Nexus - 0904 - New Times Magazine-pages

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In subsequent negotiating sessions held in Washington, DC, key issues such as the extent of the territories to be ceded by Israel, Palestinians were represented by a delegation from the occupied __ the nature of the Palestinian entity to be established, the future of territories. Participants in this delegation were subject to Israeli the Israeli settlements and settlers, water rights, the resolution of approval, and residents of East Jerusalem were barred on the the refugee problem and the status of Jerusalem were set aside to be grounds that the city is part of Israel. Although the PLO was for- discussed in final status talks. mally excluded from these talks, its leaders regularly consulted The PLO accepted this deeply flawed agreement with Israel with and advised the Palestinian delegation. because it was weak and had little diplomatic support in the Arab Although Israeli and Palestinian delegations met many times, lit- world. Both Islamist radicals and local leaders in the West Bank tle progress was achieved. Prime Minister Shamir announced after and the Gaza Strip challenged Arafat's leadership. Yet only Arafat he left office that his strategy was to drag out the Washington nego- had the prestige and national legitimacy to conclude a negotiated tiations for 10 years, by which time the annexation of the West agreement with Israel. Bank would be an accomplished fact. The Oslo accords set up a negotiating process without specifying A new Israeli Labor Party government, led by Yitzhak Rabin, an outcome. The process was supposed to have been completed by assumed office in June 1992 and promised rapid conclusion of an May 1999. There were many delays due to Israel's reluctance to Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Instead, the Washington relinquish control over the occupied territories, unwillingness to negotiations became stalemated after December 1992, when Israel make the kinds of concessions necessary to reach a final status expelled over 400 Palestinian residents of the occupied territories agreement, and periodic outbursts of violence by Palestinian oppo- who were accused (but not tried or convicted) of being radical nents of the Oslo process, especially Hamas and Jihad. During the Islamist activists. Human rights Likud's return to power in 1996-99, Prime conditions in the West Bank and the Minister Benjamin Netanyahu avoided Gaza Strip deteriorated dramatically after 1 engaging seriously in the Oslo process, Rabin assumed office. This undermined Ironically, before the which he distrusted and fundamentally the legitimacy of the Palestinian intifada, Israeli authorities opposed. Scena he Wathen soi | had enabled the fst lion sve delegates. ; ; development of Islamist power in 1999. Barak at first concentrat- talks and deterioration of the exonomie | OFGANisations (such as Hamas fo) Wien he fuled to convince the and human rights conditions in the West and Jihad) aS a Way to Syrians to sign an agreement that would restore to them less than all the area of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel in Bank and the Gaza Strip accelerated the growth of a radical Islamist challenge to divide Palestinians in the the PLO. Violent attacks against Israeli occupied territories. 1967, Barak turned his attention to the targets by Hamas and Islamic Jihad fur- Palestinian track. ther exacerbated tensions. During the protracted interim period of Ironically, before the intifada, Israeli the Oslo process, Israel's Labor and authorities had enabled the development of Islamist organisations Likud governments built new settlements in the occupied as a way to divide Palestinians in the occupied territories. But as territories, expanded existing settlements and constructed a network the popularity of Islamists grew and challenged the moderation of of bypass roads to enable Israeli settlers to travel from their the PLO, they came to regret their policy of encouraging political settlements to Israel proper without passing through Palestinian- Islam as an alternative to the PLO's secular nationalism. inhabited areas. These projects were understood by most Eventually, Yitzhak Rabin came to believe that Hamas, Jihad and _ Palestinians as marking out territory that Israel sought to annex in the broader Islamist movements, of which they were a part, posed _the final settlement. The Oslo accords contained no mechanism to more of a threat to Israel than did the PLO. block these unilateral actions or Israel's violations of Palestinian human and civil rights in areas under its control. THE OSLO ACCORDS Final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were The weakness of the PLO after the Gulf War, the stalemate in the to have begun in mid-1996, but only got underway in earnest in Washington talks and fear of radical Islam brought the Rabin gov- mid-2000. By then, a series of painfully negotiated Israeli interim ernment to reverse the longstanding Israeli refusal to negotiate with withdrawals left the Palestinian Authority with direct or partial the PLO. Consequently, Israel initiated secret negotiations in Oslo, control of some 40 per cent of the West Bank and 65 per cent of the Norway, directly with PLO representatives who had been excluded = Gaza Strip. The Palestinian areas were surrounded by Israeli- from the Madrid and Washington talks. These negotiations pro- controlled territory with entry and exit controlled by Israel. duced the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, which was signed The Palestinians’ expectations were not accommodated by the in Washington in September 1993. Oslo accords. The Oslo process required the Palestinians to make The Declaration of Principles was based on mutual recognition their principal compromises at the beginning, whereas Israel's prin- of Israel and the PLO. It established that Israel would withdraw cipal compromises beyond recognition of the PLO were to be made from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and make additional withdrawals in the final status talks. Ironically, before the intifada, Israeli authorities had enabled the — THE OSLO ACCORDS The weakness of the PLO after the Gulf War, the stalemate in the Washington talks and fear of radical Islam brought the Rabin gov- ernment to reverse the longstanding Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO. Consequently, Israel initiated secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, directly with PLO representatives who had been excluded from the Madrid and Washington talks. These negotiations pro- duced the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, which was signed in Washington in September 1993. The Declaration of Principles was based on mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO. It established that Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and make additional withdrawals from further unspecified areas of the West Bank during a five-year interim period. During this period, the PLO formed the Palestinian Authority (PA), with "self-governing" (i.e., municipal) powers in the areas from which Israeli forces were redeployed. In January 1996, elec- tions were held for a Palestinian Legislative Council and for the presidency of the PA, which was won handily by Yasir Arafat. The CAMP DAVID II In July 2000, US President Clinton invited Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat to Camp David to conclude negotiations on the long-overdue final status agreement. 26 ¢ NEXUS JUNE - JULY 2002 occupied territories. Continued on page 82 www.nexusmagazine.com