PROJECT BLUE BOOK

PROJECT 10073 RECORD CARD

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,

a — or 2. LOCATION 12. CONCLUSIONS
re 0D Was Bolloon
20 September 1957 Mantauk, N.Y. to Benson,Pa|O Prebably Balloon
— ; 2 - 0 Possibly Bolloon
3. DATE-TIME GROUP 4. TYPE OF OBSERVATION y
O Was Aircroft
Locol 0 Ground- Vi suol IDGround-Rodor O Probobly Aireraft
ony —20 71908 to Lotz. 0 Air Vi sual D Air-Intercop? Roder | 2 Possibly Aircroft
5. P os oy 6. SOURCE O Was Astronomicol
0 Yes 0 Probobly Astronomicol
{No | USAF Radar Units oe rossiexgar ma Pronoks
7. LENGTH OF OBSERVATION | 8. NUMBER OF OBJECTS | 9. COURSE Other 2. CM
0 irae (tet ont Dato for Evaluction
. 0 nknown
approx 12 minutes __|eaact nr not 275 dgr app

10. BRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGHTING given

Two radar untis (one in N.Y. & other
in Pa) observed high speed targets
heading west. Alerted other radar

11. COMMENTS

| Investigations disclose that ther
was an equipment malfunction in
first radar unti; when frequency

units along a pre-plotted track. Fightpr/changed, spurious targets disap-

intercepter units (DC)
Wisconsin scrambled ito

in Michigan &
intercept. No

mntact made. Nothing unusual seen, Tar}

- =
Zeus

faded. Radar inve:stisation team

set up to check this incident, Finding

made in special report(in case file).

peared, //Determined that two SAC
a/e were dropping streams of radar
chaff in area. Also, the targets

shown in the set were completely
abnormal.//Conclusions: No com-

pelling reason or indications
that targets were hostile or

a/c or missiles.

enemy

ATIC FORM 329 (REV 26 SEP 52)

NCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION OF AIR DEFENSE INCIDENT OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1957

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is to evaluate the circumstances

associated with the detection and reporting of high-speed radar

tracks on 20 September 1957. Specifically, the evaluation was

aimed at determining whether or not the tracks were caused by airborne

objects and to determine, if possible, the nature of the airborne

vehicles or other phenomena which caused the tracks.

RESUME OF EVENTS

1. On 20 September 1957 at 19062. the 773d ACWRON, located at
the Montauk AFS, New York, established an initial plot on a high
speed unidentified object southeast of the station at a range of 190
nautical miles, ind tracking toward the station at an estimated
speed of 3600 knots. ‘Track information was forward told to the
26th CONAD Division, CFECR, and to NORAD COC. In addition, it was
passed laterally to adjacent radars; the 646th ACWRON at Highlands
AFS, N.y. and the 762d ACWRON at North Truro, Massachusetts. These
radars were not able to establish contact with the target.

2. The unknown track was lost at a range of 50 miles southeast
of Montauk at 1907.45Z. The track was dead-reckoned by Montauk
AFS and passed by the 26th CONAD Division to the 648th ACWRON at

Benton AFS, Pennsylvania, as heading west at a speed of 2,000 knots

and an estimated altitude of 50,000 feet.

a

DOT NAP A Yr

er

UNCLASSIFIED
discussed with the NORAD team the events leading up to, and those
associated with, the detection and reporting of the high speed
tracks on 20 September 1957. The details of the above discussions
along with the NORAD team observations are contained in the
following paragraphs.

2. MONTAUK AFS; Montauk Air Force Station is located on the
northeastern tip of Long Island, N. Y. The following is a list of
radar equipment and operating parameters associated with this
station at the time of the incident:

Prime Search AN/FPS-20 (1250-1350 mc) Dual Channel
Emergency Search AN/FPS-8 (1280-1350 mc) non-operational
Height Squipment AN/FPS-6 (2700-2900 mc )

Antenna Yotation Rate
AN/FPS -20 5 rpn

Antenna Tilt (Electrical) a2”
Pulse Recurrence Frequency 400 pps

Blip/Scan Yatio on BB-6
from Detection to Fade 1.0

a. Circumstances Related by the Montauk Operations
Personnel: Prior to the detection of the high speed track BB-6, the
duty controller was engaged in an intercept over the Rocket and
Gunnery Range south of the Montauk Station. Scope displays and the
appearance of routine traffic seemed normal.

At approximately 1905:48Z, a target return was observed
on @ PPI console at a range of approximately 210 n.mi. east southeast

of the station. An initial track was established on it at 19062,

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Range 190 n.mi., a lin) i a 600 knots. The scope operator

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immediately called this track to the attention of the duty controller
and the floor supervisor. The three operations personnel observed
this track throughout its course until it faded at approximately 50
n.mi. southeast of the station. This fade occurred within the

M. Tyt» area. The average speed of the track over its entire length
was 5,400 knots. At the time of the incident, there were 3 UPA-35,

4 GPS-23 consoles and one height scope in operation.

The basis for the altitude estimation on track BB-6
was so unreliable the NORAD team was forced to disregard it.
Derivation of height associated with part of track BB-6 is discussed
later in this report.

The target was detected and tracked on a UPA-35 scope
but it was not obdserved on the height finder nor on any other scope
in the operations room; however, due to the short time that this
target was carried, it was impossible for the operations personnel
to evaluate or as-es4 the conditions of the other scopes in the
operations room. ‘No jamming or intense interference were present at
this time and weather in this area was low overcaat with slight rain.
Further weather analysis is included later.

Upon receipt of the initial target information, the
26th AD alerted other related sites within the 26th AD area to be

rn

on the lookout for this high speed track The stations initially
alerted were Highlands and North Truro. Subsequently, Claysburg,

Pa., Benton, Pa., and Lockport, N.Y. were alerted as a result of

UiyuLRooll LU
dead-reckoned pre-plot information. None of these stations except

Benton, Pa., detected anything that could possibly have been
correlated with track BB-6. Antiaircraft units in the area of the
track penetration were aiso advised but were unable to obtain con-
tact with this target. Texas Tower #2, the picket ships and AEW
stations in the area did not report unusual, high speed targets
during this time.

The characteristics of the target blip described by
the three operations personnel indicated that this return appeared
realistic insofar as shape and size were concerned. The initial
target retirn observed at 210 n.mi. was thought to be that of an
aircraft showing Mark X identification. Several sweeps later the
Mark X beacon control at the scope was placed in the off position
but the target characteristics remained the same. As the target
approached the station, the size diminished but the intensity re-
mained the same. ‘Tracking continuity and blip/scan were 100%
throughout the en‘ice track.

