Nexus - 0706 - New Times Magazine-pages

Page 21 of 85

Page 21 of 85
Nexus - 0706 - New Times Magazine-pages

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providing technical assistance to operations—staffed by MoD [Ministry of Defence] locksmiths, video and audio technicians and scienti: n sections devoted to chemicals and electronics, forensic services, electronic support measures, electronic surveillance and explosives systems. While the gadgets continue to provide the modern spy with a James Bond-like image—for instance, identification transmitters that can be hidden in an agent's shoes to enable the monitoring by satellite of their precise location—the reality is that most of the work is mundane and office-bound. Trainees still receive small-arms training at Fort Monkton, but much of the training is taken up with learning to use the computer system and writing reports in the house style. providing technical assistance to operations—staffed by MoD headquarters which is designated A****, They also learn about [Ministry of Defence] locksmiths, video and audio technicians code-words with which sensitive messages are headlined, indicat- and scientists in sections devoted to chemicals and electronics, ing to whom they may be shown. UK EYES ALPHA warns that forensic services, electronic support measures, electronic the contents are not to be shown to any foreigners and are intend- surveillance and explosives systems. While the gadgets continue ed only for the home intelligence and security services, armed to provide the modern spy with a James Bond-like image—for forces and Whitehall recipients. UK EYES B includes the above instance, identification transmitters that can be hidden in an categories, the Northern Ireland Office, LIST X firms engaged in agent's shoes to enable the monitoring by satellite of their precise the manufacture of sensitive equipment, and certain US, location—the reality is that most of the work is mundane and Australian, New Zealand and Canadian intelligence personnel office-bound. Trainees still receive small-arms training at Fort liaising with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London. Monkton, but much of the training is taken up with learning to use Additional code-words mark specific exclusions and inclusions. the computer system and writing reports in the house style. E****** material cannot be shown to the Americans, while L***** deprives local intelligence SECURITY PROCEDURES officials and agencies of its content. As part of the Service's obsession Material for named individual offi- with security, a great deal of time is cers, sometimes at specified times, is spent on being indoctrinated in cipher . _ headed D**** or D****, while par- and communications work. Photocopiers have the ability ticularly sensitive material about a Trainee officers are instructed on how to encrypt messages for trans- fellow officer or operation is known to mark and check the origin as DREHER, mission and how to use the manual of non-authorised copies The protection of files and their B*** cipher, which is regarded as age A secure handling is a top priority, with particularly secure. [See Editor's of classified material. officers taught to keep a classified record of their use and location. Photocopiers have the ability to mark Note.] Used at stations abroad to transmit details of operations, poten- tial sources and defectors, B*** is and check the origin of non-autho- sent either via the diplomatic bag or rised copies of classified material. by special SIS [Secret Intelligence Following the development by MoD Service] courier. Diplomatic bags are not totally secure, as the scientists of a means of reading a computer disc without a com- success of the Service's own N-Section testified. It employed up _ puter, all discs are protected in transit. All correspondence by let- to 30 people in Palmer Street, rifling the opened bags which were ter is secured by specially developed red security tape which then expertly resealed. The work petered out in the mid-1960s as leaves detectable signs if tampered with, though near-undetectable other means of communication took over. photographic and laser techniques exist for reading the inside of Officers learn about "off-line" systems for the encryption of mail and opening envelopes. Each officer has his own safe with messages, such as N*****, used prior to transmission by cipher —_ dual-combination locking, while the filing cabinets with false machines, and "on-line" systems for the protection of telegrams tumbler locks as an added precaution are protected from penetra- during transmission, code-named H*** and T********_ They are tion by X-rays. Since no lock is secure from picking, they col- indoctrinated into the use of certain cryptonyms for forwarding lapse internally if anything more than the slightest force is used. telegrams to particular organisations and offices, such as SIS In the event of drilling, a glass plate inside the door shatters, _ releasing a spring-loaded bolt to pre- vent opening. Frequent random checks take place on the number set- tings to see if the safe has been opened illegally. These bureaucratic procedures and attention to minute security rules are not merely technical; failure to carry out security precautions can lead to points deduction in the security breach points system. If an officer racks up 160 points over three years (a breach of TOP SECRET counts as 80 points), this may lead to security clearance being withdrawn and instant dismissal. New officers are initially based at the exotic Vauxhall Bridge head- quarters, about which many Service personnel are sensitive, almost embarrassed. Access to "Ceausescu Towers", as some officers have 3 : . : : F : ; dubbed it, is gained by use of a Menwith Hill "communications relay centre", Harrogate, UK (Photo by Paula Solloway) swipe card and PIN number. The Photocopiers have the ability to mark and check the origin of non-authorised copies of classified material. 20 - NEXUS OCTOBER —- NOVEMBER 2000