Nexus - 0216 - New Times Magazine-pages

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The newspaper was speaking with some authority as the Soviet missile submarine fleets. As tradition demands, East Gippsland Union had already constructed three similar very low frequency __ will be targeted with a minimum of two multi-megaton warheads navigation stations on its own territory for ballistic missile subma- _ riding on independently launched missiles. If the first warhead rine guidance. In an overwhelming display of nuclear ballistic _ should fail to explode, the second will swiftly contaminate half of submarine denial, the Australian committee tried this tactic: greater Victoria in less than 10 milliseconds. "Even if the Omega system was essential to the operations of Even with high-grade self-contained inertial navigation gyros, ballistics submarines, the Australian transmitter would not be. no nuclear ballistic missile submarine could maintain a post-first- No submarine-launched missile attack upon the United States, strike fighting capability without Omega providing continual exter- the Soviet Union or China is possible from any ocean area in nal navigation updates because position accuracy would continual- which Omega reception would depend upon an Australian ly degrade. Perhaps sonar mapping could be used to keep the sub transmitter," ; on station above the seabed? The problem here is that using sonar “Any American submarine missile launch against the Soviet aboard a ballistic missile submarine is similar to ringing all the Union or China would have to take place from waters in which bells in a church steeple on Sunday morning. The deadly hunter- a submarine would find transmissions from Japan, Reunion Killer cute (in ie Gea would axa iranastission in seconds, then Island, Liberia, the United States or Norway entirely adequate A A for its Omega reception. Any Soviet launch against the United oa SUBROC UUM-44A or similar from one of their torpedo States would be from waters where, equally, Australian trans- missions are not essential." Once out of its torpedo tube the SUBROC switches to missile mode, leaves the water and skims along as far as 70 kilometres before diving back into the water near the ballistic missile subma- rine. On re-entry the 1-kiloton SUBROC nuclear mine explodes Because reservations were expressed about the use of the system by American nuclear ballistic submarines, a comforting assurance wes taxed by the United Stans Goverment iat: and crushes the hull of the target sub like tissue paper. Enough "Omega receivers will not be installed in United States ballis- _ SUBROCs exploding in the Southern Ocean during a nuclear con- tic missile (FBM) submarines. The Omega system does not pos- flict should completely remove Australia's whaling problem. sess sufficient accuracy for these ships, nor in fact does it have There would be very few whales left to worry about. any uniquely military application." There are those who will argue with this This statement was a startling break wih ————__——_ article of course, especially where the accu- the well-known American policy of refusing racy of Omega is concerned, and its ability to ‘either confirm or deny’ the equipment fit to provide sufficiently accurate positions for on any of its vessels, aircraft or missiles. Perhaps worse, Omega a second-strike capability. The most cogent The United States Government was thus . argument is the submarine’s inertial naviga- either lyin ugh its hin when i emits potential tion gyros (SINs) provide much greater ying through its hind teeth when it h gyros (SINs) p 8 made the claim, or was displaying a truly j Vi accuracy when continually updated by satel- staggering level of military ignorance. catastrop aC. le : Is of lite input. Problem! After a first strike, this During the 1975 negotiations with electromagnetic ee i Sees ation — the Australia, the United States Goverment was ifs Invisi H satellite circuits wi umed out and utter- holding an ace up its sleeve: the Trident mis- from its invisible, burie ly useless. Thus over a short time period the sile system, already on the drawing board Earth aerials. gyro error rate will increase, making accu- and designed for a colossal strike range of rate targeting all but impossible. However, over 6,000 nautical miles, making launches with all known minor Omega transmission from the southern Pacific and Indian oceans inaccuracies logged in the sub's massive not only feasible but also logical in order to ; computer databases, on-board Omega atom- completely avoid the electromagnetic holocaust raging in the _ ic standards would hold the submarine on station indefinitely. northern hemisphere after a first-strike thermonuclear attack. Peace researchers Wilkes and Gleditsch stated in 1987 that, after Indeed, the range and accuracy of the Trident D5 missile allows many years of very active opposition to Omega, they were mistak- launches from an ocean position due south of the Australian conti- en in claiming it was a ballistic submarine navigation system. In nent itself—a useful place to hide when fighting a huge northern _ their 400-page book which fingered a system called Loran-C as the hemisphere ‘America vs Russia’ nuclear war. Unfortunately, this _ real villain, both took a determined, aggressive stand clearly scenario would drag Australia into the nuclear mess in a very big _ intended to bury Omega once and forever: wow The newspaper was speaking with some authority as the Soviet Union had already constructed three similar very low frequency navigation stations on its own territory for ballistic missile subma- rine guidance. In an overwhelming display of nuclear ballistic submarine denial, the Australian committee tried this tactic: "Even if the Omega system was essential to the operations of ballistics submarines, the Australian transmitter would not be. No submarine-launched missile attack upon the United States, the Soviet Union or China is possible from any ocean area in which Omega reception would depend upon an Australian transmitter." “Any American submarine missile launch against the Soviet Union or China would have to take place from waters in which a submarine would find transmissions from Japan, Reunion Island, Liberia, the United States or Norway entirely adequate for its Omega reception. Any Soviet launch against the United States would be from waters where, equally, Australian trans- missions are not essential." Because reservations were expressed about the use of the system by American nuclear ballistic submarines, a comforting assurance was issued by the United States Government that: "Omega receivers will not be installed in United States ballis- tic missile (FBM) submarines. The Omega system does not pos- sess sufficient accuracy for these ships, nor in fact does it have any uniquely military application." ee way. The range of Trident DS is especially damning. No one designs a missile with a range of between six and seven thousand nautical miles unless extreme range is an operational requirement. Based on this, the design launch position must be well down in the south- ern hemisphere, because it is the only area of the globe far enough away from Russia to utilise the missile's full strike capability. In contrast, Russia could never use the oceans around Australia to launch a second strike against the US, for the simple reason Russian sub-launched missiles have a maximum range of just over four thousand nautical miles—far too short for southern hemi- spheric use. The implication is obvious. The Russian military will be well aware that the Omega station in Victoria is of critical importance for an American second strike, but of absolutely no use to its own submarines. Targeters take no chances with high-profile command and control systems providing accurate data for hostile ballistic "Our approach to the problem of exploring the military func- tions of Loran-C and Omega has been likened by one corre- spondent to ‘cracking a hazelnut with a sledgehammer'. There is some truth in this. To sharpen the metaphor, we use a sledge- hammer mainly because of a desire to thoroughly pulverise, rather than merely crack the nut." It is perhaps ironic that one of Wilkes’ and Gleditsch's main thrusts in pinpointing Loran-C's superior accuracy was that sys- tem's use of both sky wave and ground wave transmissions at the same time, claiming "the ground waves hug the surface of the Earth and are characterised by very stable propagation velocities and moderately low propagation losses. These qualities lead to high accuracy and moderately long receivable range." Perhaps through a lack of knowledge their 400-page book failed to mention that Omega also generates a massive, stable ground wave provid- ing excellent, accurate navigation fixes at ranges more than triple those provided by Loran-C, NEXUS¢35 OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1993