The FPS-20 was operating on Channel 2 during this
period. At 19102, Channel 2 failed and the set went off the air.
Thirty seconds later Channel 1 was in operation. A defective tube
in the modulator caused the above failure. Set operation and
console noise level appeared normal during the time of the incident.

b. NORAD Team Observations: At 2000Z on 25 S=ptember,
the NORAD team observed a series of random blips on a UPA-35 con-

sole. These blips occurred at a constant azimuth of 160° but at

various ranges. The operations personnel involved in the 20

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UNCLASSH 3
September incident were called to observe this and they immediately

identified the blips as being exactly the same as those observed on
20 September. The variations in ranges were to some degree uniform
in their appearance, i.e., the blips would occur at approximately
210 n.mi., approach the station at speeds of 3,000 to 3,500 knots
for 3 or 4 sweeps then would appear at a different range unaccept-
able to track coherence. Other scopes in the operations room were
also displaying these blips. This condition was observed throughout
the night by the operations personnel at Montauk. The next morning

the transmitter was changed to Chanhhel 1 and the condition disap-

peared. At the request of the NORAD team, on the evening of 26

oer

September, the site changed back to Channel 2 and the condition
again appeared.

The following is a summary of the most important
characteristics of, and technical environment surrounding, the
Montauk target plienomenon on 20 September 1957.

At the initial stage of detection, this object's
electronic configuration was described as similar to that of B-52
type aircraft when observed at long range, with the ee
its speed. Several sweeps later the electronic configuration of
this target changed to that of a smaller object, yet the heading of
the target and its aspect remained constant. Normal target returns
from conventional or jet type aircraft do not rerlect such radical
changes in their size as this target did unless they undergo radical

changes in aspect ratio. In fact, it is very difficult for experi-

see

enced operators to detect changes in target size when the aircraft

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is maintaining a constant track. \j

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The target intensity of track BB-6 remained constant
throughout the entire tracking period. Normal target returns
fluctuate in intensity to such a degree that the condition is

visually obvious to the operator.

Tracking was continuous and the blip/scan ratio was 1.0
over the entire track. A 1.0 blip/scan ration on conventional and
jet aircraft without beacon or Mark X is a rare occurrence under

normal operation.

The fact that this target was of such size to sustain
a 1.0 blip/sean ratio at Montauk AFS would indicate that other sta-

tions within detection distances certainly should have received some

indication of this track.

rotating radar with another rotating radar operating at or fairly
close to the same operatilonal parameters will normally produce
"spirals" occurring at the outer edge of the PPI scope and spiraling
into the center of the scope along with extremely high background
noise levels. The noise level on the scope, of course, is propor-
tional to the power transmitted by the interfering radar. It was
impossible to associate track BB-6 with previously experienced
mutual interference patterns of two rotating radars. It would be
possible, however, to generate a condition of this sort with a fixed-
antenna type radar operating at or close to the frequency and PRF of

the rotating radar. The team was unable to ascertain the location

_—

of any fixed radar stations in that area that could produce such a

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condition. The non-rotating radar station would have to have
mobility in view of the movement of this phenomenon from one azimuth
to another over a period of several days, and its installation would
have had to have been made recently due to the absence of this type
phenomenon in the past.

3. BENTON AFS: Benton Air Force Station is located approximately
35 n.mi. NW of Wilkes-Barre, Pa. The following is a list of equip-
ment and operating parameters associated with this station at the time

of the incident:

Primary Search Equipment AN/FPS-1O (2700-3020 mc)
Height Finding Equipment AN/FPS-6 (2700-2900 mc)
Antenna [otation Rate 5 rpa

Antenna Tilt }£lectrical) Search 1.5°

Vertical Lower 3°

Vertical Center 6°

Vertical Upper 11°
Pulse Recurrence Frequency 300 PPS

Blip/Scan on 8B-6 and BE-111
from Detection to Fade 1.0

a. Circumstances Related By Benton Operations Personnel:
Prior to detection of high speed track BB-6, traffic and scope pre-
sentations at Benton were normal. At 1755Z and 1758Z two SAC aircraft
requested permission to run ECM against Benton. The duty controller
advised approval and the two aircraft commenced chaff runs at 1805Z
and 1810Z, respectively. Aircraft dropped chaff in streams north of —
the station extending west to approximately 220 n.mi. Chaff dispensing
ended at 1832Z and 1535Z. The residual effects of the chaff cloud

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were visible on the radar consoles for over an bour's pertod.

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At 1916Z, Benton received four overlap pre-plots from

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26th AD Control Center on an unidentified target said to be heading
west at 2,000 knots with an estimated altitude of 50,000 feet. At 1917Z
Benton detected a target on the vertical upper beam heading north-
west with an estimated speed of 920 knots. This target was correlated
as being BB-6 from Montauk. The track was carried on VU until contact
was lost at a point approximately 135 n.mi. northwest of the station.
It was again picked up on vertical center and tracked until it faded at
1926Z. No further pickup on this track was made.

At 19242 the second track was detected on Vi 75 n.mi. north
of the station heading 290°, estimated speed 1,200 knots. This track
had no correlation and was numbered BE-111. It was carried on VU until
contact was lost at a point approximately 145 n.mi. northwest of the
station. It was again picked up on vertical center at 160 n.mi. northwest
and carried until it faded at 190 n.mi., 305°. Both tracks were interro-
gated by Mark X with no response. All track information was passed to
the ACW site at Lockport and Claysburg but these sites did not detect
‘either of these tracks. Lockport was off the air for maintenance during
the entire time Benton was tracking and did not return to operation until
1935Z, one minute after the track BE-l1l faded. Lockport observed the
residual effects of the chaff drop. Anti-aircraft units in the area of
concern did not report any unusual, high-speed target activity.

B-58 aircraft activity was considered as a possible cause for
the track at Benton AFS; however, a message to WADC established that no

B-58s were flying in this area at this time.

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Technical data and radar performance characteristics

associated with B-58 aircraft are non-existent at this time and as a :

a

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consequence, the NORAD team was without acapability.to effectively V- 4 ty

assess the target data derived and properly associate this data with

B-58 characteristics.

