PROJECT BLUE BOOK

—-- =

PROJECT 10073 RECORD CARD

— —

on PPI

ATIC FORM 329 (REV 26 SEP 52)

scope. A/C scrambled, had
2 then 1 UFO on GCI

Scope, However,
interception results were negative,

J bd fi

me cen aeons esata ersiLasrlbisrcoip li clic olimah essai aoiellonetiloistioal

> 7
=> Mi ilicv S§ |

1, DATE 2. LOCATION 12. CONCLUSIONS
0 Sear sde
_?0 March 1955 Tokyo, Japan ea topeery seinen
|| 3. DATE-TiMe GROUP 4. TYPE OF OSSERVATION St aa
| Local. L813 O Ground- Vi sucl 2<Ground-Redar 5 Bway Kiveoli
7 GMTt_20/051237, 0 Air Vi sual . MWAir-Intercept Radar CO Possibly Aircraft |
5. PHOTOS é. SOURCE a) Was Astronomical
0 Yes O Probobly Astronomical /"y 5
<0 No Mild tary 0 Possibly Astronomical tk.
7. LENGTH OF OBSERVATION 8. NUMBER OF OBJECTS | 9. COURSE iG Other) SSIES
Insufficient Data for Evaluation
* a Unknown
1_ to 16 eg
10. BRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGHTING 11. COMMENTS
Tokyo radar picked up, 16 UFO's See case file. -¥

ig
~ je

=> Oe

AF FORM 112—PAR

APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948

\ AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REF

ae es

SPOM Llgency) REPORT NO,

DI FZa¥, ATLO TR-21=55 aoe’ 8 - é

—-- —_—_-- —_————- —_—- - - _ ae gee

eo oe & eee -

20. The canvavilitiss of ah aircraft which would be cavabls of the varformanca
and range at the altitude of this encounter is, of course, wmknown in the Communist
airoraft inventory.

COUSLAS J. DAVIS
Captain, USAF
Air Technical Liaison Officer

COMMENTS of the Approving Officer:

oe fe

This report-was prevared in its entirety by the Preparing Officer.
: g

CDH

NOTE. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF Thic ESPIONAGE ACT, 80 U.S. C.-
2} AND 32. AS AMENDED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHOR!ZED PERSON 15 PROHWIBITED BY LAW,
IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE O8 IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITEO STATES AIR FORCE AGENCILS, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DiR“CTOR OF

INTELLIGENCE, UDAF.
| .
7 ry iad! * “ry
— Nh ms ; ir
1¢- SSSTO-1 Yo Uf COwraewrad rrieties cevice

——

ee |

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een we FN
A , Ke ‘)

yc ROOM INFORMATION wher filled in) - ( ICY ASSIFIED yA
CAPR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION RECORD azte ana /
m~ ~ TAIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT NUMBER bas
Director of Intelligence = R21 <2 (2AIR 2) il ‘or 22 2 r.

SOURCE OF REPORT (Air Attache, Command , ete.)

Headquarters USAF
if oo
ATIN: Collection Operations Div. DI FEAF, ATLO

Washington 25, D C.

——

INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPAREO BY (Name of officer)

Captain D.J. Davis

ee

FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENT
COMPLETE

———

Ae _ USABILITY OF REPORT
es EXCELLENT

—— a = oe —

VAL IDI TY °F [INFORMATION
CONFIRMED

PRO BABLY TA que

4 PARTIAL

‘SPECI FIC

USABLE Su! CHT

STBLY TRUE.

Too GENERAL DOUBTFUL

CANNOT JUDGE

COMMENTS (Keep the intelligence collectors inforsed, Your commenta, guidance ond criticina are greatly appreciated, Definite
end detailed evaluation will lead io improveemt in the ini ty of Anceres saree Sceati ited

ee ee ee ee oe ——+ —--= ——- -——_ += ee ee --——-

a. The targets which moved and then became stationary are believed to have —

_resulted from a possible temperature inversion that would justify false echoes fron

Cround targets. However, tais report is he ‘first to detail 50 Long an adz rborne

— ee ee —— - — -——_——- ——_-_ — _ — — Seca

pursuit of UFO's , aad it is | Surprising to find the radar operati: ng normally on a

