41748549078781

41748549078781_page_1 14 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY GERMAN RADIO INTELLIGENCE ALBERT PRAUN Principal Author Former General of…

41748549078781_page_10 REF ID:A56914 Chapter Two The Significance of Blectronic Warfare Toward the end of World War JI about 12,000 signal troops of the German…

41748549078781_page_100 aa a REF ID:A56914 , -CONFIDENTIAL— | —Sacurity_laformation— ‘ With the assistance of the previously employed units the newly— arrived ones…

41748549078781_page_101 --CTT coe REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIBENTIAL- ~Sucurity-ntormation- ~S4n In order to prevent the dissemination of communication intelligence…

41748549078781_page_102 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENTIAL- Socurity-taformation— ~85- armored spearheads, as well as reports of heavy losses. Soon afterward, German…

41748549078781_page_103 REF ID:A56914 —Seeueity-tetormation- 86— later on, for example, when radio intelligence was able to predict the. transfer of a U.S, armored…

41748549078781_page_104 . “ REF ID:A56914 “Sucurity-tutormation- : -87- XIII. Russian Front (1941 - 1945) (The events in -the area of Army Group South are…

41748549078781_page_105 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL- Socunty-lafenmation— S8- groups in whose area they were stationed. The intelligence information obtained up to…

41748549078781_page_106 a REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL —Security-infermation— ~S9~ detailed information was available on the structure and strength of the Soviet…

41748549078781_page_107 REF ID:A56914 -GONADENTIAL- —Seoutity-information— -90~ of this period. However, an estimate of Soviet Army radio traffic will be attempted…

41748549078781_page_108 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENT — Cam manemeaaeal OPERATIONS OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE Shart 9 IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA 1941-1942 ee Geman OFrensive TunusTs…

41748549078781_page_109 -. oe oe HHH -- eee SS REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Security-infermation— 91- operations to be restricted to a zone of action bounded in the…

41748549078781_page_11 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAE “le also of troop units) on the ona hand, and the correspmding facilities of the enemy on the other, as each…

41748549078781_page_110 REF ID:A56914 —Secusity-taformation— ~92- On the second day of hostilities, sienals were intercepted whose points of origin were plotted…

41748549078781_page_111 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL- —Securty TONES — ~93— German intercept personnel pounced on the especially careless requests for fuel which…

41748549078781_page_112 a a REF ID:A56914 Security-Information- She Captured documents not only confirmed the results obtained by radio intelligence evaluations…

41748549078781_page_113 BEF ID:A56914 ‘Secity information ~95- frequencies used. Jamming transmitters were taken from the corps signal battalions and turned over…

41748549078781_page_114 Rainn 0914 SORFIDENTIAL— Security ntormation- ~96— of activation in the area east of Moscow. Those reports appear to have been exaggerated.…

41748549078781_page_115 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL- ‘Security internation — te During October 1941 the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies and the First Panzer Army…

41748549078781_page_116 aa Finetiat © 914 “Spemtty-inferation. ~98~ to ascertain the assembly of several divisions, ‘he radio picture thus gained, however, did not…

41748549078781_page_117 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Sacuity informstion— the campaign. In Late November 1941, traffic in the Rostov net indicated that there were…

41748549078781_page_118 REF ID:A56914 CONSENT a Security-tafocmation_ ~1L00— with a landing in Feodosiya. At the end of the first year of the war it was clear that…

41748549078781_page_119 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Security tntoreratior ~Llol- The belated reorganization of the German intercept service long-range and…

41748549078781_page_12 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL- experts tried to influence enemy as well as other countries, by means of foreign language broadcasts over…

41748549078781_page_120 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL —Seourity-tatermation- -102~ the Crimea was far less disciplined. After the Germans had occupied the peninsula…

41748549078781_page_121 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Sent item -103- Don front which had previously been held by the Seventeenth Arny was taken over by the…

41748549078781_page_122 REF ID:A56914 GONFIBENTAL— Security iaformation- -104~ Long-Range RI Company, which had so far been held at the disposal of OKH, finally…

41748549078781_page_123 — REF ID:A56914 — CONFIDENTIAL ~Secirity-tnformation— =-105— movements which, in mid-November, led to the encirclement of the German Sixth…

41748549078781_page_124 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL ~Senurity-information 106- The evolution of Russian radio traffic during the period under review proves that the…

41748549078781_page_125 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL sont eterna -LO7~ radio intelligence and the "entering wedges" spotted by the cryptanal~ ysts had been betrayed…

41748549078781_page_126 hhh . REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL— —Security-tnrormation- ~1L06~ situation, and their plans in general. In the light of this reliable…

41748549078781_page_127 REF ID:A56914 —Security-intormation— -109~ instances where the Russians jeopardized their military operations by the manner in which they…

41748549078781_page_128 :A56914 -110- information for the tactical commanders. The last major achievement of German radio intelligence in Russia was the coverage…

41748549078781_page_129 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL— —Security-tatormatton- -lll- with the "front"headquarters. All these small pieces were put together to form a…

41748549078781_page_13 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL Chapter Three German Radio Intelligence Operatios (1936 - 5) In addition to the intelligence gained from…