At the time of the incident, Benton had one OA-99 PPI

console on each of the three vertical beams and the Air Surveillance

Officer used a fourth OA-99 to monitor all beams. Of these, only one
OA-99, manned by two airmen, displayed the targets (first on the VU and .

then on the VC beams). No detection of BB-6 or BE-111 was made on any

other scope in the station. No detections were made on FPS-6 or on the
VL or search beams of the FPS-10. The operating parameters of the FPS-10

were within normal operating limits. Weather at this station was low

——_--

overcast with slight drizzle. “

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b. NORAD Team Observations: The NORAD team was unable to

— ee

duplicate the above condition by scope analysis. All scopes had indi- |
cations of interference patterns typical of those that would be generated
by interference from other radars. The technical parameters associated
with this type interference should not produce crossing tracks. The
degree of this interference was not sufficient to deteriorate the perfor-
mance of the station. The radar returns as described by the operations
personnel indicate that these returns were not characteristic of normal

radar targets. Except for the high rate of speed and unexplained

variations in speed, the blips described a normal aircraft track. These

————

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blips differed from normal returns in that they were round in shape with

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a slight fuzziness around the periphery and were estimated to be about

twice the diameter of a return from a B-52 at maximum radar range. The
intensity of the blips remained constant throughout the entire track.
Tracking continuity and blip-scan ratio was 1.0.

The following is & summary of the characteristics of, and

technical environment surrounding, the Benton target phenomenon on 20 Septem-

ber 1957.

The two tracks did not possess qualities of normal radar returns,

1. e., they had a 1.0 blip-scan ratio throughout the entire tracking period.
They maintained a constant target intensity. The size and shape varied
considerably from that of normal returns and they were not detected on the
search or vertical lower beams. ‘Targets having returns as strong and per-
sistent as these should be seen on all beams of an FPS-10. Only one scope
in the station dlsplayed this track and detection could not be made on the
height finder. In addition, other sites in the immediate area were alerted
sufficiently in advance to acclimate themselves to the situation, yet no
other detections were made by these other stations.

It should be noted that Lockport was off for maintenance and
did not return to operation until one minute after the target faded at
Benton. The 1.0 blip-scan Ratio at Benton and the target location at the
time of the fade would indicate the track should have been detected by
Lockport.

The detection and fading characteristice of these targets were

completely abnormal. The screening angles for Benton AFS do not exceed 0°

throughout the area of concern. The tracks were detected well within the

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(7) Other applicable units were checked.

In brief, the conclusions are as follows:

From the information and data studied from all pertinent units
it appears that the tracks were from orate causes; and, in
fact much of the information appeared contradicteary.

No hostile cr unknown aircraft, missiles or vehicles were in
the aren at the time and places of the radar sightings. The
UFOs were concluded to have been caused by radar-equipment
malfunctions and interference.

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line of site capabilities of the station and faded well within the

line of site capabilities of the station. Both detection and fade plots

were at 1.0 blip-scan ratio.

EVALUATION

1. Operational Procedures: Operational procedures as demonstrated

by the NORAD system and its subordinate elements were as specified by

appropriate operational directives. Weapon commitment procedures were

appropriate to the speed, altitude and radar tracking characteristics of

the target track.

a. Montauk APS: The actions of the radar surveillance personnel
were commendable in that during a 2-minute period the target was detected,
initiated as a track, Five position plots recorded and forward told to the
26th CONAD Air Division, and to adjacent radars.

It was noted that the height-range indicator at Montauk is
physically located so that it cannot be used on short notice. It was also
noted that radar s-ope photo equipment was not readily available to obtain
a photographic record of this track.

b. Benton AFS: The operation at Benton, Pa., was in accordance
with current operational directives. The target was detected and passed
to adjacent radars and to higher echelons. A determined effort to collect

data was made.

It was noted that radar scope cameras were committed to a
training program and were not employed to record this track.
c. 26th CONAD Air Division: ‘The control center personnel promptly

noted the track, assembled personnel of authority and passed track information

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to other concerned radars nal! higher echelons.

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ad. CONAD Forces Eastern CONAD Region: The Combat Operations
Center personnel promptly noted the track and properly passed track
information to those Air Defense Divisions along the probable flight path
of the object. The appropriate divisions were placed on increased readiness.
Interceptors were scrambled ahead of the track along its dead-reckoned course.
e. NORAD: Operational procedures at the NORAD Combat Operations
Center were in accordance with current directives. Track information was
passed to CONAD Forces Central CONAD Region in time for them to have inter-
ceptors on CAP along the probable flight path of the track. Preliminary
information on thls track and on NORAD actions were passed to the SAC
Control Center and to the USAF Command post.

2. Analysis of Track Overlays: The most obvious feature of the two
segments of Track BB-6, and one which contributed most directly to the
original correlation, was the similarity of their courses. The first
portion carried by Montauk described a course of approximately 289° while
the course of the second portion carried by Benton was about 278°. A line
drawn along the "average" course of the first segment and extended to the
area where the second part of the track was established passes within about
20 miles of the point of detection of the second segment. Courses of radar
tracks on bomber aircraft are seldom more consistent than this.

The first track segment appeared to curve slightly toward the
west just prior to its fade. This change in course was based on only one
or two returns; however, after discussing the track with the station opera-
ting personnel it was concluded that this change was well within the normal
variations caused by plotting errors. This turn then, may not have actually
occurred.

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The speeds of the two portions, while far less consistent
than the courses, were compatible enough to preclude discounting a corre-

lation on the basis of speed. The track earried by. Montauk’ attained a

length of about 143 n.mi. in 95 seconds, giving an average speed of 5,400

knots (as opposed to 3,600 knots reported on the initial plot). Although

the time period over which the track was carried by Montauk was too short

to provide accurate estimates of speed changes, it appears that the track
speed was, if anything, increasing. The last two plots, covering a 15-second
time span, advanced the track approximately 45 n.mi. giving an average speed
of about 10,000 knots for this portion of the track. Again it is emphasized
that these estimates must be viewed with caution because of the very short

observation time. |

The second part of BB-6 covered a distance of 128 n.mi. ina

period of 8 minutes. ‘The average speed here was about 960 knots. The

plots in this track semnent indicate a speed of above 1,200 knots at the
beginning and end ot ‘he track and a speed slightly below 900 knots in
the middle portion of the track. Track BE-l11, which paralleled the seg-

ment of BB-6 carried by Benton, achieved a jangth of 205 n.mi. in 10

minutes for an average speed of 1,230 knots.

