Covenant, and aided by a sympathetic Cecil, post-war arrangement. Kerr advocated transforming the Supreme — Wilson was in a good position to prevail. According to Knock, War Council into a "permanent international agreement" that would _ there was a "fair measure of congruence" between the original commit the Allies to enforcing the peace settlement, though they Wilson-House draft covenant of August 1918, and the covenant would only need to meet "from time to time".'* produced by the League Commission in February 1919. In fact it A particular concern of Kerr was Wilson's insistence on territorial could be argued the League Covenant had been "thoroughly recon- guarantees, automatic sanctions against violators of the internation- structed along Wilsonian lines". al peace, and that League members would have a compulsory oblig- It is therefore ironic that while the London branch of the Round ation to uphold the Covenant. Kerr had repeatedly warned that "no —_— Table failed to make the League more compatible with British international machinery or treaties" imperialism, it was a group of Americans could guarantee international peace; sympathetic to Anglo-American unity only a less ambitious permanent confer- who succeeded in crippling Wilson's ence, based in Versailles, and comprised The failure of the US to join creation. f sentatives of the "Greater States" Lead by Senator H Cabot could deliver!™ Kerr's influence event the Leag ue has been Lodee, a majority of US Senators ut ally bore fruit when in December 1918 celebrated by many New forward a plethora of reservations. Lloyd George declared in a War Cabinet World Order researchers asa Their primary aim was to ensure that meeting his view that the League "must . . American freedom of action at home or not be constituted as a body with execu- triumph of popular will over abroad would not be restricted by join- tive power" but as a body "whose elite hegemony. This might be ing the League of Nations. Wilson, authority rested with governments".'” In though, refused to compromise and on short: national sovereignty was not to be an erroneous assumption. 8 March 1920, the US Senate rejected compromised. membership of the League Covenant. Unlike Lloyd George, the British The failure of the US to join the representative in the League negotiations, League has been celebrated by many Lord Robert Cecil, was more sympathetic to Wilson's vision and had = New World Order researchers as a triumph of popular will over prepared a draft covenant—the 'Cecil-Miller' draft—to that end. It _ elite hegemony. This might be an erroneous assumption. Lodge was because that draft went well beyond what the Imperial War had long been close to former President Theodore Roosevelt and a Cabinet had authorised, that on 31 January 1919 Lloyd George had —_ number of his acolytes, including naval strategist Captain Alfred T. confronted Cecil with a list of changes. That list was in fact a Mahan and the author Brookes Adams. Roosevelt openly admired memorandum prepared by Philip Kerr. The Kerr memorandum Cecil Rhodes's "great and striking conquest for civilisation" in rejected the collective security program embodied in Wilson's southern Africa, which he hoped to duplicate in Latin America and original proposal for territorial guarantees and upheld by the Cecil- the Pacific.'® Miller draft. Instead it argued that if the League attempted to Adams endorsed an "Anglo-Saxon coalition" to check German "impose obligations” on members to "go to war in certain stated and Russian ambitions; while Mahan advocated an "Anglo- conditions", it would result in the "destruction of the League itself". American re-union", especially a naval alliance, as the two powers The only real option was a system of "continuous consultation" "united upon the ocean" would be "all-powerful there".'“ among the nations of the world, with solutions to each crisis to be In the 1890s Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan and Adams had often met decided on a case-by-case basis; the "paper obligations" the League _ in the Metropolitan Club in Washington DC to discuss the virtues of members entered into should be "reduced to the absolute America becoming an imperialist power.'* They were also close to minimum..."!** the business community, especially J.P. Morgan.'® As President Cecil, who was due to meet with Wilson in a matter of hours, (1901-1909), Theodore Roosevelt had maintained his imperialist chose to totally disregard Lloyd George's new instructions. impulse. Declaring himself an "expansionist" he had sought to Believing Lloyd George's "thoroughly bad" plan to be part of a establish the US as a world power. Inevitably, until his untimely French plot to delay resolution of the League question—rather than _—_ death in 1917, Roosevelt was one of the most vehement critics of a Round Table plot to weaken the League of Nations—Cecil also Wilson and the League of Nations. Roosevelt's preference, kept details of the confrontation secret from the American curiously enough, was for a "League of Allies". delegation.'® It is perhaps no coincidence that in the same month as the final Senate vote that Philip Kerr wrote a lengthy piece in The Round THE AMERICAN CONNECTION Table finding favour with the Lodge-Roosevelt approach while This was perhaps a wise move on Cecil's part as Wilson was rejecting Wilson. The League Covenant had "aimed too high and already suspicious of Milner and his acolytes. In a private discus- too far", Kerr observed; it was also now apparent that support for sion with future Rockefeller aide Raymond B. Fosdick while en the League from "one of its most important members"—the US— route to the Paris Peace Conference, for example, Wilson had dis- was "very unlikely". In fact: "The emphasis of public sentiment in missed Milner as "a Prussian".'® Wilson also opposed the cultural —_ ail nations is now on the rights of national sovereignty, rather than formula for Anglo-American unity—the centrepiece of Cecil on international right..." the League has been celebrated by many New World Order researchers as a THE AMERICAN CONNECTION This was perhaps a wise move on Cecil's part as Wilson was already suspicious of Milner and his acolytes. In a private discus- sion with future Rockefeller aide Raymond B. Fosdick while en route to the Paris Peace Conference, for example, Wilson had dis- missed Milner as "a Prussian".'® Wilson also opposed the cultural formula for Anglo-American unity—the centrepiece of Cecil 34 = NEXUS JUNE — JULY 2005 The failure of the US to join www.nexusmagazine.com