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The Belgian Air Force tried to identify the alleged intruder(s). We verified the radar registrations for November 29 but nothing special had been recorded. In addition, the civil aviation authorities confirmed that no flight plans had been introduced and that no special activities had been recorded by the civil radars. I was able to determine that the objects seen on November 29 could not have been helicopters, blimps, or any fixed- wing aircraft. This implied that the reported object(s) committed an infraction against the existing aviation rules. We were dealing with a problem. I checked further to find out if these objects could have been espionage flights made by F-117 stealth aircraft or anything similar. Because of the described performances that did not match any known technological capabilities, I was convinced that this was not the case. I also couldn't believe that any other nation would 1 : a . 1 1 conduct experiments with crafts using unknown technology over a populated area without any formal authorization. Nevertheless, I forwarded the question to the U.S. Embassy, which quickly confirmed that no Stealth flights or any other experimental flights had taken place over Belgium. Because there was no explanation for the events of November 29, and also because the sightings continued, we agreed to authorize the national defense system to scramble two F-16 fighter jets when abnormal activities were reported. The first two F-16s were sent out on December 8 after strange lights were reported, but nothing definitive was determined. In cooperation with the civil aviation authorities and the federal police, the Air Force established a procedure by which the F-16s could identify these phenomena. To ensure that the fighter jets would not be scrambled irresponsibly, we decided that authorization to launch the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft would only be given when: (1) the sighting of a craft was confirmed by the police, and (2) the object was detected on radar. This meant that the radar stations had to pay special attention to slow-moving targets when notified of an observation by the police. This would avoid unnecessary scrambles, but it also had major disadvantages. Most of the witnesses didn't react by calling the police, or weren't able to call quickly enough—mobile phones didn't exist yet—for the police to confirm the sightings. It was also problematic for radar controllers to work on a screen that was heavily cluttered, in order to be able to record targets not usually shown on the scope. Thus the precautionary measures prevented quick scrambles. As Chief of Operations at the Air Staff, I felt obliged to closely follow the events. However, no priority was given to this by the Belgian government since no threatening incidents had occurred, and no formal inquiries were conducted by any governmental bodies. Although the defense minister insisted on a transparent approach, especially to show the public that there was no cover-up, the Air Force was not authorized to establish a dedicated office for conducting its own inquiries. Instead, the Air Force supported SOBEPS— the scientific research group investigating