41748549078781_page_130 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIDENFIAL —Seourity-tntormatton— -1l2- massed 400 guns per mile of frontage. In this area the Germans were still able to…

41748549078781_page_131 REF ID:A56914 -CONHIDENTIAL Sect nfm -113- committed and a certain period of initial adjustment was over, German commmnication intelligence…

41748549078781_page_132 “lle Chapter Four Appraisal of Radio Commmication in Belligerent Armies Committed in the European Theater Although radio played only a…

41748549078781_page_133 REF ID:A56914 CONFIBENTHAL- “Secu intormation- on the planning, executive, and supervisory levels. 2. What tactical use did the Allies make…

41748549078781_page_134 REE, ID:A56914 -CONAontiac— Security Information— -116- in seeurity became more pronounced after the German invasion of Russia, when the…

41748549078781_page_135 REF ID:A56914 —Sooutity Internation — -117- therefore very large. In any event, it is only just to acknowledge that the responsible…

41748549078781_page_136 -CONFIDERE. TD:A56914 HAL —Seeurity-information— -118- all those with which German communication intelligence had to contend. Effectiveness…

41748549078781_page_137 eee REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- “Seeurity-information -Li9- the battle of Bl Alamein Field Marshal Rommel was always aware of British…

41748549078781_page_138 REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIBENTIAL- “Seem Tatormation -120- entered the war, especially the United States, introduced the proved British methods,…

41748549078781_page_139 REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIDENTIAL- Security iterator -121- The Americans deserve credit for the speed with which they adopted British operating…

41748549078781_page_14 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTIAL- os Austria. Toward the end of May 1938 one of the key radio stations in Prague, probably that of the War…

41748549078781_page_140 rs, Ss 7 REF ID:A56914 Severity infarmation -122- detrimental to them and resulted in needless losses. The comments made with regard to…

41748549078781_page_141 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL -Secuttytrtoaton— -123- this army dropped to an extremely low level. Unified control and strict supervision…

41748549078781_page_142 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTIAE ~Seomity intormattor ~124- necessary to switch to the defensive, most of the German radio nets con- sistently…

41748549078781_page_143 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Sucurity-infermetion- -125- information. The first time this fact became apparent was during the Norwegian…

41748549078781_page_144 Oe REF ID:A56914 Seoutity-intermation” -126- In keeping with the general characieristios of the Poles, the radio commmication of the Polish…

41748549078781_page_145 REF ID:A56914 CONFIBENTIAL- Sesurity-intermetion- -127- Chapter Five Radio Intelligence Activity of the German Armed Forces High Command —…

41748549078781_page_146 I REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL —Seeurity-intormation- ~178~ conversations. These transmissions were heard on the ultrashort wave- lengths.…

41748549078781_page_147 vee meee Cceeeecceeeeeeceeese neeeeeeee cr REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL “eenity stent ~129- In the Cryptographic Branch. there were…

41748549078781_page_148 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL ° Seaurity-Information— ~130- command responsibilities and technological problems. Co-operation be- tween these…

41748549078781_page_149 REF ID:A56914 —CONFAIBENTIAL Seourity-intermation— -131- APPENDIX I Historical Survey of German hadio Intelligence (1918 = 45) I. 1914 - 18…

41748549078781_page_15 REF ID:A56914 | 8 only the regular traffic but also a great number of field messages which increased daily and was far out of proportion to…

41748549078781_page_150 REF ID:A56914 ~132- station to repeat its messages, which had already been received by super-— ior German operators, solved by experienced…

41748549078781_page_151 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- —Secmnity-tatormation- -133- the war, in spite of repeated warnings from the military, the German diplomatic…

41748549078781_page_152 REF ID:A56914 — CONFIDENTIAL Seeenty-tntormtation -134- by small intercept units attached to various German corps. Here, too, the enemy was…

41748549078781_page_153 REF ID:A56914 , CONFIDENTIAL Security infermetion— -135~ B3udemy's Cavalry Army, which was advancing from the south. This enabled General…

41748549078781_page_154 ne wee ene wee ooo eee REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL- Securitytaformation. however, provide for any communication intelligence units.…

41748549078781_page_155 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL- “SEEM horace. DEVELOPMENT OF Chart! Appt THE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE 1921-1939 NORWAY, DENMARK, SWEDEN FINLAND…

41748549078781_page_156 REF ID:A56914 -GONABENTIAL Secunty-intormation -137- of operation, traffic handling procedures, and apparatus in use. Only gradually did…

41748549078781_page_157 on REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL SeCUTTY trtormation— ~138- trained as analysts, while the translators were first to be used on plain- text…

41748549078781_page_158 rn REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- Security-intormetien— -139 vers were observed by stations along the base lines thus established. This “…

41748549078781_page_159 REF ID:A56914 =140- to the signal unit of the Artillery School. The first tests conducted by the new units, which formed one intercept…

41748549078781_page_16 REF ID:A56914 —RONFIDENTIAL ; . -9- same type of radio panic that will be discussed later in the sectio on the Allied invasion in Normandy,…

