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October 1973, on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. The sur- prise attack caught Israel off guard, and the Arabs achieved some early military victories. This prompted American political inter- vention, along with sharply increased military aid to Israel. After the war, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pursued a diplomatic strategy of limited bilateral agreements to secure partial Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, while avoiding negotiations on more difficult issues including the fate of the West Bank and Gaza. By late 1975, these efforts had exhausted their potential and there was no prospect of achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. In late 1977, Sadat decided to initiate a separate overture to Israel. His visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, led to the Camp David accords and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and ‘ance drew unprecedented interna- October 1973, on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. The sur- active in the occupied territories: prise attack caught Israel off guard, and the Arabs achieved some the PPP. This broad-based res early military victories. This prompted American political inter- tional attention to the situation facing Palestinians in the West Bank vention, along with sharply increased military aid to Israel. and Gaza, and challenged the occupation as never before. After the war, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pursued a Under the leadership of Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin, diplomatic strategy of limited bilateral agreements to secure partial Israel tried to smash the intifada with "force, power and blows". Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Army commanders instructed troops to break the bones of demon- Heights, while avoiding negotiations on more difficult issues strators. From 1987 to 1991, Israeli forces killed over 1,000 including the fate of the West Bank and Gaza. By late 1975, these Palestinians, including over 200 under the age of sixteen. efforts had exhausted their potential and there was no prospect of By 1990, most of the UNLU leaders had been arrested and the achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. intifada had lost its cohesive force, although it continued for several In late 1977, Sadat decided to initiate a separate overture to more years. Political divisions and violence within the Palestinian Israel. His visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, led to the community escalated, especially the growing rivalry between the Camp David accords and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace various PLO factions and Islamist organisations such as Hamas treaty in 1979. (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Islamic Jihad. Palestinian mil- itants killed over 250 Palestinians suspected of collaborating with CAMP DAVID I the occupation authorities and about 100 Israelis during this period. In September 1978, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat Although the intifada did not bring an end to the occupation, it and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David, a —_ made it clear that the status quo was untenable. The intifada shifted presidential retreat in Maryland. They worked out two agreements: the centre of gravity of Palestinian political initiative from the PLO a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel, and a general leadership in Tunis to the occupied territories. framework for resolution of the Middle Palestinian activists in the occupied East crisis, i.e., the Palestinian question. territories demanded that the PLO adopt The first agreement formed the basis In December 1987, the a clear political program to guide the of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty Palestinian population in the struggle for independence. In response, signed in 1979. The second agreement the Palestine National Council (a West Bank and Gaza started a proposed to grant autonomy to the a ; . Palestinian government-in-exile), con- Palestinians in the West Bank and the mass uprising against the Israeli vened in Algeria in November 1988, Gaza Strip and to install a local admin- o 8 028 recognised the state of Israel, pro- istration for a five-year interim period, occupation. This uprising, or claimed an independent Palestinian after which the final status of the terri- intifada, was not started or state in the West Bank and the Gaza tories would be negotiated. orchestrated by the PLO Strip, and renounced terrorism. Only the Egyptian-Israeli part of the Y The Israeli government did not Camp David accords was implemented. leadership in Tunis. respond to these gestures, claiming that The Palestinians and other Arab states nothing had changed and that the PLO rejected the autonomy concept because was a terrorist organisation with which it did not guarantee full Israeli withdrawal from areas captured in it would never negotiate. 1967 or the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The United States did acknowledge that the PLO's policies had In any case, Israel sabotaged negotiations by continuing to con- changed, but it did little to encourage Israel to abandon its fiscate Palestinian lands and build new settlements in violation of _intransigent stand. the commitments Menachem Begin made to Jimmy Carter at Camp David. THE MADRID CONFERENCE In December 1987, the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza started a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation. This uprising, or intifada, was not started or orchestrated by the PLO leadership in Tunis. THE MADRID CONFERENCE American and Israeli failure to respond meaningfully to PLO moderation resulted in the PLO's opposition to the US-led attack on Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The PLO did not endorse Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, but it saw Saddam Hussein's challenge to the US and the Gulf oil-exporting states as a way to alter the regional status quo and focus attention on the question of Palestine. After the Gulf War, the PLO was diplomatically isolated. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia cut off the financial support they had been providing, bringing the PLO to the brink of crisis. The United States sought to stabilise its position in the Middle East by promot- ing a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite their turn against the PLO, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were anxious to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and remove the potential for regional insta- bility that it created. The administration of President Bush felt obliged to its Arab allies, and pressed a reluctant Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to open negotiations with the Palestinians and the Arab states at a multilateral conference convened in Madrid, Spain, in October 1991. Shamir's conditions, which the US accepted, were that the PLO be excluded from the talks and that the Palestinian desires for independence and statehood not be directly addressed. THE INTIFADA In December 1987, the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza started a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation. This uprising, or intifada (which means "shaking off" in Arabic), was not started or orchestrated by the PLO leadership in Tunis. Rather, it was a popular mobilisation that drew on the organisations and institutions that had developed under occupation. The intifada involved hundreds of thousands of people, many with no previous resistance experience, including children, teenagers and women. For the first few years it involved many forms of civil disobedience, including massive demonstrations, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of Israeli products, political graffiti and the establishment of underground schools (since regular schools were closed by the military as reprisals for the uprising). It also included the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails and the erection of barricades to impede the movement of Israeli military forces. Intifada activism was organised through popular committees under the umbrella of the United National Leadership of the Uprising. The UNLU was a coalition of the four PLO parties JUNE - JULY 2002 NEXUS ¢ 25 www.nexusmagazine.com