——- - —- —-- --—— ———_ -< --—- =

_target of this type.

woe eee ee ee - --s- — _—_— — - -- -- —--- o- ~~ —-~~ -_ - ee

2, ‘The fact that 16 targets originally appeared on the PPI scope, but only 2

‘-*

E ere observed on the ‘AL radar tends to subs tantiate the spurlous xesponse theory. —

oe on ee ae ee —- oo a ——— ——- oo —_—_—- —

Also, 1% cannot be » positively established that the 2 At targets were part or the

-—— a ee - -_—---—- ee

original 16 targets. It would be possible for the radar to malfunction during the

oa ee eee eee

flight and still check out efter the flight but it wonld be unlikely.

ee eee ae = -- ee  - w- oe — ee ee

3. There is not sufficient data upon which to make a firm evaluation, end

_ —— Se +--+ +

any additional information would be welcomed. This is a very interesting report,

_well prepared, and the incidents which happened cannot be satisfactorily explained,

Se ————

ee ee oe ——- = ——— - -_ =—--—

DOWNGRADED AT 8 YitAk INTERVALS

ry

A i | "fale RE Pye’
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AT AGENCY AND OFFICE . => ANALYST (Signature)
. TIAB5, Alr Technical Intelligence Center
6 June 55 et ne Patterann. A: Capt. C.A. Hardin

Sage “ERTS (SECURITY ua when filled jn)

ia ft aw vata dal f iewke S aes ake al

AF rs en ! 12b PREVIOUS FOITION OF THIS FOSS

e
1 OCT 52 o—,

291451

~=~™

fe FORM 112—PART Il

APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948

TROM CAyency) REPORT NO,

~ te 1 = F aay _—_ cr a
DI WSar os \TLO TReZl=55 PAGE 2 OF ? PASES

— woe eee me wee + ee ee a ee ee ee ee ee ee

ee ee _—--—
— _---

tha organizations having knowledges of pertine
cersonne el interrogated.

1. To redevelop the incident, as it evolved in chronological order, each of
rg nt fac

-_
t factors were visited and appronriata

2. The site cai et a the alert was the C?S=1 radar operating under the control
of the 195 AACS 89 vadron. this sits operates with a misston of controlling airvey
traffic in the Tokyo arsa. Radar surveillance and oattiva control is cenerally
utilized only in the sector south of tha location, A general recaoitulation or
events a3 they wares evidenced is as follows:

‘ri

At anoroximataly 1613I (local tima) tha Tokyo Radar Traffic Control
Cantar located at Jomnson Air Basa, Japan, in its usual capacity of con-
trolling airway traffic in ths Toxyo area, had under control four aircraft,
Two aireraft were inbound from tha South and under control of one of tna
radar controllars. ‘the obher controllar had a C-+\7 inbound from Diazo into
facnhikawa via aimeageye homer with an estirate of over Kumazaya at 16201, at
6,000 ft. He also had a R-50 which had taken off from Yokota at 16131, on

a tactical round robin, which aE ht bed Xumagaya north bound at 16201. Since |
the controllar wished to expedi the climo of ths 5-50, which was now
restricted to 5,0CO ft due to ts C~-1;7 traffic, he switched to short ranges

Bags |

n hig >PT and moved his off-centearad PPT position, which had been at the
360° position looking to the South, to the 150° nosition. At this setting
he Was surveilling the sector to the north-northwest for a ranzs of adproxi-
mately 32 milas. A% about this tima tha C-4.7 nad been cleared to contact
Tachikawa GCA having arrived over Kumagaya at 1618I. At 160° position the
controllsr observed what he took to be initially four aircraft due North of
Johngon near thea verinohery of the scone, To gst a be tter look at these
targets he moved the off-centered position to the 1¢0° seat bite so that he
wags looking at the targets. He now observed what ha believed to t a total
of gixtaan targets in six formations. Thsir position was aporoximately due
North of Johnson and at rangea from 20 to 23 miles. These tarzets anveared
to him to be moving in a southeasterly direction. As the controller obser-
ved the targets moving anparently in a southeasterly direction, he off=
cantered to the 220° position. He then called Butterfly, the ii/GCI Site
located on the Chiba Paninagula, as showm on Inclosurs 1, to ascertain, their
knowledes of these targets in this area. The controller as’ timated that the
tarests movad from 360° to 020° in the tan minute neriod of from 1621T to
1631Tf on an avoroximata heading of 15°. As a rasult of the call to Butter=
fly, through ADCC at Johnson, an F-G6D was scramblad from Yokota Air: Base.
At. anoproximately this same time the Tokyo RATCC controller observed tha:

