Nexus - 0703 - New Times Magazine-pages

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THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLEX DRUG Repressing the supply of illicit drugs is a counterproductive strategy that encourages illegal entrepreneurs to reorganise their activities and increase their profits. Part 1 of 2 he "War on Drugs" is lost, but the struggle continues. In spite of ever-increasing resources dedicated to the reduction of supply and demand of illicit drugs, con- sumption levels are still rising all over the world. The drug industry is probably the largest and most profitable sector of international crime. The perceived threats of drug consumption and organised crime provide the main justifications for important impulses given in recent years to the development of legislation and the organi- sation of law enforcement. Drug repression thereby increasingly acquires an international character. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral forms of pressure, intervention and collaboration are proliferating between states in the name of suffocating the ever-swelling drug econo- my. The prohibition regime is thereby, in a rapid pace, extended with the coercive powers of states to intervene in national and international drug markets, but therewith also in the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and countries. Just as individuals might get addicted to the use of drugs, so the societies in which they live are becoming addicted to the money that is generated in the drug business (OGD, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, 1995:xiii). This seems to be equally true for the agencies that are assigned the task to control it. The drug war cannot be won, at least not by the state, as long as demand for illicit drugs exists. Instead of keeping drug trafficking and organised crime in check, supply repres- sion is likely to increase the profits of illegal entrepreneurs and to give incentives to the professionalisation of their organisations. Repression-induced scarcity inflates the price of the merchandise; consequently, more people will be attracted to take the risk and enter the business. When governments enhance their efforts to repress the illicit drug industry, remaining drug entrepreneurs will reorganise their activities so as to limit the risk of detection and prosecution. Supply reduction therefore seems a dead-end strategy, as it is likely to produce little but counterproductive effects on the supply of illicit drugs and on the organisational strength of the trafficker networks it attacks. There are, nevertheless, many other regulative func- tions for the police and other state agencies that might merit their intervention in control- ling the problems related to drug trafficking/distribution and drug use. Such problems are basically related to issues of public health and public order. Ultimately, policies aimed at supply reduction must, at least in accordance with official policy goals, be judged by how they affect consumer demand—through the decreased availability of drugs, through an increase in price or through the deterrent effect of the criminal law (UNDCP, 1997:237). This picture is rather bleak. Over the last decade, worldwide production of illicit drugs has expanded dramatically. Opium and marijuana production has roughly doubled, and coca production tripled (Perl, 1994:ix). New synthetic drugs find a burgeoning demand in countries all over the world. Nonetheless, what is discussed in the relevant international fora is not so much if drug policies are one the right track, but how more powers and resources can be assigned to law enforcement agencies to suppress the drug trade. Thereby, the prohibition regime is extending its scope towards the financial sector (money laundering), new drugs, the chem- ical precursor industry and the disruption of organised crime. Moreover, it is increasingly extending its scope across borders. In public policy debates, human rights and anti-War on Drugs perspectives stand opposed to the belief that only by the strengthening of domestic and international legal by Hans T. van der Veen © 1999 European University Institute San Domenico, Italy Reprinted with permission from: Centre for Drug Research (CEDRO) University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands E-mail: CEDRO@frw.uva.nl Website: www.frw.uva.nl/cedro/ APRIL — MAY 2000 NEXUS 27 DYNAMICS OF CRIME, LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE DRUG ECONOMY'