Nexus - 1101 - New Times Magazine-pages

Page 57 of 78

Page 57 of 78
Nexus - 1101 - New Times Magazine-pages

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We should strive to eliminate some common misunderstand- ings. The new events and possibilities are surprising, frightening, and large in scale. When confronted with something greater than ever before, the human mind frequently jumps to the conclusion that it is facing something infinite, something limitless. That conclusion is mistaken. When we are overly impressed by progress in any given development, we lose our sense of propor- tion: we then enter the realm of what is called the unthinkable.* (* "Greek fire", consisting of the irreconcilable elements of fire and water—actually, a mixture mainly of unslaked lime, sulphur, and naphtha—which stopped the first Muhammadan onslaught on the Constantinople, was such an unthinkable weapon. It was secret, and it was outlawed by the Pope. The secret was kept much better than that of the atomic bomb. Similarly, the "fire" of an extraterrestrial type first proposed by Einstein was initially met with the same unthinkable scepticism until Otto Hahn proved its feasibility in a laboratory, which sent shock waves through the scientific community in 1939. The splitting of the atom was considered "monkey shine" to many leading phys of that day. Of course, since the theory was correct, and with a little guidance, inspiration and hard work, we did master the technique of fission with non-terrestrial metals and atomic transmutation of uranium and plutonium isotopes.) The boomerang of secrecy is also at work in our relations with our allies. Annoyance about secrecy was a strong motive for de Gaulle to terminate full French participation in NATO. Perhaps the main reason for eliminating secrecy is make- believe? It does not work in a free society. It affects our own law-abiding scientists, even deters them from participating in the development of super weapons. But secrecy puts no obstacle in the way of foreign governments determined to learn or rediscover the secret. To put it simply, a secret known to a million people, in fact, is no longer a secret. When arguing for openness in extraterrestrial technology, I do not mean to actually throw open our laboratories to all foreign observers. The type of secrecy practiced by America's private companies does work. But the principles of discoveries should be open. There are no secret formulas, though the chemists sought them. (The one fact the alchemists proved was that science and secrecy are hardly compatible—except, perhaps, under the iron heel of a dictator.) What can be kept secret, at least for some time, is what we call "know-how". It would not be realistic to propose that secrecy should be abol- ished forthwith. We can, however, greatly reduce it. Today we are smothered by millions of "classified" documents. A deter- mined move toward openness is firmly recommended. Its pur- pose is threefold: to stimulate research on military applications of UFO technology within our scientific community; to promote cooperation with our allies in the same field; and to inform the American public through various means the true state of UFO reality, so far as such knowledge can be made available to our intelligence. A more detailed proposal is difficult to make, especially since we want it to be realistic and acceptable. Yet such a proposal is made here, both to give an example of what could happen and to begin a concrete discussion on the important issue. We could continue "classification" of UFO documents and, therefore, secre- cy in its present form. But we could impose the condition that all classified UFO documents should be published within two years of issue. That would fully preserve tactical secrecy but exclude strategic and technical secrecy. A small number of documents might need to be kept secret for longer periods, but in those cases a few highly responsible persons would have to certify, year by year, that continued secrecy is required. The rule should be: when in doubt, classify. SECRECY Shortly after the end of World War II, Niels Bohr, the founder of atomic theory, made a statement I shall never forget. "In the coming Cold War, it would be reasonable to expect each side to use the weapons it can handle best. The best weapon of a dicta- torship is secrecy." Secrecy, unfortunately, is habit-forming. We can scarcely imagine how we could get along without it. We should remember, however, that secrecy was actually of greater advantage to us when we had secrets to keep. Today, when Russia almost certainly knows all of our secrets, especially techni- cal ones, it is apt to have many secrets of which we are ignorant. Of course, if we reveal our greatest secret, the Russians will not reciprocate. Are we not, therefore, speaking of free energy appli- cations to a revolutionary mode of transportation? The answer is in our hands: secrecy boomerangs; instead of hurting our adver- sary with it, we hurt ourselves. fed) (= MILITARY RESEARCH We are not engaged in an arms race, but rather in a race of perfecting an inte- grated program of UFO technology. The former emphasises the quantity of arms, the latter their quality and particu- larly the element of novelty. Comparison of quality would be diffi- cult even in the absence of secrecy. Since secrecy prevails and since it is effective on the side of Russia, compari- son becomes virtually imp le. It is widely believed in this country that American and Russian UFO defense are roughly equivalent. In greater detail, it is stated that Russia is ahead in quantity and we are ahead in quality. It is somewhat disquieting that the Russian advantage lies in the area "| feel alienated." 56 = NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com DECEMBER 2003 — JANUARY 2004