2

a

; «
Ee dl ban ee ets eel ke ee he ene ete

‘
eae eee Oe ie eee ee Ve ae

tare3%a moving across the scoos in an erratic mobion leaving a trace similar

to that hs had odservad from jet type aircrart,. atterfly was again notified
‘ f this ooservation, By 15551 thse motion of what the here shige believasd to
r ba these same targets had nearly ceased motion. Tha motion way now so small |. }
that movement could only be cetectad OY covering ths Peat 3 with erease wn- ‘{
cil and odsarvinz onem ag they oecame visidls again, Upon sevieek = of the
Guty officer on duty at tha site, from an adjacent room, thatarzgats had
assumed a static position, the other controller on duty did not hava a chance ;

an

a set up Ais acops to observa thease tarsets to the North, sinca he mwas rada
controlling other traffic to the South usinz off-centered °PI at the 360° |
position and looking only to the South. No one else at Tokyo RAICC made
oosarvation of these tarrets while in motion. Com eh
a

munications with Pat tarr
during this period of time indicated that they h n

dno targets in this aay

ee ee watt a wo oer

a ———— _ —
NOTE; THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL Lio asak OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE A\ thal 1 i ee ;
3) AND 22. ASAMENOED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVEL ATIONAGR Yo GOMTONTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON 15 PROHIBITED BY LAW

Iv MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER SHAN © WEFED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF

INTELLIGENCE, USAF. if ie a vers | ;
“ oF ¥ »

ae  —
at

See sho
Y . (or

po RSTn Yo U. 8. GOverAWwORT cetntiecee © 4

|

he

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]
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;
a GCL that he was claared to fire, He maintained this 5 mile ranga

Ar FORM 112—PART

APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948

(CLASSIFICATION)

AJR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

——- —_—_————

FHOM Clgtncy) REPORT NO,

DI FEAF, ATLO 21-55 | acca 3 .

-_— — — - - — ee ~e - ———EE 2 =

4. A t, Yokota Air Dey 33 the + % is b, 4d Ve) eoram! yy) 27 / ~“6f) wag r) 7, behale leas '. ag to ain

~~»
#

. "

xnowleadze of his observations. «he oilot, lst Lt. &. +. Narrick, AO 592196 57, 29FLS

the scramble sede arrived at ascroximately 1632r. he

aa on Five minuteasrlert wren ,
wag alrborns ab anoroximately 16361 and immediately want under control of Pubterfly,

rT control. Hs was givan a vector of 350? at "anzals" 10, and, was told thas
yo "adar had 16 Pozies in the area,

o ae F + - ~~ mA § 2 > “4 te % ‘ . 3. ane . ao? * 7
inca’ Sutterfly was not painting thess targets they merely ntrolled
= . 7? . — —— ~ — - » | ~e, 5 j ' a on 2
29 area. He was further vectored 270”, than 150
lin . CaAAartT ~ ~ = _- \ ; ~~ Z
ALAL “Ze SNOPULY KB Va 2UINLH wis
~
,

AONYA 445 we Ff Ly , i=
CA J PS Sed Fucked ,a J Uria VYbebe vf

.

vim througa a searca of ¢
> ,. . os " + " a , .

and than turned again on a northerly hea
% ; ‘ . =, 2 4 } * ws > ‘% .

this northerly heading hs ovicked up 2 rad.