41748549078781_page_160 REF ID:A56914 -141- headquarters. The 1/0 strength of the company was 10 officers (including civilian evaluation personnel with assimilated…

41748549078781_page_161 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL “Secumty-intermation— and thereby relieve the existing stations. Mobile intercept companies were to be…

41748549078781_page_162 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Seeurity-tntermaten— -143- The immediate fullescale implementation of these plans was delayed primarily by the…

41748549078781_page_163 REF ID:A56914 -14h- was established at Treuenbrietzen, and the fixed Army station at Frankfurt an der Oder was moved to Jueterbog. Another…

41748549078781_page_164 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL- Security taformation- “145~ difficulty in giving the personnel proper training, in providing them with…

41748549078781_page_165 REF ID:A56914 “Security-intormation: -146- OKR, which was formed as an independent unit within the Signal Inspec- torate in the General…

41748549078781_page_166 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIDENTIAL- Sey Tionnation “147 station and set up advance posts in accordance with the requirements of the situation. The…

41748549078781_page_167 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL TSeCMITTY ttormration— _—_ ees “148+ Intercept operations against the French met with unexpected diffi-…

41748549078781_page_168 REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIBENTIAL Securit -149- attempt was successful in two instances when skilled linguists acted as intercept operators. - A…

41748549078781_page_169 REF ID:A56914 —Secumty-trtormation #150= In order to make tactical radio intelligence more effective, plans were considered for detaching…

41748549078781_page_17 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL -10- engaged in cryptanalysis. Solely on the basis of D/F reports and an evalu- ation of the procedure and…

41748549078781_page_170 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Seeurity-tntormatior— w~L5lL~ had been found to the problems of transmitting intercepts obtained by long-range…

41748549078781_page_171 REF ID:A56914 RONFIBENTHAE- —Seottity-tntermatron— =152- Shortly before the beginning of the Cempaign in the West another step was taken in…

41748549078781_page_172 REF ID:A56914 esteblished along the Kranz-Rzeszéw base line. It covered the entire Russian front and remained under the jurisdiction of the…

41748549078781_page_173 IIE II REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- Seeutty-intormation— -15h- intercept teams. The intercept-L/¥ platoons comprised one evaluaticn team,…

41748549078781_page_174 REF ID:A56914 1 55- intelligence battalion headquarters at army. All available means of com- munication were used for disseminating the…

41748549078781_page_175 REF ID:A56914 ~156- The distribution of comuunication intelligence staffs and units after the reorganization wes as follows: Serving OKH…

41748549078781_page_176 REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIDENTHAL —Seeunty-tntormation— ~157- observation of all impulse radio signals which could be picked up at that pointe…

41748549078781_page_177 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL— —Secunly_tatocmation -158- served the purpose of raising the generel standards of performance. The…

41748549078781_page_178 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENTIAL “Security Tirernration— -159- to achieve such success were a few radiomen with portable receivers, some good…

41748549078781_page_179 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL- —Seeurity-nformation— -160- linguists. This was particularly true in cases where the Germans were able to tap…

41748549078781_page_18 REF ID:A56914 CHART 1 RUSSIA / / / PP Frerane Bacou | SOUTHEAST INTCP iL] ae, ANTSP. MEDITERRANEAN SEA OPERATIONS OF COMMUNICATION…

41748549078781_page_180 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENFIAL— sity ~161- captured. The fact that this carelessness did not result in heavy casual- ties was attributable…

41748549078781_page_181 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL- Securitytafermation— “162 Appendix II Survey of the Technological Evolution of German Radio Intelligence In…

41748549078781_page_182 REF ID:A56914 “TUNFIBENTIAL ‘SeEITity- intonation. -163~— which would be weatherproof under arctic and tropical conditions. More- over,…

41748549078781_page_183 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL— Secarty-informet ~l6h- logical that many countries should use these waves also for military pur~ poses.…

41748549078781_page_184 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL- Seeurity-tntoreration— -165- of this evolution, which received strong impetus in the course of the war, are…

41748549078781_page_185 1660 Appendix III Basic Elements of Radio Intelligence This account is based on the operating procedure of an intercept company. Fixed…

41748549078781_page_186 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secuntytatermation— ~167- military radio commmication services of the various nations involved, in- cluding call…

41748549078781_page_187 re REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL ~168~ in the case of which call signs were usually omitted, the beginning and ending time of each…

41748549078781_page_188 Co - - + ne REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Seourty-infeneztror ~169~ an intercept unit, had to arrange the work shifts and establish…

41748549078781_page_189 Fe REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL- Seow ntermetion— ~170< persomnel be misled. Each operator used a report form on which he entered…

41748549078781_page_19 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL -ll- on the Finnish front in easily identified locations, from where they again disappeared after a while, only…

41748549078781_page_190 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL- ae -l7l- The traffic evaluation section maintained the radio traffic chart and recorded all guarded…

41748549078781_page_191 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL- ty intornat -172- movements, had to be recognized without delay and reported immediately. As the initial step…

41748549078781_page_192 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL Sccutity Intocmation- ~175- by means of signal charts, brevity codes, and other code designations. The solution…