Since the speeds of the two segments of BB-6 differ by a factor
of nearly six to one, a logical attempt to correlate the two segments can
be made only if one assumes that the track decreased in speed during the
10 1/4 minutes it was dead-reckoned. On the basis of the two average speeds,
i. e., 5,400 knots and 960 knots, an average deceleration of 26 ,600 knots

per hour would be required over the entire 10 1/4 minutes to account for the

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speed difference. If the track had decelerated at this rate it should
have progressed about 530 n.mi. during the dead-reckoned period instead
of the 280 miles it actually did travel. Since neither segment indicated
a marked deceleration it would be more logical to suppose that if the
track decelerated, it did so only for a part of the dead-reckoned time.
In this case, the time and distance correlation would have been even
less acceptable.
Except for the high blip-scan ratio observed at each station,
there was virtually no similarity in the scope displays on the track seg-
ments. The return seen at Montauk appeared to represent a normal target.
The blips were approximately the same size and shape as normal target
returns and the only discrepancy observed was the relatively great decrease
in blip size as the track approached the station. The returns seen at

Benton were larger ‘lan normal blips and appeared round in shape. All

blips in Benton's track were identical and exhibited none of the variations

in size or intensity characteristic of real target returns. The manner in
which the second portton of the track faded was entirely unrealistic for
an outbound track. The blips remained large and round out to the point
where the fade occurred and at this point the "paints" abruptly stopped.
The fade on the portion of BB-6 carried by Montauk was more abrupt than
would be expected for such persistent returns but is believed that/a real
track could fade in this manner.

To summarize the discussion on track correlation: the corre-
lation in the courses of the two segments of BB-6 is remarkably good while
the correlation in time and distance, even assuming a highly unlikely speed
profile, is questionable. There seems to be no similarity between the

scope displays seen at the two stations.

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must be considered an extra track which correlates with neither of the
other segments.

3. Characteristics of Airborne Objects: The ADC Range Coverage
Indicator was used in an attempt to determine the characteristics of an

airborne object which could produce tracks similar to the ones observed

at Benton.

Using an average range based on the range at whipgm the target

was last observed on the VU lobe and the range of initial detection on

the VC lobe, an estimate of target size and altitude was made. It was

found that a plus 10 db target at 135,000 feet is the smallest object that

could be lost on the VU lobe and be detected on the VC lobe at approximately

this range. Applying the same procedure to the range at which the target
disappeared from the .C beam, it was determined that the smallest object
which could produce this effect would be a minus 2 db target at 120,000

feet. This information is shown graphically in the following figure:

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The cross-hatched area of the figure represents the limits of
the characteristics of an object which could produce the tracks observed
at Benton; however, two major discrepancies must be noted concerning the

above target size and altitude data;

a. No known type of airborne object should produce a 1.0
blip-scan ratio during the entire length of the track from its initial |
detection to its abrupt disappearance.

b. Based on the above target size and altitude estimates,
the RCI indicates that the observed tracks were also within the detection
capability of the VI. and search kit beams; therefore, the tracks should
have been detected In these beams.

4. Missile Churacteristics:

@. Possittitty of Cruise Type Missile: Tracking subsequent to
the first pickup indicated a speed of approximately 5,400 knots or Mach 9.
Considering the so-called heat or thermal barrier problem this would be
an extension of the state of the art so far beyond present day accomplish-
ments as to be consiiered impossible for some time to come. In order to
escape the heat barrter an airplane flying at this speed would have to fly
above 300,000 feet. This again is so far beyond present day accomplishment
as to be considered extremely unlikely. On the other hand, if we consider
only the second pickup (by Benton), the ground speed of that portion (approxi -
mately 1,000 knots) would be consistent with the present state of the art.

b. Possibility of Ballistic Missile A horizontal speed of
Mach 9 is consistent with a 900 n.mi. range ballistic missile. The 1,000

knot portion of the track is also consistent with ballistic missile re-entry

UNCLASOIED
speeds; however, a ballistic missile would re-enter the atmosphere and
land in a period of 30 to 200 seconds and cover only 20-40 miles while
doing so, whereas, the track carried by Benton extended over 100 miles
and about 8 minutes subsequent to detection. Similarly, the second track
carried by Benton fails to demonstrate the deceleration characteristics
of a ballistic missile re-entry. ‘Thus, if we consider the two pickups
to be on the same object, it seems unlikely that the object was a bal-
listic missile.

c. To summarize: Considering the two tracks as a unit it seems

very unlikely that the object was either a cruise type or a ballistic

——$

missile. ‘Pe

Considering tracking on the first segment only, one might
conclude that it could have been a ballistic missile.

Considering tracking subsequent to the second pickup only,
one might conclude that it could have been a cruise type missile.

5. Meteor Characteristics: Meteors were also considered as a possible
cause of high speed radar tracks. It was hypothesized that a meteor
approaching the earth at a relatively large angle (as measured from the
horizontal) might produce a track having a horizontal component of velocity
which could correlate with the portion of track BB-6 observed from Montauk.
Upon closer examination, however, it appears that such a hypothesis is
untenable.

Meteors penetrating the earth's atmosphere can be detected
and tracked by radar, but the results of research in this area indicate

that it would be extremely unlikely that a radar return from a meteor would

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HINCLASSIFIED

appear as strong, clear, _UNULos as the ones contained in track

BB-6. Observations made by the U. S. Bureau of Standards show that the

radar frequency is an important factor in the tracking of meteors. Radar

+ see

returns are optained more from the ionized gases surrounding the meteor
than from the meteor itself, and as the radar frequency is increased more
of the energy should pass through the ionized cloud rather than reflecting
from it. In general, successful meteor tracking has been achieved only
with radars having frequencies below about 60 mcs. Since the frequency of
the FPS~-20 is over twenty times as high as this, it is extremely doubtful
that it would even detect a meteor. Perhaps the ionized "trail" could be
detected particularly after it had had sufficient time“to expand into a
larger target, but such a return would not appear as a fast moving object.
A consiteration of meteor speeds only serves to discount
further the possibility that any of the tracks could have been caused by
meteors. During the past twenty years, several thousand meteors have been
observed scientifically, 1.e., accurate records of thelr speed and trajec-
tory have been made. Data on the velocities of over 10,000 meteors studied

by Stanford and Harvard Universities* show that meteor velocities below

35,000 knots are rare, and none of the observations showed velocities
below 23,000 knots. These studies also indicate that meteor trails, i. e.,

heating of the meteor to incandescence and ionization of gases rarely begin

above 65 n.mi. or extend below a height of 25 n.mi.
A meteor approaching the earth at a velocity of 23,000 knots

would have to follow a path inclined at least 77° from the horizontal in

*Fletcher G. Watson, Between the Planets, p. 84, 122

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order to produce a horizontal component of velocity of 5,000 knots

(the approximate average velocity of the first segment of BB-6). In the
nearly two minutes (95 seconds) that Montauk carried the track, a meteor |
at this velocity would travel about 575 n.mi. in the vertical plane. Thus,
detection would have had to be made when the object was at least 575 miles
above the surface of the earth.

