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countries in Akida, 1997). This tells us that probably the greater part of drug turnovers never leaves the main consumption coun- tries, as they are likely to offer the most lucrative investment opportunities. To assess the economic power and political influence of drug entrepreneurs, and therewith the strategies that states adopt to intervene in drug markets, it is paramount to know how these criminal markets are organised, how drug entrepreneurs confront or collide with the legislation and political economy of their coun- tries of origin, and the scope of activities of the players involved. The organisation of the drug trajectory involves the linking of the different stages of the drug industry. In spite of much police rhetoric, common wisdom is not very conclusive about the extent of horizontal or vertical integration of the drug trajectory. Are we dealing with organised crime or with disorganised crime?* Such organisational characteristics to a large extent determine the distribution and accumulation of wealth derived from the industry. As the lion's share of, for instance, cocaine profits is made in American cities, it makes an enormous difference to Colombian traffickers if they can control the upstream gold mine of the retail part of the drug trajectory or whether they have to content themselves with wholesale profits they can make through transactions in Colombia, Mexico or the United States. Wholesale profits may still be considerable but rather insignifi- cant compared to the turnover made at the retail end.° It is clear that law enforcement can play a role in disrupting the drug trajectory, and in so doing can bring about important shifts in the distribution of drug profits. This works not only by taking people out and so creating market space for new entrants (which can be individual entrepreneurs, institutions or whole regions), but also by increasing the cost of maintaining links in the drug trajectory.’ Drug repression drives up the prices and so gives an enormous impulse to the profitability of the product and the services ren- dered to the drug industry. Drug entrepreneurs, be they poppy- growing farmers in Pakistan, transport companies in Turkey or laundering exchange offices in The Netherlands, have to protect themselves against prosecution by investigation services and against competitors. The costs to decentralise production, bribe state officials, hire protection, create well-camouflaged transport facilities or convince bankers to take a certain risk, increase with the intensity of repression. Repression of the drug trade thus not only contributes to the growth of the drug economy but also incites a redistribution of the income from the trade. Taking this competition in the drug business and the effects of state intervention on the division of labour in the drug industry as a starting point, I now focus on the mechanisms through which the interactions between states' drug enforcement practices and the drug industry become part of more general efforts in the national and international domains to redistribute power, wealth and security. Endnotes According to the November Coalition, the _ selective nature of US drug policy, that 1. My greatest thanks are due to Yasemin _ prison population has 500,000 non-vio- distributes the risk of participation in the Soysal, Marnix Croes, Gianfranco Poggi lent drug offenders. As investigator trade unequally throughout the cocaine and Anne Wegner for reading and criticis- | Duncan Campbell reports, the US com- commodity chain as it overlooks or ing an earlier draft of this article. Ina prises 5% of the global population, yet is underfunds investigation into the formal more morphological sense | may be responsible for 25% of the world’s prison- sectors (provision of key components like indebted to Peter Andreas, whom | find ers. See Guardian Weekly, UK, 17-23 chemicals, airplanes, arms and communi- sharing similar approaches and concerns _—_ February 2000.] cation equipment) and core countries’ towards the underlying dynamics and 3. Naylor (1987) describes extensively roles in the drug trade (money laundering, consequences of the War on Drugs. how governments and financial institu- distribution networks). 2. Between 1980 and 1996, the number _ tions compete with one another to attract 7. For example, the US Drug of inmates in the United States more than _ international flows of hot and/or dirty iministrati i tripled from 501,886 to 1,700,661 money to shore up bank liquidity or for- ifort Ate nen GTS (Ht in 1993 the Colombian drug cartels spent 23% of their profits on laundering the hard-earned drug money, up from 6% in the late 1980s (Foust and DeGeorge, (Belenko, 1998:53). One in 50 American _ eign exchange reserves. men are in prison; one in 20 are on parole 4. The literature embarking on such or probation. In 1993, one in three black assessments is extensive, especially for Americans who did not finish high school —_ producing countries. See, for example, were in prison (ESB, 26 June 1996). The Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug 1993). number given by Mauer (1997) for drug Trade (six volumes), undertaken by the wy . offenders in American State and Federal UN Research Institute for Social Editor's Notes: . . prisons is substantially lower than that Development (UNRISD) and the United ~* Due to space constraints, we will provided by Akida. However, he also Nations University. publish the author's bibliography in our notes a considerable shift in law enforce- 5. For a discussion of ‘models’ of the next issue, June-July 2000. Meantime, ment priorities towards drug law enforce- _ criminal firm, see, for example, Peter interested readers can check the ment. According to his data, from 1985 Reuter (1983) and Joseph Albini in CEDRO website or follow the link from to 1994 drug offenders accounted for Thomas Mieczkowski (ed.) (1992). the NEXUS website. more than a third (36%) of the increase in Thomas Naylor (1995) points at the = Hans T. van der Veen's article is the number of offenders in state prisons important distinction to be made between reprinted with permission from CEDRO and more than two-thirds (71%) of the forms of organisation to participate inthe the Centre for Drug Research (Centrum increase in federal prisoners. One of the market and organisation to control the varc] largest increases in arrests has been for market. ban ae eee atl we ee violation of laws prohibiting drug sales, 6. Anexample of one of the few studies Of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht distribution and possession—up 154% that analyses cocaine as a transnational 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The during this time period, from 580,900 to — commodity chain can be found in Wilson Netherlands, telephone +31 (20) 525 1,476,100 (Belenko, 1998:55). [Editor's and Zambrano (1994). They assess that 4061 /4280 /7432, fax +31 (20) 525 note: In February 2000, the USA's two- most profits (87%) remain in drug-con- 4317, e-mail CEDRO@frw.uva.nl, web- millionth prison inmate was announced. suming countries. They also note the site www.frw.uva.nl/cedro/. 32 NEXUS APRIL — MAY 2000 Continued in the next issue of NEXUS...