Nexus - 0706 - New Times Magazine-pages

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an ambitious and serious colleague, Nick Fishwick, who was Serbs. General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and responsible for developing and targeting operations in the Balkans Commander-in-Chief of the UN Protection Force, realised that (P4/Ops), had pulled out a file and handed it to Tomlinson to read. during 1994 all his communications were being electronically "It was approximately two pages long, and had a yellow card intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo "bugged" by the attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document Americans, because Washington—which wanted to use NATO air rather than a draft proposal." It was entitled "The need to assassi- strikes to bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table—thought the nate President Milosevic of Serbia", and was distributed to senior British were too supportive of the Bosnian Serbs. The Americans MIO6 officers including: the head of Balkan operations (P4), also monitored the communications of SAS scouts deep in Maurice Kenwrick-Piercy; the Controller of Eastern European Bosnian territory and discovered that they were deliberately fail- operations (C/CEE), Richard Fletcher, and later, Andrew Fulton; ing to identify Serb artillery positions. This lack of trust caused the security officer responsible for Eastern European operations friction and led to a backstage confrontation between the secret (SBO1/T), John Ridd; the private secretary to the Chief services. It reminded some observers that the special relationship (H/SECT), Alan Petty ("Alan Judd"); and the Service's SAS liai- existed only on the basis that the US saw Britain as a chance to son officer (MODA/SO), Major Glynne Evans. According to extend its reach into Europe.” Tomlinson, Fishwick justified assassinat- ing Milosevic on the grounds that there Continued next issue... was evidence that "the Butcher of Belgrade" was supplying weapons to Endnotes Karadzic, who was wanted for war crimes 1. Punch, no. 71, 2 January 1999. including genocide. US and French intel- 2. Sunday Business, 20 December 1998, 24 ligence agencies were alleged to be January 1999. Family friend and former . : : Conservative defence procurement minister, already contemplating assassinating Karadzic. General Sir Michael Rose, Jonathan Allen, who was an MI6 agent, providing insights into the Saudi royal family and their ' There were three possible scenarios put a former head of the SAS defence spending plans orward by . Firstly, to train a Serbian . . . ry Business, ibid. paramilitary opposition group to carry out and Commander-in-Chief 4. Sunday Business, 11 October 1998. 5. Observer, 21 November 1993; Panorama, the assassination. This, Fishwick argued, i had the advantage of deniability but the of the UN Protection Force, | saci, 22 December 1993. . - . A 6. Sunday Times, 22 September 1996, 21 disadvantage that control of the operation realised that December 1997, 2 August 1998. Id be low and the chances of success H i . ibid. unpt ‘able. S vdly, to use the small during 1994 all his i ‘Shverver 22 December 1996. unpredictable. Secondly, to use the small INCREMENT cell of SAS/SBS per- sonnel, which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI6/MI5, to send in a team that would assassinate the President with a bomb or by a sniper ambush. Fishwick said that this would be the most reliable option, but would be undeniable if the oper- ation went wrong. Thirdly, to kill Milosevic in a road crash which would be staged during one of his visits to the international confer- ences on former Yugoslavia in Geneva. Fishwick suggested that a stun device could be used to dazzle newspapers, magazines and jour- the driver of Milosevic's car as it nals, and has appeared on numer- passed through one of Geneva's motorway tunnels." ous radio and television programs. Stephen is also a co- A year later, Tomlinson acted as a Counsellor to the founder of the respected British journal Lobster. Commander of the British forces in Bosnia and worked at manipulating sources in the Karadzic entourage. One participant — Editor's Note: to these operations suggests that these sources "produced a very © Stephen Dorril's article is edited from chapter 36 (pages detailed intelligence picture which included not just the military 783-800) of his book, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her plans and capabilities of the different factions, but also early Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service (published by The Free warning of political intentions". There appears to have been little | Press, New York, 2000). NEXUS downloaded the extract evidence of this intelligence coup in the Foreign Office decisions from the Cryptome website, http://cryptome.org/mi6- that followed, and its value is contradicted by another source sd36.htm. which, while admitting that several significant agents were = Cryptome advises that code-word, cipher and communica- recruited, concludes that they did not "produce substantial tions systems disguised by the author on legal advice are intelligence of quality"."' shown as printed (e.g., "B***"). It invites information for pub- The intelligence deficit was worsened by the US unwillingness _ lication on the true form of these code-words as well as infor- to provide its Atlantic partner with all its intelligence on the mation about the systems; e-mail jya@pipeline.com. 9. Guardian, 25 March 1998, 7 October 1998; Sunday Times, 30 August 1998; Independent, 2 September 1998. 10. ibid. 11. Urban, Mark, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence, pp. 215- 16; Sunday Times, 22 September 1996, 21 December 1997, 2 August 1998. 12. Guardian, 20 December 1994; Times, 10 November 1998. communications were being electronically intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo "bugged" by the Americans... About the Author: Stephen Dorril is a writer/ researcher in the field of security and intelligence services. He has written articles for major UK Serbs. General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and Commander-in-Chief of the UN Protection Force, realised that during 1994 all his communications were being electronically intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo "bugged" by the Americans, because Washington—which wanted to use NATO air strikes to bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table—thought the British were too supportive of the Bosnian Serbs. The Americans also monitored the communications of SAS scouts deep in Bosnian territory and discovered that they were deliberately fail- ing to identify Serb artillery positions. This lack of trust caused friction and led to a backstage confrontation between the secret services. It reminded some observers that the special relationship existed only on the basis that the US saw Britain as a chance to extend its reach into Europe.” General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS realised that Sarajevo "bugged" by the Americans... Editor's Note: < Stephen Dorril's article is edited from chapter 36 (pages 783-800) of his book, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service (published by The Free Press, New York, 2000). NEXUS downloaded the extract from the Cryptome website, http://cryptome.org/mi6- sd36.htm. = Cryptome advises that code-word, cipher and communica- tions systems disguised by the author on legal advice are shown as printed (e.g., "B***"). It invites information for pub- lication on the true form of these code-words as well as infor- mation about the systems; e-mail jya@pipeline.com. 24 - NEXUS Continued next issue... and Commander-in-Chief OCTOBER — NOVEMBER 2000