On the other hand, a meteor at 23,000 knots, following a
trajectory flat enough to be tracked for 95 seconds by radar, i. e., within
100 miles of the earth's surface, would travel nearly 600 siti horizontally
at a horizontal velocity of 22,500 knots.

To Summarize: A meteor following a trajectory having a hori-.
zontal component of velocity consistent with the speed of track BB-6 as
seen at Montauk wouid have had to be detected nearly 600 miles above the
earth's surface without benefit of a cloud or trail of ionized gas. Such
a feat is considered extremely unlikely for a rotating, surveillance radar.
A meteor remaining close enough to the earth's surface to afford even a
remote possibility, of being tracked for 95 seconds would have to travel at
a speed of at least 22,000 knots.

6. Aurora Borealis: Aurora Borealis was also a factor considered
by the team as having possible effects of this nature. Research into past
history on the subject indicates all known auroral effects in the —
frequency spectrum produces receiver saturation by random noise, creating an
entirely different scope condition from those observed during this incident.
No instances have been recorded where auroral effects have produced just one

or two tracks similar to those observed at the Montauk station.

nr AMIryern
’ ™

UNCLASSIFIZD

In 1953, an evaluation and detailed report was made on 4

phenomenon existing at Cutbank, Montana, called "Pipsqueaks." This
Parveubetoy waute cate in any way be associated with the 20 September
1957 incident iy te NORAD team.

7. Weather: Immediately following the incident, the Division Weather
Officer analyzed weather and atmospheric conditions prevailing in the 26th
Division. This analysis was based primarily on soundings and reported
weather conditions. In general, this analysis showed no ducts, inversions
or other conditions which could account for high speed radar tracks.

—A similar analysis was performed by members of the 3d
Weather Group, Hq. ADC. ‘The results of this analysis verified the find-
ings of the Division Weather Officer.

Weather ‘forecasts and soundings from the four weather stations
closest to the area in which the tracks were observed are included in Attach-
ment IIT. It should be noted that the only indication of a refractive layer
is found in the plots >f B units (refractive index) from Idlewild. This layer
was not strong, however, and was at a higher altitude than are layers which
normally cause false targets.

To summarize: Two independent studies of the available weather
data by qualified weather officers failed to reveal conditions which are known
to produce anonalous propagation or false targets. If weather conditions pre-
vailing on 20 September did produce these high speed tracks, one would expect
the occurrence of such tracks to be the rule rather than the exception.

8. Equipment Malfunction: Montauk Air Force Station has recently had

the AN/A'PS3 Bearch radar modified into an AN/FPS-20. The station has, in

BIAIAL ANITA

nh . *. ' | Seer ase
rh ae alle | UivurAoon thal) (

3. Alleged High-Speed "UFOs" Tracked from Montauk, New York and Needing
towards SAC Headquarters, Nebraska - 20 September 1957 SA)

a. Commander, ATIC, was requested by Deputy ACS/I, Headauarters
USAF to provide full particulars and other related informaticn
regarding a reported potential, very high-speed unidentified
object alleged to have been picked up near Montauk, H.Y.,
passing over Buffalo, towards SAC Headquarters at Offutt Ars, |
Nebraska. The incident resulted in an inmwediate alert dy
both SAC and Ait,

b. Detailed report of the incident based on investigations and |
analyses conducted: |

(1) Track was pieked up originally by the radar unit at
Montauk, HN. Y. at 1906Z time, 20 September 1957. It |
was picked up by Benton, Pa., unit at 1918.

(2) The radar units at Highlands, N.Y., N. Truro, Masa.,
Locksport, N.Y. and Claysburg, Pa., wem alerted.
However, these wits could not make contact with the
supposed target.

(3) F-102 aircraft were scrambled from Kisross APB (ADC)
(Michigan) as well ag additional F-102"s from Truax AFB
(Wisconain) as the target was reportéd bearing on a pre- |
plétted track in that direction. No contact made;
nothing unusual found. The tracks faded at this point.
(Significant to point out that the last observed track
was in the vicinity of Benton, Pa., and not in the
vicinity of SAC Hq as reported to ATIC). Weather |
conditions: overcast and rain.

(4) NORAD wat a radar team to study this incident, in-
cluding similar targets if they should appear.

(5) Om 25 September, a radar team noted 6 series of blips |
on the radarscope of the Montauk, N.Y. Station, the
unit originally reporting the tracks. The tracks vere
“exactly identical" to those of 20 September. When the
channel (frequency) was changed the blips disappeared.
(or cheat th or eit ens They reappeared when the original frequency was tuned,
Aut! ap aS in, A circuit malfunction or interference from a radar
By Ura rrr oe set having a non-rotating antenna was considered the
: 3 most probable cause for this. |

Date Bact e
ve a” jem eel:

Classification Cancelled

"y

to(6) Meanwhile, a check of the Benton, Ps. radar unit dis-
closed that there were two SAC airasft in the area whicn |
dropped "Streams of radar chaff" near the station on the
Gay of the incident. It was also determined that the |
detection and characteristics of these targets vere
completely abnormal, probably caused by equipment mal-
function. HIhIAt sm are

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N CL ASs! I | ED

the past, experienced hits difficulties in several major components

of the equipment. None of these were serious enough, however, to induce
long periods of breakdown or degradation of operational performance.

The NORAD team could not find any specific source of component
malfunction that could contribute to the cause of the 20 September phe-
nomenon. The circumstantial evidence associated with the 20 September
phenomenon such as the observation by the NORAD team of a condition similar
to that observed by the operations personnel on 20 September would indicate
erratic performance of some électronic component within the equipment. One
member of the NORAD team has been closely associated with the technical
development of the FPS5-20 since its inception. It was indicated by this
member during the evaluation that certain electronic components of this
equipment, on rare occasions, would produce random noise known as "angel
effects." These effects are similar to those experienced on 20 September
by the Montauk station. The similarity, however, is not conclusive enough
that the incident can be attributed to this effect. Further technical
analysis must be accomplished before "angel effects" can be either accepted
or rejected as a cause.