41748549078781_page_193 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL- —Seeunty-tntermation— -17h- The experience of German radio intelligence shows that the emphasis on the…

41748549078781_page_194 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL. —Seourty-Joinamation__ @175= Appendix IV Radio Counterintelligence (Bsed on a report by Lieutenant Colonel de…

41748549078781_page_195 REF ID:A56914 “GONFBENTIAL- Security tetormetios— -176- fighting war. however, this freedom of the air waves involved the risk that a ham…

41748549078781_page_196 REF ID:A56914 " ~GONFIDENTIAL —Seoutity-tafermation- -177~ movements and resistance groups or interdict the activities of numerous agents…

41748549078781_page_197 REF ID: a5@out ORGANIZATION OF RADIO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Chart! App. 4 1941-1945 Ar Forcas Signal Communication Group Counterintetngence…

41748549078781_page_198 REF ID:A56914 ° RADIO INTERCEPT COMPANY (MTZ) Chart 2 App. 4 OPERATING PROCEDURE 1941-1942 OKH RADIO G.!. MAIN EVAL CEN

41748549078781_page_199 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTAL— -Secwritytetormation- -178- especially that of the Army. From the very beginning the military rea- lized that…

41748549078781_page_2 REF ep? AS56914 Biographical Sketch of the Principal Author Albert PRAUN was born 11 December 1894 in Bad Gastein, Austria. He entered the…

41748549078781_page_20 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTtAL- =-12— intercept stations in Graz and’Tulln (near Vienna) and two intercept companies. His sphere of action…

41748549078781_page_200 ‘ ‘ REF ID:A56914 Chert3 App.4 RADIO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ry ‘ 6 1941-1942 G ok 390 4 0600 700 BOO 9 MILES NORTH c SEA \ 4 s…

41748549078781_page_201 REF ID:A56914 RADIO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE Chart 4 App.4 INSTITUTED IN 1943

41748549078781_page_202 REF ID:A56914 CONFIBENTIAL- Seeurity-tefermation— -179- ‘to serve with the radio intercept branch of the civilian police, which op- erated…

41748549078781_page_203 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL- Secuntydntoneatton 180~ With this streamlined organization the Germans had less difficulty in coping with the…

41748549078781_page_204 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTIAL- “Secuty-tnternation— 181. were progressively eliminated, the radio agents imitated more and more the German…

41748549078781_page_205 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Sacunty-tntermatior A82~ radio. It was organized in such 4 manner that several D/F teams were simultaneously…

41748549078781_page_206 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL SeCUMTeyttormration— -183- civilian police. In the first category was the so-called intercept loca~ ting data…

41748549078781_page_207 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTIAL- _Sacusty-fatomation =18). re ffter successfvl arrests, experienced radio operators of the short-range…

41748549078781_page_208 REF ID:A56914 ~Secarity-intermation -185- under observation and had even been located, but were never actually seized. There were at least…

41748549078781_page_209 Total Hy t : Chart 5 Appendix IV Us : ultra- A56914 : (Con s (Con- REF ID z Czech + British : British : & : (Con- Agent-Uperated Radio…

41748549078781_page_21 REF ID:A56914 LONFIDENTIAL Secucitytntormation -13- Before the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans the Germans detected Greek army wnits…

41748549078781_page_210 Chart 5 (Continued) Appendix IV :A56914 REF ID err arc wr a a ar Se i i L } ; | ip @ in uN Qroyng tata [| 3 | io] a en ee ty | gee 3 | pPpo…

41748549078781_page_211 REF ID:A56914 -CONFBENTIAL- —Seeverty-tntennaon— -186= contains numerous inaccuracies. In the publishers’ introduction the author is…

41748549078781_page_212 a REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Seco tomato — -187- gence was burdened with additional missions which initially had not been expected and…

41748549078781_page_213 SSS tO rr REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Seeuritytetermation— -188— into the enemy's over-all strategy as expressed by the missions and move-…

41748549078781_page_214 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL— —Secmity information “189+ and receiving their reports and requests for supplies. Especially selected men and…

41748549078781_page_215 REF ID:A56914 CONFIBENTIAL- sey-atoumali -190= about the hideoutsa, conduct of operations, and strength of the partisan units, as well as…

41748549078781_page_216 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secu Information -“191l- cepting and evaluating these orders the Germans were able to deduce the directions in…

41748549078781_page_217 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL— Security tatermation— A92- RCI units which were given specialized training for this technically com- plicated…

41748549078781_page_218 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL Seeurity-informat -193- five officers and many noncommissioned officers and enlisted men were killed, some…

41748549078781_page_219 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL- —Seenetty-irtormatror a9h- organizational structure, composition, strength, and concentration areas of this…

41748549078781_page_22 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Seourity-intormetion -“lh- paymaster in the British military government ordering a certain agency to ‘be…

41748549078781_page_220 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTIAL- Security-intormaor 195~ those with Mihailovic were recalled, at first gradually and then more and more…

41748549078781_page_221 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL- Seourtty-tnforeatron- -196- had top priority with Tito. In politics, however, Tito recognized only two…

41748549078781_page_222 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Senuerty-tntermation— A97= & Appraisal of Allied Subversive Radio Activities The Russian subversive radio…

