Nexus - 0402 - New Times Magazine-pages

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[NEXUS submitted this article prior to publication to the Libyan Arab Cultural Centre in Melbourne, Australia. They had these points to add. Ed.] Re: THE GULF OF SIRTE (SIDRA) INCIDENT lhe events of August 1981 should also be considered in the light of previous US actions. An analysis of US foreign policy under the Reagan administration, entitled From El Salvador to the Libyan Jamahiriya (published by Third World Reports, UK), states: "In a move seemed designed to raise tensions in the Middle East, and perhaps to pro- voke a Libyan military response to justify a joint US/Egyptian invasion of the Jamahiriya, units of the US Sixth Fleet violated Libyan sea and air space on four consec- utive days from 10 March 1981. Involved were two aircraft carriers, ten other military vessels and several squadrons of carrier-borne F-14 fighters. "The Libyans have been careful to avoid a military response to the American provoca- tions, but the entry of American planes and shipping into Libyan territory could easily have provoked a response from the Libyan air force were the Jamahiriya not concerned with avoiding a major pretext for US intervention and a serious confrontation in the region. "The March incidents are not the first time that the United States has attempted to pro- voke the Libyans into a response. In September 1980, Washington admitted that it had sent spy planes to the very edges of Libyan airspace. The International Herald Tribune referred to two confrontations in less than a week, involving a C-135 plane escorted by an F-14 fighter ‘armed with Phoenix air-to-air missiles'. According to the report, an addi- tional two Navy F-14 planes were launched from the John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier when Libyan planes intercepted the Americans. The paper said that a US Air Force C- 135 electronic eavesdropping plane was involved in 'flying at the edge of Libyan air- space’.” Jonathan Bearman, a British journalist, wrote one of the most accurate assessments of Libya. About the incident of 19 August he says: "The collision finally came in August. A giant battle formation from the Sixth Fleet, led by a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Nimitz, sailed into the Gulf of Sirte to conduct further exercises specifically authorised by the White House. On 19 August, the Libyans responded by sending up two SU-22 bombers to monitor movements. Without warning, both planes were attacked and shot down by F-14s from the carrier Nimitz's Black Ace squadron. Subsequent American claims that the action was pre-emptive are belied by the Pentagon's own admissions that the Libyan pilots had received no orders, transmitted by radio, to open fire on the American planes or fleet. Had the Libyans wanted to engage the Americans, they would more likely have despatched MiG or Mirage fighters. "All the evidence to emerge since has pointed to deliberate American provocation. Before the incident occurred, the Pentagon warned that the exercises would be held in a 3,200-square-mile zone. The Libyans appear to have acted when the F-14s exceeded this range. That much was revealed during a press conference aboard the Nimitz on 24 August, when Vice-Admiral Rowden admitted that the clash had occurred outside the designated area. Adding to his words, Rear Admiral James E. Service said: ‘About the closest we came was about 25 miles to their coast.’ Previously, the American command had insisted that the incident arose some 60 miles out, within the declared zone." (Qadhafi's Libya, Zed Books, London, UK) Re: THE LONDON EMBASSY SIEGE The Libyans have always maintained there was never any such secret message granting authorisation for their London Embassy to shoot at the demonstrators in April 1984. Libya's external security agency claims that the Israelis were manufacturing radio mes- sages to be conveniently intercepted by Western sources and used as evidence of Colonel Qadhafi's 'crazy terrorist behaviour’. Interestingly, this is covered in detail in The Other Side of Deception by Victor Ostrovsky, an ex-Mossad (Israeli Intelligence) agent. More obviously, though, why would the Libyan leader authorise the Libyans in the London Embassy to shoot on the demonstrators? Given all that had transpired under the Reagan administration, he knew that this would invite a severe reaction by the West against Libya. Nothing was to be gained for Libya by shooting a few paid provocateurs, but such an incident would, and did, cement the image of Colonel Qadhafi as a 'madman'. In the days and months leading up to April 1984, the Libyans in the UK were subject to widespread harassment. Libyans studying in the UK were subjected to detention, house searches and other harassment. Just prior to the April shooting, Libya issued a statement to the British press to the effect that "daily, we receive telephone calls from our students and trainees, saying that the British police search them and harass them and take arbitrary measures against them". (Further information on Libya can be obtained from the Libyan Arab Cultural Centre, PO Box 373, Brunswick, Vic. 3056, Australia. E-mail: jamahir@peg.apc.org Web: http:/Avww.peg.apc.org/~jamahir) is the rationale of someone with a well- developed sense of political reality. After the shooting, Brittan immediately ordered an investigation—which has remained under lock and key ever since. Not long afterwards, sordid stories began to circulate amongst the British media that the Home Secretary had unusual sexual appetites. The rumours were fed to the satirical magazine, Private Eye, whose edi- tors recognised the handiwork of the secu- rity service and refused to publish the alle- gations. However, within a year, Leon Brittan was forced from office for his part in the Westland helicopter debacle. With Western European objections so neatly taken care of, Qadhafi's demonisa- tion went into full gear. The anachronistic Bedouin was rapidly elevated from ‘useful’ to 'primary' Middle Eastern 'scapegoat’. At the same time, as a result of the Libyan bombing, European governments learned just how hard the US was prepared to play in pursuit of domestic politics and wider foreign policy. Tarring Qadhafi as the world's 'bad boy’ suited the selfish interests of the political power elite in the US and was an added bonus when other illegal CIA Middle East ‘covert ops' went belly-up. One such operation was the CIA-protected heroin pipeline operating from the Middle East to the USA. CRACKS IN THE MIDDLE-EAST DRUGS PIPELINE A recurring problem for President Reagan was his inability to rescue the US hostages held in Lebanon by HizbAllah. Hanging like a dark cloud over his other- wise successful term of office, the hostage problem was turned over to Lt Colonel Oliver North to resolve. North, a medium- ranked military officer with close personal ties to the CIA's Bill Casey, was the admin- istration's global "Mr Fixit". He, in turn, called on the services of his old friend, Monzur al-Kassar—a Syria-born ‘big time’ narcotics and arms trafficker. Earlier, the Syrian had assisted North in his time of need by brokering a large shipment of weapons to the CIA-backed Nicaraguan Contras. It earned him a lot of kudos inside the administration. Lebanon's Beqa'a Valley is a fertile and productive area specially suited to growing opium poppies. Rif'at al-Asad, the brother of Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad, was widely known to have been in charge of Syria's narcotics enterprise. As the "Supremo" of the Beqa'a Valley's massive opium industry, he was also a paid 'asset' of the CIA and was being 'groomed' to suc- ceed his elder brother as President. He was 36 = NEXUS FEBRUARY - MARCH 1997