Nexus - 0704 - New Times Magazine-pages

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intelligence agencies (see Anderson ef al., 1995; Anderson and of a state's security forces can also limit the sovereignty of indi- den Boer, 1994; Benyon et al., 1994, Fijnout, 1993; Marshall, viduals, peoples and countries, and hence the level of freedom, 1991). Many of these are not new. Before the end of the Cold democracy and human rights they can enjoy. War, countries like France and the United States had extensive Drug repression thus also attains an important political dimen- programs for the assistance of foreign military and police forces sion. From the perspective of the ruling elites, it is of concern to (Fijnout, 1993; Marshall, 1991). Nowadays, however, such pro- prevent power-contending ethnic, political or clan associations grams are legitimised by the supposed need to strengthen other from using the drug proceeds for building their own power struc- states’ capabilities to fight the drug industry. Since the mid- tures. In such a situation, they may have little choice but to gain 1980s, through the process of European integration, the European control over the business themselves, or at least find a way of Union also has been asserting itself as a major player in the field. incorporating such new, dynamic sectors into the existing power The internationalising powers to enforce the prohibition regime structure. In many cases, drug repression would only strengthen are largely legitimised and rationalised by interdependencies that the opposition as it would leave a good share of the population derive from the global division of labour in the illegal drug indus- without means of support. try and the concomitant problems this presents to individual states Domestic and foreign drug policies thus touch upon the distrib- to control the drug industry. But forthcoming interdependency ution of power, wealth and security, both within a country and does not necessarily mean greater integration (collaboration and between societies. These interests are informing, if not imposing, harmonisation). Interdependency can possibly also mean "depen- a specific logic on many a state's policies and practices, and they dency", "exploitation", "free riding" and "conflict" (Buhl, lead to systemic interactions between the upperworld and the 1995:123). underworld, that play a decisive role in deepening their perverse International law-enforcement instruments are unevenly impact on the relations among states and between states and their distributed and include the exchange of information between law societies. The phenomenon of "protected trafficking" here enters enforcers, international pressures on countries to shape their the picture (Scott and Marshall, 1991:vii), where the selective legislative body (for example, with the closure of coffee shops suppression and protection of the drug industry becomes a more and the lifting of bank secrecy), the provision of military aid and likely outcome of drug policies. advisers (an important element of the American efforts in Latin America), LINKS BETWEEN ORGANISED or the extension of 'intelligence'- CRIME & THE POWER ELITE gathering by liaison officers stationed Criminal groups (and criminally in foreign countries. The control Drug interests are strong obtained resources) are often a deviant over these instruments ultimately element in the national and international touches on the control that countries enough to create powers dynamics of politics. The illegitimate use have over their economies and that can play a major role in of violence and ‘authorised’ force to serve political system, and on the control we . . the purpose of one class, clan, ethnic people have over their privacy and political life and economic group, region or country against the other sovereignty. activities. is no new phenomenon. However, it is strongly related to the dynamics and con- sequences of the growth of drug markets and the state policies implemented to control them. In many countries, it is exactly the association of criminal groups POWER & SOCIAL CONTROL The strategies and tactics applied by governments in their drug policies not only touch upon very different conceptions of 'the drug problem’, but they also affect the distribu- with power elites that produces and prolongs such perverse conse- tion of income within and between societies and the level of pro- quences (Hess, 1986:128). tection that citizens can attain. In the recent history of both industrialised countries (e.g., Interventions in drug markets influence the direction, composi- France, the United States and Italy) and developing countries tion and volume of drug streams around the world and of the (e.g., Turkey, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico), many examples flows of money that are generated in this international business. can be found of cooperation between secret services, political par- They thereby touch upon the distribution of wealth that can be ties and other elite power groups with drug-trafficking criminal accumulated in the drug business and the relative power of play- groups in the repression of domestic opposition, the destabilisa- ers within and between societies. tion of foreign governments and the support against (geo)political Drug interests are strong enough to create powers that can play _ foes (see, for example, Block and Hess, 1986; Kriiger, 1980; a major role in political life and economic activities. Where many McCoy, 1972; Scott and Marshall, 1991). Equally, many opposi- people depend on the drug industry for their income, and where _ tion groups have discovered how important drug income can be to the overall economy is dependent on the influx of foreign curren- withstand (foreign) control over their territories (e.g., the PKK in cies from the drug trade, such drug interests—and concrete efforts Turkey, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Afghan Mujahedin). of drug entrepreneurs to protect their trade—severely limit the Such symbiotic relations between drug entrepreneurs and local, margins for governments to deal with the drug industry. national or foreign power elites are often amended by forms of Moreover, enhanced drug repression also strengthens coercive corruption of a more or less institutional nature. The price- and other powers within state apparatuses relative to each other increase effect of prohibition works effectively as a tax which does and the society at large. not flow straight into the coffers of the state treasury, however, but Drug policies therefore also have an impact on the distribution is collected by the producers, traffickers and other service of power and security in and between countries. On the one hand, providers in the trade. In many countries, though, a prohibition tax they can limit the destabilising effect of the drug industry on soci- is equally levied by ‘corrupt’ enforcement officers and other ety. On the other hand, enhancing the resources and legal powers protectors of the trade within the politico-administrative system. of a state's security forces can also limit the sovereignty of indi- viduals, peoples and countries, and hence the level of freedom, democracy and human rights they can enjoy. Drug repression thus also attains an important political dimen- sion. From the perspective of the ruling elites, it is of concern to prevent power-contending ethnic, political or clan associations from using the drug proceeds for building their own power struc- tures. In such a situation, they may have little choice but to gain control over the business themselves, or at least find a way of incorporating such new, dynamic sectors into the existing power structure. In many cases, drug repression would only strengthen the opposition as it would leave a good share of the population without means of support. Domestic and foreign drug policies thus touch upon the distrib- ution of power, wealth and security, both within a country and between societies. These interests are informing, if not imposing, a specific logic on many a state's policies and practices, and they lead to systemic interactions between the upperworld and the underworld, that play a decisive role in deepening their perverse impact on the relations among states and between states and their societies. The phenomenon of "protected trafficking" here enters the picture (Scott and Marshall, 1991:vii), where the selective suppression and protection of the drug industry becomes a more likely outcome of drug policies. Drug interests are strong enough to create powers that can play a major role in political life and economic —-a! activities. 26 - NEXUS JUNE — JULY 2000