41748549078781_page_223 EE REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL —Secuclty-tefermation -198- determined by fast-flying German airplenes equipped with short-range D/F sets…

41748549078781_page_224 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL — Secunty-intormatinr -199- effectiveness to be thus gained were obstrudéted by influential traitors. It is,…

41748549078781_page_225 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL saeumty tnteesistl— ~200- Appendix V Cryptanalysis Before the outbreak of the war the Cryptographic Branch of…

41748549078781_page_226 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Becurity-intermation— -201- Even during the French campaign, German army cryptenalysis was so short of personnel…

41748549078781_page_227 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL Soeurity-mtormation — ~202~ were able to think and feel in it coulé be used as cryptanalysts. In 1942 the…

41748549078781_page_228 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Sncuritytotermation— -203- 3. Cryptenalysis Section of Intercept Companies end Fixed Stations (Persomel…

41748549078781_page_229 aa REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Seourity-tafermation- -204— Organization and Operating Procedure of the Cryptanalysis Section at the…

41748549078781_page_23 REF ID:A56914 -CONABENTIAL Security teformation -15- from Crete and the Aegean islands was continued. During subsequent’ British operations…

41748549078781_page_230 REF ID:A56914 “GUNTIBENTIAL- Socurity-infermation— -205- The long distance between the Russian front and Berlin precluded the possibility…

41748549078781_page_231 ——$_ REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL ~Security-tntormation- ~R06— his analysis. After Army cryptanalysis had laid the foundation for this…

41748549078781_page_232 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL —Geoutity-intormation— ee fad start. Since any system is subject to compromise at some time, changes had to be…

41748549078781_page_233 REF ID:A56914 Becnrity-intormatar -208~ and the loss of which would not threaten serious consequences. These desiderata ran contrary to the…

41748549078781_page_234 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL- —Seourty-tnfrmstion —209- The Russian Army did not use mechanical ciphers but employed code systems uniformly…

41748549078781_page_235 Four—digit eryptograms Five-digit cryptograns REF ID:A56914 —Seeurity-tformatior more and more complicated during the war, and a body of…

41748549078781_page_236 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENTIAL- Security-tatormation ~2L1- The Russians tightened their security measures during the war, but without making…

41748549078781_page_237 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL— Socarty fatormati ~212— analysis in World War ITI, cryptanalysis continued to furnish a major part of the…

41748549078781_page_238 REF ,JD:A56914 —ObnTTaENTIAL ~213~ Appendix VI Appraisal of Short-Range Communication Intelligence What was the opinion of the…

41748549078781_page_239 SS” ”—_V'TC —Security-trtonmation— -214- headquarters. Once mobile warfare was resumed, enemy radio traffic re- ‘.ppeared with messages…

41748549078781_page_24 REF ID:A56914 GONFIBENTIAL = Secure talormatee— CHART 2 RADIO INTELLIGENCE DURING THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN > 31 MARCH ~I4 JUNE 1940 p (…

41748549078781_page_240 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL —Seemrity-tnterrsation— ~215~ with intercepted messages indicating the enemy's plans, requests for artillery…

41748549078781_page_241 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- security nt —216- battalion was usually able to set up the necessary wire facilities. But the extensive area…

41748549078781_page_242 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIDENTHIAL —Security-tnformation— -217- the intelligence officer at army Jevel who assigned the battalion its specific…

41748549078781_page_243 cos REF ID:A56914 “Secerctyterrato ~218— The Evaluation Control Center compiled the information obtained by the army groups and added…

41748549078781_page_244 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL — Security tntorenioa ~Al9— Commnication intelligence could observe even camouflaged night movements. Moreover,…

41748549078781_page_245 REF ID:A56914 —Kecurity-tatormnation ~220~ order of battle, and probable moves, as well as his steadily increasing production of tanks and…

41748549078781_page_246 REF ID:A56914 Chart 1 Appendix, Vi Allocation of Responsibility for Communication Intelligence Operations Enemy Signal Communication…

41748549078781_page_247 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Swcrtty-tntermmation — Appendix VIT German Intercept squipment (This appendix is based on a report by Colonel…

41748549078781_page_248 “CONFER TD :A56914 HAL ~Secuuity-taformation “2220 As previously mentioned, models c, d, and e ware captured by the British at Bl Alamein…

41748549078781_page_249 REF ID:A56914 CONFIBENTIAL- Stcucttytatormation— —--------——____ ~223- and sensitivity. However, this model never got into mass production…

41748549078781_page_25 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Sacimity_tntormation- -l6- the German operations staff. (Chart 2) The Norwegian Army stations usually…

41748549078781_page_250 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secure intermatron ~22))- radio frequencies were amplified and filtered by special amplifiers whose output was…

41748549078781_page_251 a ee ee --- --- he eee ee 2 eee eee - 2-5 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL Secomty tomato w225e sets were produced as early as 1942, the…

41748549078781_page_252 Tr REF ID:A56914 —Seauritgantormstion— ~226— h. Recording Devices When radio communication followed the example of wire comnunication in…