4
o'clock his cosition. Hs turned into these

*
,
“—
-—~
oe
 ]

3 and lost them in the
ub avain and had ona Pox
ON. m3 maneuv red

turne Azter making about a l5°? turn he rolled «
t anoroximately 22 miles at tha 1159 o'clock posi

g tarzgat and cot the targat ir the 12 eet ele)
and they asked him for identification run. At this tims he had an overe
in af

j
gition. ite resorted to

.

a
+
wu
‘

sé

»
A ri

OC

——-

wy

5 ~
3 indication of from 100 to 175 knots. ie waa

4

bay
bore indicating adout .&5
Hlock=-on" and closad down to 6 miles where he switched scopas and kept

. wr) 4, a g P + + er . | +*60 ~ {2
closing. At 21/2 to 3 miles range his 20 seconds to go cirelsa bean
’

3
teryvurner at full

a 4 e “Le - .* ‘ — * 4 ae ——e .
- .cO Mach. At 15 miles ha got an indication of

ay
,

“~ * s* . ‘ . .
collsog8 around the target. Since hia rate of overtaks was relatively high
- “ - * % ¥ Se en , ‘a - «© ~- “*) } »’ i 4. A, »¥ mr c . 9
he came back out of afterburner. the target came back through 20 seconds

to rO rr) *4 r? ara I 4 3 rn! a 0 oe (323 io Pyom | O33 - 4 oF ee | ov rmrink 2 Py a
; - - s+ - > _ - . 7 - ’ * > ~ a - > »
’

-25, than to a -50. As ha saw a -25 ha vant back into afterburnar operation

+. "> wet

and managed to hold about 2 -50 as the tarzes want cut to about 7 miles and
7 * Lt. > *. .. | % 4 te L2 ? oma
mada a vort turn. He followed tha tarest through this turn, still in trail,

+ ..¥ S 1 Ue, 4
n to tne starboard, saek

’ - Pn te Lv. ome 2} tos
ven Sj jortly - arte that MTOULZA at “4 LuTr
4 x > > 4° ~od
lL of this tima he had been flying
4 +
a

. ,
uO | ann
> - iy

b 10, 00¢
arzet waa climbing on his oresenta-
hy

.

ing of annroximately 020° - a
ft. He then ane an incication that

~~
ee

%

+ion and closed ranca to asout 5 milas. By this tine hea was notilied by

to about 16,000 rt. He then realized that ha had overshot a little and that
thea Pozie was at abdout 15,000 °t so he began a latdom again still in after-
burner. At the 15,000 ft level, ha fxalg that the Bogis levalad off
bagan to expand range = he want back to his 50 mile scones aa the raneve
of the Hogie expandad through 7 - & then 9 miles. Yinca ha waa at 1é
ft he began a shallow diva, [fn this diva his speed naturally increased — ha
vant through wing roll at about .¢! then saw .97 and .93. During thi

_

P i
reaag and gradually vent over to the 1030
ura indication of nazativa 200 knots.

,

the rate of closure continued to d
? 3
y thereafter OCI fave nim a vector back

}
2¢
ogition with a negativs rata of cl
At 15 milas ha croxa lock and short
to home station at Yor«ota.

tha two tarzets which he picked up intti: ra in his oointon nornal
radar tarests. thesa t ni "2 wna ones thirty position
and were similar in apogarance to two aircraft in formation. tha returna of |
thase two blios were as large as, or larsar than, tha raturn from another
SOD. They zara sharply defined and aoneared to bs normal radar returm. Eis
impression was that his radar equinment was very good witha clear (milxy)
scopes ab snort ranz933 and normal grovwnd return showing ud at naar maxinun

At the tima he was within minimem range ha feels that he was within

,

>.
ximately 2 1/2 milas and had about 15 saconds

oA oC
esis

»

. . a) , frre. :
A @) "Oo F.@) ae ras \ Lng
a

e) > be Pas

*- O ®

is
. t - ie oO. . — - ” ae hl a & . > .
wag the time he came out of aftarburmer and inmediabaly his targets voazan to
expand range.) Sinee he was trying to establish identification on this
.. % A TL = i a ee a ds wil , LN ‘ 1 os we 7
tarces he didn't want his rata of closura to ne sreater tha 10) ts. ’
’ . aa me Z on “~ == 7 ‘ 2 . . oo a7 . a . a a
wag in solid weather from 1100 (t until ha vent throuzh 1100 ft on landing.
Mha pilot balioves that ths tarzet which he fina Liv Siexad ont na ive chase
was deftnitaly one of the tarrets that ha had vicked un while saarchinz. Tha
a + _ a : : ‘* ~ ee) s : ‘ > .
_-—-——So— —_ —_— —_————
ITE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL NITHIN THE MEANING OF THF ESPIONAGE ACT,
3). AND 32, AS AMENDED, 115 TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON 15 PROMISITED |
IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR
if LL fat E, USAF.
N 7 & ft % is vw. &.'4 Per etal Me corre

