Nexus - 0503 - New Times Magazine-pages

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Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), an "ad hoc group of exceptions, governments chose to exempt some core, open-ended BIAC experts...meets with and advises OECD negotiators prior to areas of the agreement. In some countries, the exemption process each negotiation session".” The negotiators have made extensive probably involved government representatives who had previous- use of the "expertise" of the ICC, for instance, in shaping the dis- ly been uninformed about the MAI and were now reacting with pute settlement mechanism. In fact, the ICC's own court of arbi- cold feet to the far-reaching provisions of the agreement. tration is one of the three possible bodies to which corporations Some of the major core exemptions proposed by member states can turn for dispute settlement purposes.” are: No less important than these direct injections into the OECD * The US demanded an exemption for sub-federal law, which process is the lobbying done by industry on the national level. would provide states and localities with immunity from the MAI. For example, USCIB has "regular meetings with US negotiators * The EU asked for positive discrimination for investment with- immediately before and after each MAI negotiating session".” in regional economic integration organisations (REIOs) like itself. Similar close cooperation between industrialists and national The aim of this clause is to ensure that the MAI would not prevent negotiators has taken place in many other OECD countries, countries from changing their laws to match EU legislation. This including Canada and the Netherlands. The pressure by the Dutch could be of crucial importance for Central and Eastern European negotiators on the US to withdraw its reservation on research and —_— countries waiting for EU membership as well as for the future development (R&D) subsidies was a direct result of lobbying possibilities of harmonising EU legislation. from Netherlands-based TNC, Philips. Philips wanted to ensure ¢ France and Canada requested that culture be carved out of the its access to R&D subsidies in the US.” agreement entirely. Corporate lobby groups like the ICC and the ERT have used * The EU made noise about the need to ban secondary boycotts, their political access at the highest political levels—including such as the US Helms-Burton Act which penalises companies summits of global importance, such as the G7—+o stress the need doing business with Cuba. for a speedy completion of the MAI and for keeping the agenda « Many governments discouraged the proposed ban on the use clear of labour and environmental demands. of tax measures which could, for example, favour domestic or The basis for the cosy consultations between governments and smaller enterprises. corporate lobby groups throughout To add insult to injury, country- the MAI drafting process is that the specific exemptions to the MAI now usiness agenda is wholeheartedly | The first draft of the MAI saw the total a hefty 1,000 pages, with some embraced by several of the most governments exempting page after influential negotiating delegations. light of day in early 1997. Uniil page of the key sectors of their The ICC's April 1996 "Multilateral this time, the agreement had been economies.” Rules for Investment" report leaves The serious impacts upon the treaty no doubt about the almost complete sailing along quite smoothly, with of these far-reaching reservations, consensus between the MAI negotia- the general public and even most such as culture, and the daunting vol- tors and industry.* The rules pro- . oe — ume of the specific exemptions have posed in the report are basically elected public officials oblivious served to unsettle the previously trou- identical to the first MAI draft that i i ble-free MAI negotiations. was completed nine months later. to Its very existence. A decision to postpone the deadline Generally, economic or trade min- for the negotiations until May 1998 istry officials represent their coun- was taken at the May 1997 OECD tries in the MAI negotiations in the OECD. In the Netherlands, Ministerial Conference, with ministers arguing that a "high stan- the traditionally close connections between industry and econom- dard" MAI required more time. ic and trade ministries have been exploited to their full potential. The Dutch negotiators sided with industry in their mutual aim to | EXPLOSIVE PUBLIC REACTION get "as many obstacles as possible to foreign investment The second and simultaneous spanner in the MAI's works was removed".* Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Van Dok- the explosive reaction of the international NGO community after van Weelen reported to the Dutch Parliament in November 1995 a draft text of the MAI was leaked at the beginning of 1997. that national treatment should also apply to "issues like public Canadian and US NGOs were quick to put the draft text on their procurement and the granting of all kinds of subsidies and guaran- websites, and campaigning spread like wildfire to other parts of tees".* In many countries, the MAI went largely unnoticed by the world. other ministries, e.g., those of environment, social affairs and cul- NGO strategies have included public education, lobbying of ture, until a very late stage. government officials and parliamentarians (many of whom first wae - tha NOAM and tin Mate exceptions, governments chose to exempt some core, open-ended areas of the agreement. In some countries, the exemption process probably involved government representatives who had previous- ly been uninformed about the MAI and were now reacting with cold feet to the far-reaching provisions of the agreement. Some of the major core exemptions proposed by member states EXPLOSIVE PUBLIC REACTION The second and simultaneous spanner in the MAI's works was the explosive reaction of the international NGO community after a draft text of the MAI was leaked at the beginning of 1997. Canadian and US NGOs were quick to put the draft text on their websites, and campaigning spread like wildfire to other parts of the world. NGO strategies have included public education, lobbying of government officials and parliamentarians (many of whom first heard about the MAI from the NGO community), and, in October 1997, the organisation of a global NGO strategy meeting on the MAI and a simultaneous informal consultation with the OECD. The consultation/strategy session brought together representatives of development, environmental and consumer groups from over 70 countries and resulted in a call for a major overhaul of the agreement.” NGOs and trade unions have successfully injected two new demands into MAI negotiations: the integration of labour and environmental standards in the agreement. For industry, these demands, taken in conjunction with the cumbersome reservation process, are intolerable. "RESERVATIONS" ON BOTH SIDES The first draft of the MAI saw the light of day in early 1997. Until this time, the agreement had been sailing along quite smoothly, with the general public and even most elected public officials oblivious to its very existence. But both the complicated reservation process and the discovery of the MAI process by the NGO community have served to slow down and perhaps even fundamentally disrupt the charted course of the planned agreement. Governments submitted their "reservations" to the MAI in February 1997, and, in addition to the sheer volume of national APRIL - MAY 1998 NEXUS - 33