41748549078781_page_253 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Security tatormration— . aP27= Facsimile transmission by radio was in extensive use by such Russian agencies as…

41748549078781_page_254 TT REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL 228~ ee From 20 to.450 miles behind the front -- long-range D/f opera- rions; and d. More than 50 miles…

41748549078781_page_255 “GONFIBENTIAL— —Security-tatermation— ~229- centrally controlled by direct wire lines. By using the main short-wave base lines Koenigsberg…

41748549078781_page_256 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL- —Seeurity-tefonmation— ~230- supplemented by four maps covering Korth America, South America, Asia, and…

41748549078781_page_257 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secuntyteteriation— -231~ to the cryptanalysis and evaluation sections of the Armed Forces Crypto- grephic…

41748549078781_page_258 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL— Security tetermation— Appendix VIII Transcript of an Intercept lade by the RI Unit of the 252d Infantry…

41748549078781_page_259 0730 0734, a7L0 O7h7 0753 o75h 0800 0810 O85 0820 0821 0823 0830 REF ID:A56914 ~CONFIBENTIAL- —Seeurity-trtommarin -233- Napor to Upor via…

41748549078781_page_26 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Seourity-iatuntation -l1~ transmitted air reconnaissance reports, information on the composition and commitment…

41748549078781_page_260 a 0835 0853 0857 0859 0910 o91e 0915 0016 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Security-information— -23= Nepor to Upor via Kedr: Fire steadily on…

41748549078781_page_261 0030 0935 1005 1030 REF ID:A56914 — CONFIDENTIAL ~Security-information— ~235~ Upor to Fapor via Kedrs Who is with Kostarjev? Napor to Upor…

41748549078781_page_262 1037 1039 10h3 1045 1100 21135 12 13 1150 1152 1153 1200 -. oH —-- eee —---- —--- THe. —_--..>>:>-T > -- REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAE Secuti…

41748549078781_page_263 v7 1210 1212 1e22h, 1226 123) 1235 1238 12h0 12h5 12h)8 1304, REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Security-tnformation- “237- Napor to Upor via…

41748549078781_page_264 1306 1307 1310 1317 1327 1332 1337 133 13h) Upor to Napor: to fire. Napor to Upor: Napor to Upors Napor to Upor: REF ID:A56914…

41748549078781_page_265 150 : 57 58 1500 150 1505 1506 1507 1508 1510 152k, 1525 153k, 1538 a 1538 1539 1539 Upor to Nepor: Alexanderevski the Liyth. Upor to…

41748549078781_page_266 15h0 15h 15h2 15h 1550 1603 160) 1605 1606 1608 1610 1626 1628 1631 1635 1636 Napor to Upors Napor to Upor: Bpor to Napors Napor to Upors…

41748549078781_page_267 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL -SECURIFY INFORMATION e

41748549078781_page_27 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Security-intormaa— ~18- Norwegian radio traffic stopped. In this way the withdrawal of the Allies from Narvik…

41748549078781_page_28 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL iy Insemat ~19- lacked special equipment and suitable personnel, the British ciphers could not be solved.…

41748549078781_page_29 REF ID:A56914 OPERATIONS BY INTERCEPT UNITS August - October i939 SS= how ntecusence ay inTERcEPT Companies SSS tan tue sonoen. ——_ Lone -…

41748549078781_page_3 | | =F EAS list of Other Contributors (Last rank held and assignments relative to the present subject) de Bary Major, commander of radio…

41748549078781_page_30 REF ID:A56914 Char id fh April 1940 February~April 1940 "tee ( age JFronkturt 70" ‘ + ‘Stuttgort eFreudenstodt Eire

41748549078781_page_31 REF ID:A56914 =20—. identify these messages after only a few minutes of listening. Communications with an ally should be prepared with…

41748549078781_page_32 REF ID:A56914 _ CONFIDENTIAL ~21- Belgian and French traffic emanating from the border region. The intercept companies which became…

41748549078781_page_33 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL . Security-tatormation- ~22- that the French 2d and 3d Cavalry Divisions had been reorganized into the 1st and…

41748549078781_page_34 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL 23+ whereas the Dutch were more careless. The missions which OKH gave to the army group headquarters concern-…

41748549078781_page_35 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL -2h- intended to offer strong resistance behind the Albert Canal. On 10 and 11 May French radio traffic in the…

41748549078781_page_36 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL secryehone -25- within the British army, the headquarters of whic was found to be in Hazebrouck on 23 May.…

41748549078781_page_37 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL ; ~26— together with the French 68th Division, near Nieuport, and it also indicated the beginning of the…

41748549078781_page_38 REF ID:A56914 -CBNFIDENTAL- -27- Generally speaking, the enemy transmitted too many messages and thus enabled the Germans to intercept them…

41748549078781_page_39 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIBENTIAL- Senwity-atemat ~23~ portant. Since the 56th Intercept Company could not, in the long run, keep pace with…

41748549078781_page_4 een nn | REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL Seconty-tntonmation Marquardt Major, liaison officer between the clearing center of communication…

41748549078781_page_40 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Sacursty-tntormation -29- on the air with links to the corps in the Ghallerange - Grandpré area in the center of…

