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and thoughts is imagination (or the counselor’s subtle cueing), not memory. Yet, he or she (nor the counselor) may not consider the possibility that these experiences are primarily the product of the need to make sense of his or her life. Rather, he or she is supported by a variety of sources in the otherwise groundless interpretation that the experiences are de-repressed memories of traumatic events in childhood. If the counselor is also a source for this interpretation, then a fully realized and totally erroneous belief about a traumatic experience is likely to develop. Ganaway reminds us that part of our clinical responsibility to such a client is to offer psychological understanding and support, while, simultaneously, not actually adopting nor promoting the client’s point of view. When such = apparent memory for confabulation, which may be consider- able. A substantial body of research A substantial body of research effectively demonstrates that the so-called videotape recorder model of memory is an inaccurate one. This appealingly simple model has been replaced by one that may be less appealing, since it does not substantiate our confidence in the reliable recovery of forgotten memories. By contrast, the evidence has led to a contemporary model that portrays memory as a highly complex, constantly evolving interactive process, always susceptible to continuing modification by the individual’s psychological needs. Unlike the videotape recorder model, this empirically-based, dynamic model demands the need for caution in the way a clinician interprets a client’s reports of in By recovery contrast, memory. In rare cases, it may be that there is accurate recall of memories that have been forgotten for years; however, the literature yields no evidence to credit the a: ena When such = apparent memory recovery occurs through the use of either hypnotic or other methods, the pressure on the clinician to interpret the experience as historical fact rather than psychological coping can become very compelling. This is especially likely to occur when the clinician already believes that the client was traumatized—but this is also the case when more cautious clinicians are faced with such a dramatic and _ credible narration of events. contemporary widespread reports of sudden recovery of long-repressed memories of early trauma. Yet, without factual verification of these reports, what actual evidence do we have to determine their accuracy? Often, clinicians interpret the process- ing, the working-through of such so- called recovered memories in the course WHY WOULD ANYONE MAKE THIS UP? of of counseling—and the subsequent resolution of symptoms—as proof that the reports were accurate. While this criterion has appeal and seems to be supported by common sense, closer examination suggests its inadequacy. Nash describes a client who presented with anxiety symptoms which he attributed to his abduction by extraterres- trials. In the course of treatment, the anxiety symptoms were relieved, but the client still believed that he was once abducted by aliens. Clearly, we cannot interpret this symptomatic relief as evidence for abduction by aliens. The successful use of imagination is the It is sometimes asserted that no one would intentionally create the horrific histories that develop within claims of abuse. Yet, a substantial literature explains why an individual might do so. The unsettling fact is that all of us—clients and alte. fe. ake alae ee den fee eee clinicians—make up our memories, in the sense that all of our memories are constructed, all of the time. Sometimes what we construct is a generally accurate representation of events and sometimes it is not. Aside from this, of course, is the more complex issue of any client’s motive as 62