At Benton Air Force Station, the NORAD team was unable to
find any specific cases of malfunction of the AN/CPS-6B that would Gn
tribute to the 20 September phenomenon. The station has experienced only
those minor equipment difficulties, all of them common to the AN/CPS-6B
over long periods of sustained operation. The circumstantial evidence

associated with this phenomenon, such as the pick-up and fade character-

istics of the target, the appearance of the target on only one scope, the
7 ~ . s / if i af vig i ;
DO WNC»P ATTY) AT Hh VP imery ATTN eras, 22

Doc enw be’

are =
we = | SRS

———

eT

—

antl Bi tee te in nl Dn ce - Se

SS\

ack sik Sal on vertical, lower, and

inability of the Seite OR WNGLAS

search beams, and the lack of height-finder detection would indicate erratic

performance of some electronic component within the equipment. That com-

ponent malfunction was the cause of the phenomenon can only be verified on

the basis of further technical analysis.

CONCLUSION

1. In studying the characteristics of these high-speed radar tracks,

it was found that much of the information pertaining to them appeared to

| “be
be unrelated or contradictory. Under these circumstances, it is very

difficult and often impossible, to arrive at positive conclusions. None

of the possible causes considered in the study could be supported indis-

putably as the one responsible for the tracks. The evaluation did show

that certain of the explanations were much more tenable while others were

rejected almost entirely. Therefore, the conclusions presented concerning

the cause of tracks BB-6 and BE-11l are not stated in unaquivocal terms
as one would prefer conclusions to be, but rather they are statements of

the relative probability that the tracks were the result of the various

possible causes evaluated.

a. Despite the apparent track correlation between the two seg-

ments of track BB-6, it is highly probable that these two tracks resulted

from separate, unrelated causes.—~

b. ‘The most probable cause of track BB-6 carried by Montauk is

believed to be either a circuit malfunction or interference from & radar
4? (f} Hi OO rr

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having a non-rotating ehtennal. / Ofsted lewd causes, the former is considered

the more likely.

c. The most probable cause of track BB-6 and BE-111 carried by

Benton is believed to be equipment malfunction. External interference is

not considered a probable cause.

d. Estimates of the altitude of BE-111 and the portion of BB-6
carried by Benton are highly questionable. Estimates of the altitude of
BB-6 carried by Montauk are totally without basis.

e. It is considered highly improbable that any of the track
segments were caused by either meteors or auroral effects.

f. Although weather phenomena cannot be completely discounted,

it is believed improbable that the tracks observed at Benton were a result

of any known weather or atmospheric conditions.

g- Since weather data are not available from areas over the
ocean, it is possible that unknown weather conditions could have caused
the track observed at Montauk. On the basis of available data, however,
weather is not considered a probable cause of the first segment of track
BB-6.

h. On the basis of known missile capabilities, it is possible
that a ballistic missile could simulate the trajectory of BB-6 as ob-
served at Montauk and that the trajectory of a cruise missile could re-
semble BE-111 or the second portion of BB-6. Neither of these are con-
sidered probable causes.

i. Operational functions of the NORAD system were within

established time criteria and in accordance with existing directives.

LJ

‘
j

a.

Plautnw (faust

‘Es
UNC LAR SdED

1. It is recommended that further technical investigation be

accomplished by appropriate Air Force agencies to attempt to isolate
the phenomenon outlined in this report to insure proper recognition of

this phenomenon should it re-occur.

hecaee A) (orp

MAURICE D. SURRATT C NCE W. KNOTT
Major, USAF Major, USAF
Member . Chairman

‘
lal ing? Gue-cl- A Ly  Marege—
WAL “GOODRICH, JR. Mr. ROY E. DO

Major, USAF NORAD Operations Analysist
Member Member
77 Lunt
. JOHN J. McGRATH
ORAD Operations Analysist
Member

— ne

Attachment II

AREA WEATHER FORECASTS FOR 26TH AIR DIVISION (DEF)
Valid 20/0900Z to 20/1700% Sept 57

General Situation: Little change expected in synoptic picture during
forecast period with high pressure area in North
Atlantic and ridge extending southwest over Virginia.

All Zones:
Clouds: Mostly clear with increasing high cloudiness above 25,000 feet.
Precipitation: None

Visibility: Patches of ground fog burning out and vsby reaching 3 miles by
133QZ.

Freezing Level: 13,000 ft. msl.

Icing: None ft. msl.

Contrails: 38,000 ft. msl.

Remarks: Cloud bases given as ceiling ht. in feet--tops given in feet msl.

Valid 20/1500Z to 20/2300Z Sept 57

General Situation: Cold front approaching Div. from the northwest with
considerable shower activity in advance.

Zone 1 and Northwest Sxns. lf Zone IIT:

Clouds: Bkn-ove near 1500-2000 ft. with tops to 35 thsd. ft.
Precipitation: Shwrs. and sctd. tstms.

Visibility: 7 plus xcept lwrng to 2-4 in pcpn.

Freezing Level: 13,000 ft. msl.

Icing: Severe in tstms ft. msl.

Contrails: 36,000 ft. msl.

Remainder of Division Area:

Clouds: Sctd ocnly bkn cumulus bases near 3,000 ft. tops to 12-15 thsd.
with bkn middle clouds bases near 12-15 thsd. ft.

Precipitation: None.

Visibility: 6 mi in haze.

Freezing Level: 13,500 ft. msl. Icing: None ft. msl.

Contraiils: 30,000 rt. msl.

Remarks: Cloud bases given as ceiling height in ft--tops given in ft. msl.

a ee _ I

( 1230 - Wed sday, 26 Feb. 58

Mr . ite

(Paraphrased) Refereace inquiries regardiag Martha's
Vineyard radar incident evaluation requested by General VW.,
full particulars are in. [In brief, report not entirely
correct that radar units made observation all the way across

to point supposedly a target.

Track was picked up originally by two statioas ia New
York. First contact was at Montauk, N. Y. However, radar
units aloug line (paraphrase) to S were alerted. These
units did not see target on radarscopes.

F 102 aircraft were scrambled from various bases in
Michigan as well as Wisconsin. No contacts made, nothing
unusual found, ana tracks faded at this point.