41748549078781_page_41 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Sonus : -30- In the following days the French Sixth Army at Epernay, the "Staff Slbeuf" and "Army Headquarters…

41748549078781_page_42 REF ID:A56914 Do. ~CONRDDHAL- preehre Chart 4 ue Na RADIO INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS wong) em DURING THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN <== _AOUTE OF ADVANCE…

41748549078781_page_43 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Reutty information -31- and Bighth Armies on the southern flank. Chart 4, contains the nadio intercept results…

41748549078781_page_44 —_ BO REF ID:A56914 ~GONFIBENTIAL— Serunty-iformati 32- High Command) closed down and turned over its functions to the main station at…

41748549078781_page_45 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL " -33- About three days before the attack, in order to pin down the units along the fortified front, the…

41748549078781_page_46 OO ITT REF ID:A56914 Goourity-tnformation— =3h- the upper Rhine on 1) June, the intercept companies were given the mission of keeping track…

41748549078781_page_47 REF ID:A56914 ~GONFIDENTIAL Seourieinformation -35- effective cryptographic systems, the enemy had made no attempt to achieve adequate…

41748549078781_page_48 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secuslty-internation 4 Defensive measures initiated by: (a) Permament coastal defense forces, (bo) Mobile…

41748549078781_page_49 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL Securitytefermation- -37- had operated againgt the British Expeditionary Forces on the Continent during the…

41748549078781_page_5 | REF ID:A56914 , , list of Charts No. Facing Page 1. Operations of Commnication Intelligence Units Against the Balkans and the Near East -…

41748549078781_page_50 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Secerity intormation- ~38- Germain-en-Laye near Paris. It was connected with its four (after 1 November 1940,…

41748549078781_page_51 CONFIDENTIAL Seeurity-trtormrattor -39- habilitated, and that in any event they were not yet ready for the large- scale training exercises.…

41748549078781_page_52 REF ID:A569i14 ~GONFIDENTIAL TSRCUTTy TnvorTatOT -40- In the beginning the training exercises in these areas were still characterized by…

41748549078781_page_53 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL- Security-tatermation— _ -41- with which unit designations were revealed raised the suspicion that this was all…

41748549078781_page_54 REF ID:A56914 GONFIBENTIAL Seourity-tefornrationy 5. South Wales; 6. The Midlands; and 7. Scotland (on both sides of the Firth of Forth).…

41748549078781_page_55 REF ID:A56914 “GONFIBENTIAL Security-tntormation- -43- in March 1941. About the same time, the "Euskirchen station" was returned from…

41748549078781_page_56 REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL Security-tntornation- “4d the summer of 1942. The Bergen Fixed Intercept Station in Norway was established and…

41748549078781_page_57 a REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL “Surety tetermetion Chart 5 RADIO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN JULY 1940-JAN.19 41 <= ss…

41748549078781_page_58 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENTIAL- ~Security-tntermation- ~45- ineluding individual aircraft, liaison staffs, and airfields. It enabled the…

41748549078781_page_59 rrr rv REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL: ~Securty-tiformation— -hb~ was too great for perfect reception, it was nevertheless possible to follow…

41748549078781_page_6 REF ID:A56914 -GONAIBENTIAL- Security intonation ‘ab: Con: Page Biographical Sketch of the Principal Author i list of Other Contributors ii…

41748549078781_page_60 “Secartty-ietormator “4i- whereas western port designations, for example, San Francisco, meant shipment to the Pacific. American units were…

41748549078781_page_61 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL Security tatermetion- ~48- intercepted. After a short while the receiving ope: utors were able to "yead" the…

41748549078781_page_62 REF ID:A56914 Security imonmaror ~49- difficulties. The numerous, informative messages in clear text dis- appeared. One of the best sources…

41748549078781_page_63 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDERTIAI —Sesurity-intormattar ~50- manner, German communication intelligence was once again working system- atically.…

41748549078781_page_64 REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL Security-tntormation -51- omitted and texte in the clear were paraphrased to prevent the enemy from gaining any…

41748549078781_page_65 ao2 5-522 -- === REF ID:A56914 ~52- designations; the failure to mask such terms properly; and the use of extremely simple ciphers and…

41748549078781_page_66 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL “Security tatommattor— ~53- which he could base his bold and varied tachics. His peculiar talent for gaining…

41748549078781_page_67 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL- Security tatormation— She encirclement. On repeated oceasions radio intelligence was able to observe that the…

41748549078781_page_68 REF ID:A56914 Seourity-tnformation ~55— by the German intercept service, as well as German and Italian radio schedules and ciphers. Radio…

41748549078781_page_69 REF ID:A56914 —Security-infermation- 56 situation in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, and neutral. Turkey, therefore, appeared…

41748549078781_page_7 Appendix I. Appendix II. Appendix III. Appendix Iv. Appendix ve Appendix VI. Appendix VII. Appendix VIII. REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL ser…

41748549078781_page_70 REF ID:A56914 Chart 6 FRANCE Fras YUGOSLAVIA Montpelier ¢ TURKEY BRITISH FIRST ARMY TUNISIA BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE…

