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the feasibility of the idea. Brzezinski also pushed his trilateral con- cept in a number of articles in the CFR's journal, Foreign Affairs, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's new periodi- cal, Foreign Policy. These articles, which focused on building the first phase of his trilateral plan, were also noteworthy in that Brzezinski explicitly justified trilateralism as the correct response to the Nixon Administration's numerous excesses. Brzezinski's criticisms of Nixon's foreign policy were threefold. Firstly, by "turning its back" on the Third World, Nixon was failing to deal with the "contagious threat of global anarchy", increasing the risk of "social and political fragmentation". Secondly, Nixon's recognition of China and détente with the USSR was having "a negative effect on American—European and American—Japanese relations", as well as creating splits among the capitalist countries which the Communist states might exploit. And thirdly, the "balance of power" approach favoured by Nixon was an "unrealistic and fundamentally untenable" strategy that offered "little leadership and historical direction".* In fact, claimed Brzezinski, with international stability being challenged by "global anarchy", the Nixon Administration: ...fails to seize the opportunity to postulate a larger community of the developed nations, spanning Japan, Western Europe and the United States, as the historically relevant response to that challenge.’ the feasibility of the idea. Brzezinski also pushed his trilateral con- commodities, especially oil. Furthermore, according to Perry, he cept in a number of articles in the CFR's journal, Foreign Affairs, was also worried that the Soviets and Chinese "might use détente as and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's new periodi- a front for expansion and the ultimate weakening of the capitalist cal, Foreign Policy. These articles, which focused on building the nations".’ These arguments were pure Brzezinski. first phase of his trilateral plan, were also noteworthy in that David's other motivation in creating the Trilateral Commission Brzezinski explicitly justified trilateralism as the correct response to _—_— was the declining effectiveness of the Council on Foreign the Nixon Administration's numerous excesses. Relations, much of it caused by an incendiary public debate over Brzezinski's criticisms of Nixon's foreign policy were threefold. the Vietnam War. Although the Establishment's position had shift- Firstly, by "turning its back" on the Third World, Nixon was failing ed to backing an immediate withdrawal—now that the war had to deal with the "contagious threat of global anarchy", increasing been deemed too financially costly to continue""—the Council itself the risk of "social and political fragmentation". Secondly, Nixon's remained divided between supporters and opponents of the war. recognition of China and détente with the USSR was having "a These divisions came to a head in 1970 when David, as the new negative effect on American—European and American—Japanese CFR Chairman, attempted to appoint William Bundy, one of the relations", as well as creating splits among the capitalist countries architects of the conflict, as editor of Foreign Affairs. The appoint- which the Communist states might exploit. And thirdly, the ment provoked outrage among those new CFR members, mostly "balance of power" approach favoured by Nixon was an "unrealistic academics, who opposed the war on moral grounds, some of them and fundamentally untenable" strategy that offered "little leadership _ publicly branding Bundy a "war criminal". This upset Rockefeller, and historical direction".* In fact, claimed Brzezinski, with who considered Bundy to be a "man of quality and culture", but it international stability being challenged by "global anarchy", the was also clear to him that the war had "poisoned the atmosphere” at Nixon Administration: the Council."" ...fails to seize the opportunity to postulate a larger community The impact on Rockefeller of the battle over Bundy's of the developed nations, spanning Japan, Western Europe and appointment was profound. According to journalist John B. Judis, the United States, as the David "lost confidence that high-level historically relevant response to that challenge. policy discussions could be carried on at the Council on Foreign Relations", and to remedy this he "began to cast about for a new organization". Nixon's Nemesis Pat) . . There can be little doubt that David s other motivation Inspired by Brzezinski's call for Brzezinski's attack on Nixon was in creating the Trilateral "more informal three-way contacts" attractive to David Rockefeller; for aa between the "social elites" of the three the plutocrat was already fast losing Commission was the regions, David decided to establish a new policy-planning clique that would bring together the power-elites of the advanced capitalist countries.’ patience with the Nixon | __ declining effectiveness of the Administration, especially on eco- . . . nomic matters. Nixon's "New Council on Foreign Relations... Economic Policy" (NEP) of 1971, which had imposed wage and price controls and increased tariffs, had incensed David along with most of David launched his crusade in the Establishment. As David admits in 1972. In March of that year, in Memoirs, he regarded the NEP as a "futile effort" to fight inflation, speeches at Chase International Financial Forums, David proposed one that conflicted with his own inclination "to allow markets to creating an "International Commission for Peace and Prosperity", have a freer rein".° Consequently, he had sought an audience with comprising "leading private citizens" from Europe, North America Nixon to discuss the "international monetary and trade picture", and Japan who would devise solutions to the world's problems. presumably to set the wayward President on the correct course, but The "problems of the future" which David identified reveal much Nixon's Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, blocked him. Eventually, about his broader global agenda: "reduction in world tensions; David secured a meeting with Nixon's aide, John Ehrlichman, but international trade and investment; environmental problems; control his démarche was a failure; his views were dismissed by one of the of crime and drugs; population control; and assistance to develop- officials at the meeting as "not especially innovative".’” ing nations". David also took Brzezinski with him to that year's This calculated rebuff made it all the more easy for Brzezinskito Bilderberg meeting in Knokke, Belgium, where he proposed sell his trilateral concept directly to David. Both spent their including Japanese representatives at Bilderberg rather than form- summer holidays at Seal Harbor in the US State of Maine, and ing a new organisation. His proposal received enthusiastic support Brzezinski used the opportunity to discuss his scheme with the from the conveniently present Brzezinski, but it was "shot down in plutocrat.* flames", David claimed, by British MP Denis Healy." The impact of these discussions was evident in David's criticisms Undaunted, David moved to a more congenial environment, sum- of Nixon's foreign policy, expressed in a private meeting in 1972 moning various notables from the US, Western Europe and Japan to with presidential aspirant Jimmy Carter. As revealed in Roland the Rockefeller family estate at Pocantico Hills in August 1972. Perry's book, The Programming of the President (1990), David Those at the meeting agreed with David that "something should be hinted at having some reservations about the Nixon Administration, done"; and thus the Trilateral Commission was born, with noting that despite Nixon "proving to be a good President" and he Brzezinski nominated as its director. The Commission was pub- and Nelson having "a lot of time for Henry [Kissinger]", unfortu- licly launched in July 1973—along with its magazine, Trialogue— nately "neither of them is a businessman, a banker..." David was as an organisation that would "formulate and propose policies" to concerned that their lack of economic sense was leaving the US achieve the Commission's goal of "closer cooperation among the vulnerable to Third World attempts to control the supply of key three advanced regions". This event conveniently coincided with a Founding the Trilateral Commission in creating the Trilateral Commission was the — declining effectiveness of the Council on Foreign Relations... 34 = NEXUS David's other motivation www.nexusmagazine.com DECEMBER 2003 — JANUARY 2004