A vadar team was set up to study this incideat, iaclud-
jug similar targets if they should appear. Oa 25 September
the radar investigating team was in the original radar unit
that sighted tie tracks. Exactly identical tracks appeared.
Yhea frequency was changed to new channel the blips ais-
appeared. They reappeared whea the previous chaanel was
tuned back in,

A check of the secoad radar unit disclosed that there
were two SAC aircraft in the area which dropped "streams
of radar chaff"' near the station on the date of sighting.
It was also determined tiat the detection ana characteris-
tics of the targets observed were completely abnormal. Tie
other applicable units were also checked by tnis inuvestiga-
tive team,

CONCLUSION:
Ja brief the conclusioas are as follows:

a. The information and data studied from all pertinent
units appeared to be unrelated and in fact coutradictory to

each other.

/
*

b. It is, therefore, difficult if not impossible to

draw aay valid conclusions, although there is no compelling
reason or indicatioas that the tracks were hostile, or un-
k.owa aircrait, or missiles.

A £ull report will be oa your desk upoa retura.

George T. Gregory/aa
Captain, USAF
Air Scieace Division

nys

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Claysburg, Pa.

RADAR SITE

RAOB STATION_2ittsburgh, Pa.

pate20 Sept 57 +... 18002

310

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|

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is

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_

365
555

1152
PAGE

4980

FOR
INDEX OF REFRACTION

19
15

COMPUTATION SHEET

20
14
CASE NO.

48

ni

An

3 WG FORM 29-I1SEPT 55

FORECASTER
ATMOSPHERIC

975
850

WAK2A
ok

NV WASHINGTON *=(UP)--STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND HAS BEEN ALERTED AT
LEAST ONCE BECAUSE. . ..A RADAR REPORT OF UNIDENTIFIED SUPERSONIC PLANES
APPROACHING THIS COUNTRYe THE REPORT TURNED OUT TO BE FALSE.
SEN. RALPH Ee FLANDERS (R-VTe) TOLD ABOUT IT IN THE CENSORED ACCOUNT _
OF SENATE gga er Seoere nbecae PUBLIC TODAY, ON THE ,

$1,260,000,000 (B) SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE BILL. Ji
. THE SENATOR QUOTED GEN. THOMAS POWER, STRATEGIC AIR COMMANDER » AS nw & |

SAYING THAT ON ONE OCCASION "APPARENTLY AUTHENTIC INFORMATION HA
COME FROM OUR RADAR STATIONS .IN THE OCEAN AND CORROBORATED BY OUR __

_, RADAR STATIONS ON THE COAST, OF A FLEET OF PLANES TRAVELING AT 2,000) ~) |
MILES AN HOUR HEADED FOR THE INTERIOR OF THIS COUNTRY.® als = ER

( "THE QUESTION WAS: WHAT SHALL WE DO ABOUT IT?" FLANDERS SAID.

"HE (POWER) SAID WAIT AND THEY WAITED, AND (THE REPORTED PLANES) —

) RISAPEEARED INTO THIN AIR AFTER THEY HAD’ PASSE} THE COASTe & -
WAS ONE OF TH UNIDENTIFIED FLYING gree WHICH WERE. -

We RADAR AND NOT TO ANY ACTUAL EXISTING.
OBJECTs* | =

. JEL36P See AT { recap — ae. .

22
WITH DEENSE. \A7*
S

NMBA TA

USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
| -WEMO ROUTING SLIP MYER UE FOR APPR AL, BISAPTRO LS,

: 2 WAME OR TITLE a waTuLg J) CIRCULATE
| mi Ma. AIWaAEeR 1
ORGANIZATION AKO LOCATIQ! ‘aed ere
‘ / Fx . ; = av, /G “i
] z FILE

FORM Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 44, and AYAQ CO tO“ oss!
1 FES SO 95 Porm 12, 10 Nov 47, whieh ray be used

eee

_~

SCO TT

‘
—— — _ — Se

tar = TCLAS SeiFIED

es ov eed TRE Bice SA Cee a

SPAOKB HELOW RESERVED YOR Ce wwe NICATION ¢ "EN TER

JCINT MESSAGEFORM

— = — — =, ——— —

PRECEDENCE ‘| TYPE MSG (Check) ACCOUNTING ORIG OR REFERS TO
ween -—- ' “y- SYMBOL } OF REFERENCE
ACTION BOCK MULTE | SINGLE j
er - RICK a :
INFO ae © * AY ORIGINAL

-——— —— — == -— — — 26 —

FROM * | SPECIAL Inf

i eten ‘ AT ; We

COR, ANC, ENT AF, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO ‘tip, 14
ro
w\

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;
. Terre, o ah bd ’ . i
aei Leet; UL «a fy a}! 2 ay a :

REQUESY TSPORMATION AXD DATA REGARDING UFO REPORTEDLY TaugeD
BY RAW FROM ABA MEAR MARTHA'S VINEYARD, MASS. TO SOME FOINT Di

VICINITY OF CMAHA, WEBRASKA, SPEED ESTIMATED AS 2000 HPH. ALSO
EEPULRD TUAT TRACK PLOTS MADE OVER BUFPALO, MEW TORK, AND CHICAGO,
AS A SMGIR, CONTINUOUS TRACK PLOT, AND BELICVED TO HAVE TACGH
PLACE Swe TIME IN SEPTEMBER 1957. j

THIS CEUTER BAS BO OFFICIAL RECORD OF ANY SIDULE, COMTINKUS
UFO LOM] TRACK PLOT GF THIS RATUDE, REFEREED TO YOUR OFFICE UPON
QUERY TO HEADQUARTERS SAC POR PARTICULARS OM THIS CASE, IMSIkE

FOLLOWING BASIC INFORMATIONS — % ; ;

le WAS THIS A SUOMEE, CONTINUOUS TRACK OF THE SAME OBJECT egies

CLASSIFK ATION

TRULY

Date 2 ay ye
Ge > 2 ASCIH-AZL BOF

YR POIZT OF ORIGIN TO FOINT OF EISATPRARAICE OR A SERIZS OP SEPA- [care |

ILLIM0IS 45 TT PASHED OVER THESE CITIES, THAIS SICHTIMWG IS RETORTED

R
!
Tt | PHONE Yr - Pay Ox eyo 7] reat “FR. OF
5 et. Pacas

DD ; FORM, 1 73 REPLACES OD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

MAY sO

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7FRO ADODI-8 6£2 REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE

BFCIN@“4SE4 10 4: 154, 18 FEBRUARY 1558. INVESTICATION OF THE INCI-
DENT OF 2c SEPTEMBER 1957 WIS CONDUCTED EY A HEADQUARTERS

NORAD AD KOC COMMITTEE, INCIDENT PATA REQUESTED IS CONTAINED

IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT WHICH IS FEING FORWARDED To YOUR

HEADQUARTERS BY SEPARATE COVER THIS DATE,

PIIYS DATIT AL

ALL INTER ENA v r ar CRENCE ‘oe TIME G, Az 5

PARAPHRASE NOT 7 REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR Tp
LEN CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION —
Faas

MIORN To DF

AIM ASSIFIED eas
UNCLA OIC
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

2 May 1958 |

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL WALSH

SUBJECT: Air Defense Radar Incident

1. I have reviewed the attached account of an Air Defense |
radar incident with great fater est. I referred the report to my
electronics officer who advised me that he is inclined to agree

with the NORAD team that the most probable cause of this incident

was equipment malfunction. However, he also stated that he is
unéble to susrest a specific 1 malfunction that would result in an

incident preciscly as reported.