41748549078781_page_71 REF ID:A56914 Security information ay Turkish radio operations and crytographic systems were extremely prin-~ itive and in no way mt minimm…

41748549078781_page_72 -PONFRBIHAD :-A56914 i a ~58- Long before the Allied landings in French West and Northwest Africa, Garman radio intelligence intercepted…

41748549078781_page_73 REF ID:A56914 Seourity-infermation- 59 good signal strength. Bergen immediately recognized their importance and reported them to St.…

41748549078781_page_74 CO REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL— —Securitytntormation— -60- their tactical organization during the advance. After the arrival of the first…

41748549078781_page_75 REF ID:A56914 es —Security-information- -61- According to Chart 6 the Commander of Communication Intelligence (Seven) was in command of the…

41748549078781_page_76 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL “Security information ~62- of Commmication Intelligence (Seven), safe and rapid inter-unit eom- munication was…

41748549078781_page_77 REF ID:A56914 feenty eter Chart 7 SEA ADRIATIC TYRRHENIAN SEA \ \ \ ES: 3) a SS t e i Tunis i 4 1 \ H . i g COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS | 1A…

41748549078781_page_78 Biirimbrat> 0224 SUNTIBENTIAL —Seeority-tntormration— ~62A- components, which had withdrawn along the coast all, the way from Egypt to the…

41748549078781_page_79 —_—_.._—— REF ID:A56914 —CONFIBENTIAL- —Security-laformation— + and the resulting lack of reports, the operations officer (G-3) for OB…

41748549078781_page_8 REF ID:A56914 -1- Chapter One “INTRODUCTION Because of the difficulties encountered in this highly specialized field the topic required…

41748549078781_page_80 a ieee REF ID:A56914 -CONFIBENTIAL Seourity-information- ~64- The Commnication Intelligence Commander's request to save the intelligence…

41748549078781_page_81 REF ID:A56914 —GONFIDENTIAL- Secunty-information- 65- planned minor landing on the northern shore of the island, was trans— mitted not only…

41748549078781_page_82 _GONFIBENTRE, TD:A56914 Pat sty nformet -66- in contrast to the forner decentralized method of employing radio intelligence units, a more…

41748549078781_page_83 REF ID:A56914 ~GONFIDENTIAL— —Security-infermetion- 6- the vicinity of various corps headquarters short-range intelligence platoons were…

41748549078781_page_84 eee Fo REF ID:A56914 —GONFIBENTIAL— —Seourity-information- ~68~ radio report. The headquarters of OB Suedwest, together with the units of…

41748549078781_page_85 6914 EVE SEP mesy 8 Sr uee ~69- not have translators for each language. Such teams were, therefore, legs important in Italy than in other…

41748549078781_page_86 I EE -SONFIDERYEE. TDR O974 “SacI -irtormation— -70- often unnecessary, furnished unit designations, terrain data, and officers' names.…

41748549078781_page_87 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL. —~Security-tnfermation- -T1~ It had also become difficult to recognize the order of battle during the…

41748549078781_page_88 a i—0 el REF ID:A56914 CONFIDENTIAL —Seeurity- internation — JQ 4merican unit near Naples, as had been previously suspected. The following…

41748549078781_page_89 REF ID:A56914 -BONFIBENTIAL— Secuity-tetormateer— Chart 8 ORGANIZATION OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNITS UNDER OB WEST . {A) At The Start Of The…

41748549078781_page_9 REF ID:A56914 “CONFIDENTIAL e ifaraat ~2- mented by reports from officers who had held important positions as experts : * in various…

41748549078781_page_90 REE. p:A56914 Senutty-tnformati XII. Defense of Western Burope (1944 - 45) Following the spring of 1944 German communication intelligence…

41748549078781_page_91 -T4- available in 1944. A subsequent comprehensive evaluation prepared some time after the start of the Allied invasion showed that…

41748549078781_page_92 REF ID:A56914 —CONFIDENTIAL- Seeurity-information ~~ The German radie intelligence organization in the West had been prepared for the…

41748549078781_page_93 REF ID:A56914 —Covarity-information— 76 speedily obtained. An even greater wealth of information was provided by short-range radio…

41748549078781_page_94 REF ID:A56914 -GONFIBENTIAL Secure nternation- ~7]~ time after the beginning of the invasion a British lending craft had been captured near…

41748549078781_page_95 ————————$— TTT -eanripen_ 72 #256914 NIA ‘Security trtormation- ~7— Normandy any attack of division strength and greater could be predicted…

41748549078781_page_96 REF ID:A56914 -79- hands. In the German experience British artillery would open fire on these objectives before launching the attack…

41748549078781_page_97 -CONFIDENSE. 7D‘ 2°0974 Security intormation— -80- and that the enemy fire, moreover, was equally heavy at all points. It is remarkable…

41748549078781_page_98 REF ID:A56914 - CONFIDENTIAL Seeurity-intormation- ~81- the retreat of Army Group G following the Allied landings in southern France. In…

41748549078781_page_99 et to REF ID:A56914 —Secerity-intormation— ~32- where its forces had learned to deal with German commmication intelli- gence. In any event,…