NCLASSIFIED
Af FORM 112—PART 1 a reer
APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
FROM (Agency) REPORT NO,
ln
DI PIAS, ATLO — ERe2155 PAGE h OF 3 PAGES

-_ —s- — _- — — — _

~< oe - _ ——— —— —

targat had changed azimuth as he tuyned into it, changed ranvze and his presentation
reacted normally to that he has observed on occasions when he has worked vractice
no ke other "Dogs", During the entire intercant ha was in contact with
Sterfly to ascertain that they watched terrain clearancs for him since he knew

ha was flying tn an area with mountains which reached close to his altitude. Hs
Wes continually transmitting to Butterfly information about actions of the Pogia -
the fact that he had lLock-on - was within 20 saconds to go to Mrs, etc. All comu-
nications with butterfly vare on UHF channel 5 frequency. He cm taken off on
channel 2 =- switched to channel 10 =- then all control was exacutead utilizing channel
5» His Ivf transvonder was on Mods 2 throughout the encounter, Kithough k a could
not concentrate on navigation, since he was preoccupied with other duties, ha felt
that his position was generally north and northeast of Yokota area and in the vicinit
of Uikko,. THa estimate of time thronghout the encounter was not more tnan 15 minutes
nrobably from 10 to 15 minutes. the elapsed tima from takeoff until the vickup of
h3 two tarzets was aoproximately 15 minutes. The vnilot feels that the only thing
hat was excesobional about thea sncouhter was the rate of negative closure. fhe rata
f negative closure he described as similar to that experianced when flying in trail
with another 6) and have him go into afterburner operation while you ars sitting
flatfooted at low Mach not expecting it. He was, of course, indieating eY7 on this
ce

30:

.
*
”
v
b
o

occasion. At the time of breakoff he was still holding tha target at 1200 o'clock
position under the "jiszla band”,

COMMSNTS of tha Preparing Officsr:

i. The radar which made the observations, as mentioned before, is a CPS5-1,
and is used primarily for airway traffic control in the Tokyo area. In their presen
operation they have two "PPI" scopes in tha operations room both of which are nor-
mally utilized in the off-centered position at 360° scanning to the South. An "A"
scope is utilized for tast and calibration and is located in an adjacent room.

-
= _.to-we—202 cen

5e Tha controllers working thesa scopes in normal operations are controlling
traffic South of the radar location and ara not familiar with the normal ground
veturm in the areas other than those normally viewsd to the South.

6. Thea controller on duty is a 5-leval airman who is OJT for 7-level. Hea has
twenty months excerisnce in traffic control work and is familiar with the radar
control of aircraft at this location. Hs: is familiar with normal radar returns
(aireraft targets) and with the normal ground returns South of the Johnson arsa,
howaver, ha as well ae tha other controllers, was wfamiliar with the normal zround
raturn pattarna thronghout 350° fromthe site.

7. ‘tha ground raturn to the Northesast from Johnson 13-8xceeding sharp and
more hignly dafined than the sround return normally associated with this tyne radar

2UUTN >

& The sconve which the controller was using at the time of the incidant was
oparating normally and used for control immediately prior to and after the incidant,.

As tha time of tne incidents another controller had kmowm aircraft under pogsitivsa
control to the Southe

9 The maintenance NCOIC conductad the pravaring officer through the site on
a check of the facility. he, the NCOIC, is very familiar with the CPS-1 system
and this particular installation. Ha is familiar with the permanent echo patter
throughout 360° and with the permanant echo which he uses for antenna alignment
and functional check of this installation, A satup of the conditions under which
the cbhservations wera made by the controller was made. Ths parmansnt echoas to th

’

northeast’ of the sita are comolately off tha scone at the 160° and 190° off-centarnd

KOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL I Be cB Hon STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THe ESPIONAGE ACT, OU SC -
31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF I?9{COMPENTS IN TANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIRITED BY LAW,
iy MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER Thi tee TSG Si —_ AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF

INPELLIGENCE, USAF, Be ee ae
a" > bee she oe

‘s ‘ i *
. ~ “a .
»} me * ’ Sows

i
'
+
(CLA Sich ate? 14- SSA 1 FF OU © OO ENeS ENT POdRtISE Merce MF

- ee rs ee ee ew en ee - — a

cis -)
‘af FORM 112—PART 1 (CLASSIFICATION) _
APPROVED 1 JUNE 19438
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
FROM (Ayeney) REPORT NO,
. : os f
PR PLAS, A TLO R= etic PAGE 5 OF ca? PAGES

szitions. At the 220° vosition tha varmanent echoes to tha Northeast ara sharply
ned. ‘The only maintenance vroblem realized in the naar cast has been a vreakdowm
sea by the drooping down and consequent mangling of the antenna s2layn drive -3ars,
ince thig breaxdown the system has bean operating on the 1 to 1 salsyn withont j6-1

ratio tio in batween the antenna and the PPL indicstcrs,. Jarky oresentation hag ar
svidenced during some conditions, hovaver, low winds at the tire of the visit caused |
no noticabdla oscillation. |
190, No lovical axdlanation for the vossible misorientation of tha vresented |
\formation on the PPl in use can ba found, |
ll. The controllsr do2s not now recall whether or not he evar did 522 slither
ha C-l7 or the R50 sincs his attention was distracted by the presenca of thea |
bai Paty tarve ts,
12, The pilot of the *-S4D has avproximately 565 hours total tire with 100 hours
in the -S6D and asoroximataly 120 hours in the F#6 74 F, He has a total of 15 hours
of actual weathe er time.

Le zue dilots rough astimate of his pogition and the time of the actual Shgage-
ment were excellent in- view of ths fact that he was very busy. ‘for instance, his
estimate of tine vas aporoxinately 15 minutes for the enzagement, GSCI records show a

7
tina of Ly minntes,..

wi. As soon as the aircraft was on the ground the NCOTIC of redar maintenance i
and the Hughes technical’ reorssentativea made a check of the complete firs control. A
system. The system was’ found to be operating’ normally in all respects with tha
axeception of the closing rate indic-tion which was not zeroed. This conditiorm would. 1
induca an error wnhich-would give a plus 30 knot error in closing spead,. oth arwise no 4
other system crror would be induced, nie a

15. The technical representative and the Operations Officer of the 59th souadron
wera imoreased that tha pilot was familiar with tha 7-86N fire control system, anc
that the indications which ha described wore, az wall ss can now ba datermined, normal
radar functioning... — yi

16. The svifch in rangs mentloned in varagranoh #3 of thts renort is a modifica-
tion nada in this. theater to the basic firs control system. ‘hig modification was
made to facilitate identification run3 from astern. iffactivaly, tnis modification
maraly blows u2 the last six miles of rangs over the entire scons 90 that short ranges

below aix miles, can be reac mora accurately for this idantif£fication type pass.

Ca

17. Inclosures fl, 2, 3, i and 5 were preoared by Toxyo Weather Central, 1s
in ‘hd

jaather Wing and cover tha waather situation effecting tha area. Inclosura ¢5, show-
inz tha synoptic situation irdicates a pronounced temperature Inversion from tha

$,000 to the 10,000 ft lsevals,

“

15. At ths time the F-S6D was in the air thers were no known friendly aircrart
an tha area from which he received a return, end an onerational check eliminated the

oagaibiliity that the identified targat was a friendly atreraft.
\

19. No conclusion can tw rsachad from this individual incidant as to what the
radar target or targets could hava been. It is exceadingly difficult to astabdlish
2 tia in between the ground radar observations and the obsarvations of the pilot of
the airnvorne nireraft.

NOTE; THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEER OL Gas UNITCO STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THe ESPIONAGE ACT, SOULS |

31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION ORAS CONTE? ‘fs IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON (1S PROMIRITEN Dr LAW.
If MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY CHER GHAMUMITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCLPI BY PERMISSION OF Tile DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE, USAF. LALO eRe a

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