2. Considering factors such as deceleration times, lack of

good correlation. etc., I am inclined to believe that the object
reported, if t sctually existed, is most probably not @ weapon
of enemy origi::. evertheless. I believe that from your stand-

point, this inc!d+nt should not be closed. Some additional
engineering opinion would be of value and I sugsest that your
electronics people as well as ARDC may be able to shed further
light on the ;roblem. In the meantime, you may want to consider |
asking ADC's essistance in having radar sites report similar
types of incidents on a special effort basis for the next few |
months with th- objective of determining whether this is in fact

an isolated instance. |

iW MAP E TRS .

‘a jor Henkral. USAF
issistant Chier of Staff for

TY 4 ow rat
hire D 32 Systems

Inclosure
NORAD Rpt

Classification Cancelled

or changad to
year TA) ERVALS? oA \ WAiSee>) | |
Taka! 2. \4 @ a bi RADED AT : arias 4 2S. Ir fasisilacca Mere E tie, (CAY ,
RELA EO AE bY 6727 ¢ te
a DO ee : aie L_ fin

Bey AFCAD Cont. 580808

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RK
26 February 1958 ns: y iol Ail
eT fa ae og
tt /? “afl |; yu
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Arcier, 4X1 shar Ud h pe jl
THRU: Colonel Gilbert, 4E b— ‘of WH po
V

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Air Defense Radar UFO Incident - Requested by

General Walsh tn Laer", cote, |
Lk 71s [2 paw

1. Reference is made to Gen Walsh's request to Gen Watson re-/* FE ey |
garding full particulars on a long-duration, potentially hostile ae Fi ike)
tracks (reportedly) originating near Martha's Vineyard, Mass., passing
over Buffalo, New York, Cleveland, Ohio and pointed towards SAC Head-
quarters at Omaha, Nebraska. The incident resulted in an immediate |

alert by ADC and SAC,

2. Attached is a detailed report of the incident, properly plotted,
carefully analyzed and concluded. For purposes of contacting Gen Walsh
and presenting the incldent in brief form, the following are submitted:

a. Track was picked up originally by the radar unit at
Montauk, New York at 1'}06Z time, 20 September 1957. It was picked
by Benton, Pa unit at 19182. |

b. The radar units at Highlands, N.Y., N. Truro, Mass, Locks-
port, N.Y. and Claysburg, Pa. were alerted. However, these units could
not make contact with the supposed target.

c. Two F-\02 aircraft were scrambled from Kinross AFB (ADC)
(Michigan) as well sa two additional F-102*s from Truax AFB (Wisconsin)
as the target was bearing on a pre-plotted track in that direction. No
contact made; nothing unusual found. The tracks faded at this point.
(Significant to point out that the last observed track was in the vicinity
of Benton, N.Y. and not in the vicinity of SAC HQ as reported to ATIC).
Weather conditions: overcast and rain.

dad. NORAD set up a radar team to study this incident, including
similar targets if they should appear.

e. On 25 September, the radar team noted a series of blips on the
radarscope of the Montauk, N.Y. Station, the unit originally reporting the
tracks. The tracks were quote exactly identical to those of 20 September.
When the channel (frequency) was changed the blips disppeared _ They re-
appeared when the previous channel was tuned in. Tration Caneettac

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f. A check of the Benton, Pa. Unit disclosed that there were two
SAC aircraft in the area which dropped "streams of radar chaff" near the ;
station on 20 September 57. It was also determined that the detection and l
characteristics of these targets were completely abnormal.

&- Other applicable units were checked.
3. Conclusions: In brief, the conclusions are as follows:

a. The information and data studied from all pertinent units
appeared to be unrelated, and in fact contradictory to each other.

_
ot ~

SIE AAT YN ne =
A

b. It is therefore impossible to draw any
valid conclusions, although there appears no indication that the tracks
were hostile or unknown aircraft or vehicles.

ve 4, This report has not been channeled through the Electronics

sn I tt

oy il
74 RLF ‘on™ J ik | |

|

Division, because of the urgent request that all results be brought
immediately to your attention, for subsequent transmission to AFCIN.
This report, in the opinion of the undersigned, should be of value to
personnel involved in analyzing radar UFOs. It will, therefore, be

“reproduced and forwarded to AFCIN-4E1 for their possible guidance.

ye TSrogng

1 Inel T. GREGORY |
NORAD Rpt, ©. “/ Captain, USAF |
(758-5070) . AFCIN-hith |

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UNCLASSIFIED
3. Benton establisned an initial plot on an unknown target

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north of the station at 1918Z. The track described a westerly

course at a speed of about 920 knots. The target was tracked con-
tinuously until it faded at 1926Z. At 19242, 2 minutes prior to
the fading of the unknown target, a new target appeared at a posi-
tion northeast of the station at a’ speed of 1,200 knots. This
target described a track that closely paralleled that of the first
track and faded at 1943Z ata position northwest of the station.

4, These unknown tracks were passed to the 763d ACWRON

(Migrate) at Lockport AFS, N.Y. and to the 772d ACWRON AFS (Silvertone)

at Claysburg AIS, Pennsylvania; however, these radars failed to

5. Four Divistons went to a state of Increased Readiness
during the time period. The 20th CADD and the 3lst CADD at 2008Z
and the 30th CADD and 37th CADD at 19432.

6. No scrancie action was taken by the 26th CADD due to the
very high speed of the target. When the track first appeared on the
CFECR plotting board at 1907Z, the 37th CADD was notified and at
1910Z two F-102 alrcraft from Kinross were scrambled. The 37th then
scrambled two additional F-102s from Truax. By this time, both,

tracks had faded.

RELATED DATA

1. GENERAL: On 25 and 26 September 1957, ACW maintenance and

operations personnel associated with the 20 September incident