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were more direct in identifying the globalist core of the Trilateral Commission's ideology. C. Fred Bergsten, for example, one of a number of officials who defected from the Nixon Administration to join the Commission, left no doubt, declaring that "Liberal interna- tionalism is our creed". This "broad consensus" was that the US had no choice but to embrace trilateralism. With its economic power waning, David claimed, America was a superpower in decline and therefore unable to fulfil its global security commitments; however, growing global economic interdependence meant that it could not retreat into isola- tionism. David made this clear to the World Affairs Council in 1980: Today, whether we like it or not, the world including the United States has become truly interdependent... Gone are the days when America could be the military policeman of the world, the moral preacher of the world, the sole arsenal of democracy, or a patch of prosperity on the globe.” the UN, he explained, the "trilateral community...could well be a major factor in building a new world order." The "broad consensus" was also reflected in the Commission's Task Force reports, the so-called "Triangle Papers", most of which seemed to recommend as a response to growing interdependence what we now call "global governance". For example, Triangle Paper No. 14, "Towards a Renovated International System", described the "world of separate nations" as "a mental universe which no longer exists", given that social, economic and political interdependence had "grown to an unprecedented scale". Its strate- gy for the "management of interdependence" involved "piecemeal functionalism", in which global solutions to international problems would be reached by approaching each one separately; and the decentralised management of the international system, with local administrations enforcing rules made at the global level”* Triangle Paper No. 11, "The Reform of International Institutions", recom- mended—to achieve the "overriding goal" of making "the world safe for interdependence"—the "checking of the intrusion of nation- al governments into the international exchange of both economic and non-economic goods". However, as David had observed in 1975, the urgent task of man- al governments into the international exchange of both economic aging an "interdependent world" could not be entrusted to the UN, and non-economic goods".”” as nationalist and anti-capitalist forces had captured it. Commenting on the profusion of UN committees established to Get Carter! examine the activities of multinational corporations, David detected By the mid-1970s, the Trilateral Commission's approach to world an alarming "distrust of free enter- order had become, according to the prise and the free market economy". Director of the CFR's "1980s Project", Noting the failure of this radicalised "the consensus position on foreign UN to create "a unified world polity", . policy" in the USA (Ullman). Nixon's he concluded harshly that "the United By the mid-1 970s, the successor, Gerald Ford, made great Nations has largely reduced itself to a . Fata efforts to conform to this consensus, forum for the expression and promo- Trilateral Commission s appointing two Trilateral tion of narrow national or bloc inter- approach to world order Commissioners to his cabinet: ests rather than the broad human " Secretary of Commerce Elliot interests its charter proclaims". had become the consensus Richardson and Secretary of Those (broad numa interests te position on foreign policy" Transportation waiiam Coleman claimed, could only be served when . onsultations etween the "free market forces are able to tran- In the USA. Commission and the administration 6123 scend national boundaries" : The solution to these contrasting were also encouraged: in late 1975, the Commission's Executive trends was obvious. In a speech to Committee met with Ford; and in May the Japan—America Society in 1979, 1976, Commission members also met David asserted that it was imperative that the US collaborate with with Kissinger, Richardson and Coleman.* David Rockefeller, the other capitalist powers to manage global affairs: however, found Ford's efforts wanting and he actively cultivated a Economically as well as politically, the US must exercise replacement regime from within the ranks of the Democrats. constructive leadership, recognizing that, today, we can The alternative President soon emerged in the form of Jimmy neither dominate nor escape the global marketplace. Only in Carter, Governor of Georgia. Carter seemed to be the ideal trilater- concert with other nations can we hope to achieve a freer, alist candidate; he had been an enthusiastic member of the Trilateral safer and more prosperous world that should be the goal of all Commission ever since David had personally invited him to join in nations and all people.* 1973, attending all of its meetings. During the election campaign, Carter had publicly thanked the Commission for giving him a It should come as no surprise that, contrary to David's claims of a__"splendid learning opportunity" and endorsed its basic precepts, "broad range of political views" but in tune with the "broad consen- pointedly rejecting Nixon's balance-of-power strategy. A running sus", his logic was echoed by other leading figures in the organisa- _ theme in Carter's campaign speeches was that "the time had come" tion. Commission member and former Japanese Foreign Minister __ to replace "balance-of-power politics with world order politics" and Kiichi Miyazawa, for example, explained at the Commission's 1980 _ to "seek a partnership between North America, Western Europe and meeting in London that since America had "lost its once dominant —_Japan..."” position", the only solution was for the trilateral countries to "coop- Assisted by Ford's politically self-destructive decisions to drop erate amongst themselves to share the responsibility for maintaining Nelson Rockefeller as his running mate and pardon Nixon over a stable political order and for undertaking sound economic man- Watergate (annoying voters and the Establishment), Carter sailed agement..." While the Commission's North American Chairman into the White House in January 1977, ready to start a new era. Gerard C. Smith told the CFR in 1974 that since it was now "obvi- Although confident of Carter's commitment to trilateralism, David ous" the UN "was not going to fulfil its promise as a universal Rockefeller did not let his new protégé in the White House organisation around which a universal structure could be formed", completely off the leash and continued to provide direction. While other approaches were necessary. Although "less ambitious” than only two meetings between Carter and Rockefeller at the White By the mid-1970s, the Trilateral Commission's approach to world order had become "the consensus position on foreign policy" in the USA. It should come as no surprise that, contrary to David's claims of a "broad range of political views" but in tune with the "broad consen- sus", his logic was echoed by other leading figures in the organisa- tion. Commission member and former Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, for example, explained at the Commission's 1980 meeting in London that since America had "lost its once dominant position", the only solution was for the trilateral countries to "coop- erate amongst themselves to share the responsibility for maintaining a stable political order and for undertaking sound economic man- agement..." While the Commission's North American Chairman Gerard C. Smith told the CFR in 1974 that since it was now "obvi- ous" the UN "was not going to fulfil its promise as a universal organisation around which a universal structure could be formed", other approaches were necessary. Although "less ambitious” than 36 = NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com DECEMBER 2003 — JANUARY 2004