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that their infection was derived from British beef or beef products. export of cows and contaminated feed worldwide. One of them, British beef could well be the source of vCJD in the French cases, Dr Laura Manuelides, physician and Professor of Neuroscience at too, since approximately 10 per cent of France's beef for human Yale University, proposed that the epidemic could swiftly be consumption is imported from the UK. A smaller but significant brought to a close with the immediate culling of infected herds. proportion of British beef is consumed in most European coun- Britain's attitude to the Manuelides solution was, in her words, tries. Given the vast number exposed to Britain's BSE-suspect "penny-wise and pound-foolish", and her idea was dismissed on meat and the distinct possibility that significant numbers are the grounds that compensation for the owners of the herds was silently incubating the disease, the potential for human-to-human financially out of the question. transmission looms large, notably with respect to blood and organ From then onwards, the global spread of mad cow disease went donation. into full swing. Britons were placed at further risk of vCJD when Two neuroscientists from Yale University in the United States, an estimated 700,000 BSE-infected cattle entered their food chain, Laura Manuelides and the late Eli Manuelides, illustrated way chiefly because the animals’ slaughter age, usually three years, back in 1975 that injections of human blood taken from CJD vic- was below the age at which they would show signs of BSE tims had the capacity to transmit CJD across the species barrier to infection."” laboratory animals. The implications of the Manuelides's experi- Next, the duplicity of the British Ministry of Agriculture, ment evaded authorities for the better part of the 1990s, though Fisheries and Food, known as MAFF, exposed mainland Canadian authorities spent C$15 million in 1995 to withdraw Europeans to an unknown quantity of BSE-contaminated veal pooled plasma, already in the process of being transfused to thou- among the two million calves transported to European saleyards sands across the country, on the grounds that it contained a dona- between 1990 and 1995.'"* MAFF also sabotaged a 1990 Brussels tion from a man who had subsequent- ruling designed to prevent the spread ly died of CJD." Similarly, in 1996, of BSE outside Britain, when it New Zealand authorities bit the bullet issued civil servants with secret under weight of public pressure and French official Gilbert Castille orders to skip the computer vetting of quarantined blood products which had | had suggested back in 1990 that calves designed to exclude BSE- been contaminated by a donation infected animals. from a CJD-infected donor." Britain ought to be asked not to Britain was not entirely alone in The years-long incubation time pre- publish its research results, the processes which effectively ceding CJD symptoms increases the globalised mad cow disease. In difficulty to link a blood transfusion saying “it would be better to September 1996, the French recipient's cip with a donor source, minimise BSE by practising newspaper Libération revealed that a and it falls within the realms of possi- pet oy memorandum from French officia bility that secondary CJD in a transfu- disinformation . Gilbert Castille had suggested back sion recipient may appear months or even years in advance of the primary not to publish its research results, CJD in a blood donor, as happened in saying "it would be better to the case of CJD in a liver transplant recipient which was eventual- minimise BSE by practising disinformation". In fact, rather than ly traced to a CJD-like illness in one of the blood donors."* ganging up on Britain, Brussels, via Guy Legras, head of the In the UK, whole blood or blood products from donors who European Commission's agricultural directorate, warned of the have later died of vCJD has already been administered to a large financial repercussions from a beef panic and hushed news of the but incalculable number of recipients. As a consequence, Britain BSE situation.” now imports all plasma for transfusion purposes, and all blood In a moral sense, the globalisation of mad cow disease then from UK donors is filtered to remove the white blood cells which worsened. As Britain's market for the animal protein-enriched are the most likely carriers of vCJD infectivity. A number of cattle feed dried up in Europe between 1988 and 1992, debt- other countries, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, burdened Third World countries became the replacement in 1990 that Britain ought to be asked New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States now exclude marketplace for attractively low-priced BSE-suspect meat and the blood donations from anyone who has resided in Britain for six same animal protein-enriched pellets believed responsible for months or more during 1980 to 1996. Similar policies are pend- Britain's BSE problems. Some European countries—Belgium, ing with respect to organ donation, and in Britain regarding the The Netherlands, France—which had imported the British meal, reuse of surgical instruments, especially those used in neurologic routinely shipped some of it to the Middle East and North Africa and ophthalmic procedures. in concentrated form, where, before being fed to cows, the meat- and-bone meal is mixed with other locally produced animal feed. FROM BRITAIN TO EUROPE AND BEYOND It wasn't until 1996 that Britain finally banned the export of meat- Britain's first move to halt the spread of BSE came in 1988 and-bone meal. when a ban was placed on the 50-year-old practice of feeding pro- Britain's defence today is that her agricultural and public health tein-enriched cattle, sheep and other animal remains to cattle. A authorities had debated the propriety of allowing the country's year later, UK authorities reassured both national and internation- feed industry to continue exporting meat-and-bone meal after ban- al audiences that mad cow disease was under control, and at the ning the practice at home. In the end, the decision was left to vet- same time gathered scientists from the world's major laboratories erinary authorities in the importing countries, the argument being engaged in human and animal spongiform disease research and a _ that those officials had been adequately informed of the risks! number of respected neurovirologists in order to seek advice. The globalisation story did not stop with European and Third Unwittingly, the solutions put forward by the experts shaped World countries. Between 1988 and 1996, Britain, in its thirst for the events which have effectively spread mad cow disease across greater and greater market profits through hybrid strains, also the globe. All were sworn to secrecy, notably regarding the exported 3.2 million live cattle to 36 countries, representing every had suggested back in 1990 that Britain ought to be asked notto publish its research results, saying "it would be better to minimise BSE by practising disinformation". FROM BRITAIN TO EUROPE AND BEYOND Britain's first move to halt the spread of BSE came in 1988 when a ban was placed on the 50-year-old practice of feeding pro- tein-enriched cattle, sheep and other animal remains to cattle. A year later, UK authorities reassured both national and internation- al audiences that mad cow disease was under control, and at the same time gathered scientists from the world's major laboratories engaged in human and animal spongiform disease research and a number of respected neurovirologists in order to seek advice. Unwittingly, the solutions put forward by the experts shaped the events which have effectively spread mad cow disease across the globe. All were sworn to secrecy, notably regarding the 14 = NEXUS APRIL — MAY 2001 French official Gilbert Castille www.nexusmagazine.com