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When a hypnotized client reports an experience, it is characteristically a compelling report and the clinician commonly believes the client’s report to be historically true—as opposed to psychologically true—because of the added credibility of the hypnotic experi- ence. As the literature amply demon- strates, however, clinicians are highly susceptible to misinterpreting a hypno- tized client’s reports. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that any clinical intervention involving the imagination—including, but not confined to hypnotic intervention—increases the likelihood that the client’s memory will be distorted. That is, it is likely that the client will have images, feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and other experiences that he or she believes to be memories—but that are at least partly, and perhaps mostly, the result of imagination and not true—as to of memory. val Garry et al. demonstrated that merely imagining an event can lead to subse- quent belief that the event actually occurred. So, even if we are exceedingly careful in our attempt to avoid contami- nating the client’s memory with our own beliefs and expectations, it is inevitable that the experience of discussing events in the context of heightened imagination will alter the client’s memory, however subtly. Moreover, it is likely that the client honestly will believe and then confidently report the distorted memory to be accurate. According to Loftus: event the to False memories are constructed by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions received from others. During the process, individuals may forget the source of the informa- tion. This is a classic example of source confusion, in which the content and the source become dissociated. Consequently, we must be willing to acknowledge that a hypnotized client’s report—however compelling—may be completely accurate, partially accurate and partly imagined, or completely imagined. However, despite the abundance of evidence to the contrary, many clinicians believe they can discern when a client is telling the truth. Our confidence in our ability to discriminate truth from fiction rests largely with our appreciation of sincerity. That is, we tend to believe the client’s report if it is plausible, internally consistent, congruent with accompanying affect, or some combination of the above. na . on wea owe or Our tenacious confidence in this belief is understandable: The ambiguity of not knowing if someone is telling the truth is quite uncomfortable. Unfortunately, however, there is no evidence to support our confidence in these criteria. Unless we have independent verification, we cannot know if someone’s report is accurate or not. Moreover, the issue is not whether the client believes in the truth of what is said—we assume this is so—but whether the events are accurately reported. However, even though the client is being honest and is conscientiously attempting to be truthful and accurate in reporting, he or she cannot correct for the constant activity of the human _ imagination, hypnotized or not, which leads to the vagaries of individual perception and, inevitably, to distortion of memory. In this context, then, let us examine further the third hypnotic experience creation of believed-in reality from imagination. A dream is a_ universal example of a fully believable yet com- pletely imagined experience. Similarly, the hypnotic experience offers the occasion for an individual to experience imagery, laden with affect, and surely also laden with psychological import. Such imagery, because of its meaning and_ affect, provides the opportunity for an impor- tant clinical intervention. But psychologi- cal meaningfulness does not equate with events 60 THE CLINICAL PROBLEM